






Title of Document:  “MEDIA PRIMARIES: THE ROLE OF 
NEWSWORTHINESS VALUES IN SHAPING 
ISSUE COVERAGE IN PRESIDENTIAL 
PRIMARIES.” 
 Zachary A. Scott, PhD., 2020 
Directed By: Professor David Karol, Department of Government 
and Politics 
 
Presidential primary candidates vie for the attention of voters by emphasizing specific 
issue stances or prioritizations. Yet not all candidates get their messages across. Why does 
the media follow the candidate’s agenda in some cases but not others? 
I answer this question by noting the role professional values play in journalists’ 
evaluations of “newsworthiness” and the important political ramifications those professional 
values have. Journalists prefer news stories that feature conflict, human-interest components, 
are timely, and are simple. I argue that there may be ways candidates can cue these values via 
their rhetoric and that the structure of primaries may affect how journalists apply these values 
when crafting coverage. I further argue that media outlets should differ in how strongly they 
prioritize these values. Finally, I argue that the media ignoring a candidate’s message should 
affect how voters evaluate candidates and how well voters are able to “correctly” vote. 
I show that the amount of anger language and candidate-based appeal rhetoric are 
positively correlated with the level of similarity between a candidate’s and the media’s 
agendas. I also show that expanding primary fields, where the contextual simplicity of the 
race is shrinking, are correlated with reductions in agenda similarity between candidates and 
the media. I also show that these effects are not homogenous across media outlets. 
Newspapers react more strongly to anger in candidate messages than TV news while news 
outlets with tighter space constraints are more responsive to declines in contextual simplicity. 
To assess the ramifications of these findings on political behavior I designed a laboratory 
experiment to test the effects of candidate-media agenda similarity on candidate evaluations 
and “correct” voting behavior. Subjects exposed to the low convergence treatment displayed 
higher rates of incorrect voting behavior. 
Collectively, these findings improve our understanding of the political repercussions 
of journalism’s professional values and provide insights into an oft-overlooked level of 
election. They also illustrate the normatively undesirable effects of low convergence. I close 
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Chapter 1: The Role of Journalists in Media-Centric Primaries 
 
As unconventional as the 2016 primaries were in some notable regards, they were 
remarkably similar to preceding election cycles in the candidates’ determination to shape 
media narratives. It’s not hard to see why. Media coverage has long been thought 
essential to succeeding in any national election. But while candidates may have 
preferences for what the media should do, the media is an independent institutional 
capable of playing by its own rules (Cook 1998, Sparrow 1999, 2006, Zaller 1999). But 
these rules do not result in absolute, deterministic outcomes. Sometimes the media 
follows along with what one candidate would prefer their coverage say but not another. 
There are numerous examples. The eventual Republican nominee, Donald Trump, 
campaigned extensively on issues of immigration and trade and these messages certainly 
permeated media coverage. Potential voters who interacted with the campaign primarily 
via the media likely got that message. But one of Trump’s rivals and the one-time 
frontrunner, Jeb Bush, had a different experience. While Bush gave speeches discussing 
macroeconomic trends, foreign policy, and healthcare, the media consistently questioned 
his previous stances on immigration and education, specifically support for Common 
Core. 
Ohio Governor John Kasich and Texas Governor Rick Perry both campaigned 
extensively on economic issues and appeals to their executive career accomplishments. 
For the former, that message eventually got through and he was able to compete well into 
the primary cycle. For the latter, the media instead talked about an impending lawsuit in 




Among the Democrats, a similar story played out. The frontrunner and eventual 
nominee Hillary Clinton began her campaign talking about the need for education reform. 
Her first campaign events were roundtables at community colleges in Iowa. Her rival, 
Bernie Sanders, spoke primarily of economic populism. His message got across while 
Clinton’s was subsumed in coverage of Benghazi hearings and stops at Chipotle.  
Why does the media pick up the messages of some candidates but not others? Is it 
that the media just finds some topics inherently more interesting? That would not seem to 
be the case. The media talked about education with regards to Jeb Bush, who was not 
campaigning on that issue, but not with regards to Hillary Clinton, who was initially 
making that a cornerstone of her platform.  
Is the media biased against one party or another? If that were so, then there would 
not be situations where the media is following the agendas of some Republicans 
(Democrats) but not others, as described above. 
Does the media just gravitate toward scandal? While that might explain the 
extensive coverage of Benghazi and email servers for Hillary Clinton and the lawsuit for 
Rick Perry, Donald Trump was constantly surrounded by scandals or gaffes but still got 
his message through among the negative coverage (Patterson 2016). Scandal coverage 
does not seem to erase the possibility of agenda permeation.  
Does the media focus on issues that divide the parties? While Trump’s rhetoric on 
immigration may have been particularly extreme, it was not that out of step with many of 
his rivals for the nomination. And this would not explain why John Kasich got his 
economic message through but Rick Perry didn’t. 
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Does the media just follow the agenda of the frontrunner? Once again, this does 
not comport with the above examples. Jeb Bush was the frontrunner early on and could 
not drive coverage. And Hillary Clinton was the frontrunner throughout and faced a 
similar limitation. 
Does the media follow the agendas of insurgents, then? While that might explain 
the success in messaging that Trump and Sanders had, it does not match with the 
messaging success of establishment exemplar John Kasich.  
None of these potential explanations seem to fit the evidence all that well. In this 
dissertation, I will lay out and test a theory that does. Doing so involves understanding 
campaign media coverage from the perspective of the journalist on the trail. What do they 
see and hear? How do they evaluate it? What about a candidate’s message do they see as 
newsworthy? 
Doing so reveals a series of newsworthiness values that all journalists are taught 
and utilize and a particular context in which a subset of these journalists will apply these 
values. These values include preferences for content that involves conflict, possesses a 
human-interest angle, is simple, and is timely. In practice, this means that the media 
followed Trump’s message because it was angry and contained lots of attacks (high 
conflict), was framed largely around his own personal brand (high human interest), and 
was easy to comprehend and explain (high simplicity). The media ignored Jeb’s message 
because it did not appeal to those values, partially because Jeb was trying to downplay his 
connections to the unpopular presidency of his brother (low human interest). The media 
followed Kasich’s economic message because it was framed from his blue-collar 
perspective (high human interest) while ignoring Perry’s economic message because it 
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discussed mostly abstract macroeconomic trends (low human interest and simplicity). 
The media ignored Hillary’s education agenda because it was intentionally crafted to 
avoid conflict with the accomplishments of the Obama administration (low conflict) and 
was disconnected from her own interactions with the American education system (low 
human interest). Conversely, the media followed Bernie Sanders’s economic populist 
message because it featured attacks and anger aimed at economic elites like the “big 
banks” and the “1%” (high conflict).  
Appreciating these values can help explain who gets their messages across in 
primaries and who doesn’t. This is important not only because primaries, like presidential 
general elections, are contests where candidates compete for voter attention primarily 
through the media (Cushion and Thomas 2018) but also because primaries feature a set of 
rules that create circumstances that affect how journalists assess newsworthiness values. 
The context in which a newsworthiness value is applied is crucial for its interpretation 
and primaries are a distinct context because of the rules in place (Norrander 2010). For 
example, a reporter covering a natural disaster and one covering a primary would both 
agree that conflict is an important newsworthiness value. For the former, conflict in 
context likely means who was physically, mentally, financially, or emotionally harmed 
and in what capacity. For the latter, conflict in context will be most likely found in 
expressions of anger since there is little risk of physical confrontations and the 
multicandidate and intraparty nature of the race limits the strategic utility of other, more 
direct expressions of conflict (more on that in the following chapter).  
An understanding of these values is also important because of their broader 
implications for electoral politics more generally. Given the intraparty and multicandidate 
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nature of primaries, the ability to successfully convey a message through the media that 
highlights specific issue positions and/or prioritizations is a crucial element of 
differentiating oneself from the competition. Given the serial nature of presidential 
primaries, being able to consistently do so is similarly essential as not all voters will be 
paying attention at one time. Furthermore, primaries structure choice for general elections 
and broader opinions of the political parties, meaning the implications that primaries have 
do not end at the convention. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I explain in greater depth the features of primary 
campaigns and the implications of those features on the communication environment. I 
then discuss previous research on candidate and media messaging in primaries and 
compare with studies of general elections. In doing so I seek to situate this dissertation 
among other studies of primaries and show what the novel contribution I am making is to 
this literature on campaigns and elections. I then conclude with a short outline of the 
plans for the remainder of the dissertation. 
Rules of the Primary 
 
Presidential primaries are radically different from general elections in a number of 
key respects (Kendall 2000). As one cartoonist put it, “Imagine a sport where you spend 
1 year [hopping] on one leg and not using the other, then suddenly having to run a 
marathon.1” Table 1.1 provides a list of six of the biggest differences between primaries 
and general elections. It also contains a short description of how this difference 





strategic content choices. This description is not meant to be exhaustive but to make 
salient an important point: Because primaries feature such different rules, they create 
radically different communication environments than other types of campaigns. 
Table 1.1: Distinctive Features of Presidential Primaries and Effects on Candidates 
and Media 
Feature of Primaries Effect on Candidates Effect on Media 
Multicandidate Need to differentiate from 
others, diversify agenda 
Cannot solely rely on both-
sides version of objectivity 
Intraparty Greater emphasis on 
persuasion 
Must provide more context 




Need to differentiate from 
others 
Must seek out nuanced 
sources of distinction 
Different electorate (size, 
interest, demographics) 
Need to target messages 
within broader population 
Tradeoff between 
appealing to interested 
audience and appealing to 
general audience  
Serial Need to sustain message; 
target to different regional 
constituencies 
Established, defined steps 
to process can peg stories 
to 
Long Need to sustain message Avoid repetition of 
storylines, seek out timely 
stories 
 
Presidential primaries are multicandidate affairs. The exact number of candidates 
can vary dramatically throughout and across primaries. At the low end, the 2000 
Democratic primary consisted of only two candidates. At the high end, the 2016 
Republican primary featured 17 notable candidates and the 2020 Democratic primary 
featured as many as 28 (depending on who is counted as “major” or “notable”). From the 
perspective of the candidate, this can make identifying a distinctive appeal difficult. 
Defining what sets you apart from the others can be tricky when there are so many others 
for comparison. From the perspective of the media, this can make the both-sidesism that 
has come to define journalistic approaches to objectivity (e.g. Bennett 1990) a difficult 
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proposition. There may not always be only two sides to a story when there are so many 
candidates willing to offer a perspective. 
Primaries are also intraparty contests. For candidates, this can mean that voters 
committed to other candidates are more persuadable than those in general elections as 
they do not need to be convinced to overcome the psychological pull of their partisan 
identity (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954, Campbell et al. 1960, Lewis-Beck et al. 
2008). For the media, this requires giving context on factions within parties – for example 
the religious right and business interests for the Republicans or pro-choice organizations 
and organized labor for Democrats – as these may be important fault lines within the 
race.  
The candidates competing in presidential primaries are typically more similar than 
they are in other races. Many agree on most of the important issues, in principle if not 
entirely in practice. This once again leads candidates to an emphasis on differentiation. 
For the media, they must seek out nuanced sources of distinction to tell the candidates 
apart.  
The electorate itself tends to be dramatically different in primaries. A much 
smaller percentage of the population is particularly interested in politics enough to want 
to participate in such convoluted elections (Geer 1988, Kaufman, Gimpel, and Hoffman 
2003, Norrander 2010). For candidates, this means targeting messages more precisely to 
those who are likely to actually participate in the primary process is necessary. For the 
media, this creates a tradeoff. Providing content to this subsection of voters may mean 
pushing content that is uninteresting to a general audience. 
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Presidential primaries occur serially rather than in one big national election. For 
candidates, this means that messages must be sustained over time. After all, voters may 
not be paying attention at the same time. Those in the early states may be locked in, but 
the voters in states on the first Super Tuesday have weeks to go before they need to make 
any decision. Getting a message out early isn’t enough to guarantee support in later races. 
In addition, this invites some message tailoring by region: signaling policies about 
ethanol subsidies when campaigning in Iowa and federal funding for high-speed rails 
once the race shifts to California. For the media, this serial nature creates a defined set of 
steps that the primary process will take. This is useful for setting scheduled news events 
that allow some preplanning as to the form coverage will take. 
Finally, primaries are much longer than general elections. The time from the 
convention to Election Day tends to be 3-4 months. The earliest candidates typically 
jump in 6-12 months before the first in an extended concatenation of caucuses and 
primaries. Once again, this highlights a need for sustained messaging from candidates. 
For the news media, it can stress the value of timeliness. The longer the primary goes on, 
the less novel a candidate can become.  
It should be clear from this discussion that presidential primary contests are 
dramatically different from presidential general elections. As both the presidential 
primaries and general elections are the only contests carried out nationally, this makes 
them a unique campaign environment within the American political context. 
Furthermore, as this discussion highlights, the differences between primaries and general 
elections in terms of formal rules and structure can, and likely do, alter the strategic 
messaging calculations of both candidates and the media. Because no other political 
9 
 
context is as individually driven as campaigns, this further makes primaries a unique 
communication environment within the American political context. And because 
primaries fundamentally shape the electoral coalitions, common perceptions of political 
parties, and options in general elections, they are an important communication 
environment as well.  
Studies of Primaries and Media 
 
With these important points established, I now turn to a discussion of what we 
currently know about communication in presidential primaries so as to discuss how this 
dissertation pushes forward the discipline’s collective knowledge. Within political 
science, the most prominent work has studied the quantity of media coverage. Some have 
looked at quantity measures as independent variables to explain who wins (Bartels 1988, 
Cohen et al. 2008) and who loses (Haynes et al. 2004) in primaries while others have 
looked at quantity of coverage as a dependent variable, theorizing on how the media 
decides who to cover (Haynes and Murray 1998, Sides, Tessler, and Vavreck 2018, Sides 
and Vavreck 2013). These studies do not tell us much on what the media talks about, 
however. 
Communication scholars have studied candidate messaging and media content at 
this more granular level, but much of it has been looking at the two categories separately 
rather than the relationship between them. Scholars of candidate rhetoric, especially those 
working from the functional theory tradition, have collected candidate messages in 
various mediums including campaign ads (Benoit and Rill 2012, Kaid 1994, 1998, Kaid 
and Ballotti 1991, Payne, Marlier, and Baukus 1989, West 2010), debates (Glantz, 
Benoit, and Airne 2013), press releases (Cho and Benoit 2005, Haynes, Flowers, and 
10 
 
Gurian 2002), and mailers (Benoit 2007). Others have taken larger collections of 
campaign text and checked for how comparable the messaging is across multiple 
mediums (Benoit et al. 2011). But studying solely candidate messages does not tell us 
how the media decides what topics to emphasize. 
A similar limitation is present among studies of mass media content in 
presidential primaries. In-depth examinations of media content in isolation from the 
candidate messages that seek to drive it cannot illuminate the relationship between the 
two. As such, while content analysis of various newspaper and network television 
transcripts (Benoit, Hansen, and Stein 2004, Brady 1989, Farnsworth and Lichter 2003, 
Johnson 1993, Just et al. 1996, King 1990, Lichter and Smith 1996, Robinson and 
Sheehan 1983, Steger, 1999) are descriptively interesting, they do not shed much light on 
the central question in this dissertation. 
There are only a handful of studies that do make this comparison (Conway et al. 
2015, Conway-Silva et al. 2018, Flowers, Haynes, and Crespin 2003, Kendall 1993, 
2000, Tedesco 2001, 2005, Vinson and Moore 2007). These studies provide great insight 
but generally don’t directly lay out a theoretical structure for why some candidates 
succeed at driving media narratives while others fail. Instead, most are descriptive and 
note that there do tend to be differences between the issues candidates discuss and those 
the media emphasize, without explaining why these differences arise. As such, this 
important question is not currently answered within the literature. 
Comparison to Studies of General Elections and Media 
 
Scholars studying presidential general elections have posed this question, 
however (Ku, Kaid, and Pfau 2003). Some have found that the media is generally on a 
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similar page as the candidates (Dalton et al. 1998, Stempel and Windhauser 1991). Others 
argue that there are differences and that those gaps can be politically meaningful (Hart 
2000, Patterson 1980, 1994, 2016). Many of these studies are either primarily descriptive 
or structural equation model tests of the reciprocal influence between candidates and 
media. But others have incorporated novel theories as well. Hayes (2010) notes the role 
of competitiveness and time in moderating the relationship between candidate messaging 
and media coverage in presidential general elections. And Vavreck (2009) looks at the 
role of external economic conditions in shaping the strategic messaging choices of 
general election candidates, when the candidates advantaged by favorable economic 
conditions seek to keep the media attention on that subject, and when the candidates who 
do not benefit from the strength of the economy are able to raise insurgent issues via the 
mass media. 
These studies highlight the importance of questioning the relationship between 
candidate messages and media coverage. But because primaries are so radically different 
from general elections in ways that fundamentally alter the political and communication 
environments, the theories and results they offer cannot be neatly generalized to this 
different level. As such, there remains an important question about primaries – why does 
the media follow the agendas of candidates in some instances but not in others? – that is 
not currently addressed in the existing literature and cannot be answered by looking at 
similar literatures on different election circumstances. 
Outline of Dissertation 
 
This dissertation seeks to answer this important question by noting the vital role 
newsworthiness values play in structuring the decisions journalists make when covering 
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campaigns. Chapter 2 expounds on this point by situating theories of professional norms, 
from which theories of newsworthiness values stem, among other theories of news 
creation forces that comprise the media’s institutional “logic” (Altheide 2004, 2013, Asp 
2014). Chapter 2 then offers a novel theoretical contribution: Newsworthiness values are 
general principles to journalists but are only meaningful when defined with a particular 
context. The chapter ends by explaining how the political context that primary elections 
create, including the unique features described above, can be defined from the 
perspective of a journalist covering a campaign to derive testable hypotheses about how 
newsworthiness values shape coverage in presidential primaries. 
Chapter 3 lays out the data and methods that will be used to test these hypotheses. 
This dissertation utilizes a multi-method approach, but the primary methods involve 
using text as data. The chapter outlines how the corpora were gathered and processed 
using a combination of human-coded content analysis, dictionary-based text analysis, and 
unsupervised topic modeling and to what end. It also describes the structure of the 
experiment that is employed for one of the empirical chapters. 
Chapters 4-7 are the empirical chapters. Chapter 4 tests the theory as it applies to 
candidate-level variation in newsworthiness values. Chapter 5 tests the theory as it 
applies to variation created directly from the multicandidate, long, and serial nature of 
primaries. Chapter 6 tests how the emphasis of newsworthiness values according to the 
medium in which specific media outlets operate. It is useful for understanding why the 
media values certain traits as newsworthy. And Chapter 7 tests the implications of the 
findings from the preceding three chapters on evaluations of candidates, political 
behavior, and normatively desirable “correct” voting actions. 
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The dissertation concludes with Chapter 8, which summarizes the central results, 
expounds on the normative implications of the role of newsworthiness values in 
presidential primary coverage, and offers suggestions on how the parties and the media 
can create a presidential primary process that will lead to the selection of more 

























Chapter 2: The Contextual Application of Newsworthiness Values  
 
A journalist on the primary trail, like a journalist covering any beat, encounters a 
slew of information. She must then sift through to make the “news” version of the 
campaign. Among the information the journalist encounters there is likely to be a 
candidate’s preferred message: the candidate’s agenda. In some cases what the journalist 
reports, which will go on to be part of the media’s agenda, will closely resemble the 
candidate’s agenda. At other times the candidate and media agendas will be radically 
different, depicting two different versions of the campaign’s message or narrative. 
Understanding what leads to this difference involves understanding the decision-making 
process of that journalist. As she sits down to create the news, what is she going to be 
considering? 
This chapter will argue that a core consideration for this intrepid reporter is a set 
of professional norms called newsworthiness values. These newsworthiness values serve 
as guidelines for converting the external world, candidate agendas included, into the 
media’s agenda. These values are important to the daily operation of the media as an 
institution. As such, they manifest significant political power, especially within the 
confines of a campaign where public opinion and behavior is so intimately intertwined. 
This only serves to make questions on the way these newsworthiness values operate and 
their malleability more significant. 
Mirror Theory v. New Institutionalism 
 
The power of the news is often tied to the ability of journalists to craft the image 
of the world their audience will ultimately hold. This serves as a baseline assumption, 
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well-rooted in empirical evidence, for popular (Lippmann 1997[1922]) and scholarly 
(Edelman 1988) critics of the media. Journalists will often defend themselves via 
references, in some capacity, to mirror theory. They will argue that they do not exercise 
any power of their own at all. Instead, they merely reflect the world as they encounter it 
to their audience. Or, as Gans (1979, p. 79) put it, “events determine story selection, with 
journalists simply holding a mirror to them and reflecting their image to the audience.” 
Mirror theory denies that the media is an institution. Instead, it posits a more 
agentic role for the media within the political sphere. This non-institutional assumption 
therefore puts it in line with a popular assumption made by scholars who utilize media 
reports as accurate descriptions of real-world events. But evidence comparing real-world 
war casualty data to media reports (Althaus et al. 2011), or economic data to media 
coverage (Soroka 2012), or crime data to media coverage (Graber 1984, Soroka 2014), or 
populations of opinion polls against those used by the media (Groeling 2008, Searless, 
Ginn, and Nickens 2016) suggests that the media is often unrepresentative of external 
events. More importantly, it is unrepresentative in systematic, institutional ways.2 This is 
important because while mirror theory suggests the media plays only a token role in 
crafting the image of the political world that exists for news consumers, empirical 
evidence suggests that the media is not quite so disorganized or powerless. 
Because of this empirical evidence with regards to the media’s political power 
and systematic nature, I align myself with the institutionalist perspective on the mass 
 
2 Mirror theory is also pragmatically unlikely. The real world contains a very large amount of potential 
news stories while the space or “newshole” available to journalists to report on them – be it column inches, 
minutes on a television news program, or hours in a day – is ultimately finite. Some things have to end up 
on the proverbial cutting room floor and those decisions are meaningful moments of non-arbitrary 
journalism decision making. 
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media (Cook 1998, Sparrow 1999, 2006). This theoretical tradition notes that because 
most media outlets appear to follow similar procedures and produce largely homogenous 
outputs (Lawrence 2006), the most apt conceptualization of the media is as a single 
institution where each media outlet comprises a separate actor (Strömbäch and Esser 
2014a). From a political science perspective, this institutional nature comes with two 
important caveats. First, the media is most accurately conceptualized as an institution that 
operates in the political realm, not necessarily as a political institution. As Benson (2006, 
p. 196, emphasis in original) put it, “Is journalism a political institution? Perhaps. But 
first and foremost it is a journalistic institution that refracts rather than simply reflects the 
play of external forces.” While the media interacts with political elites, covers politics, 
and shapes political attitudes its organizational structure is not designed to achieve purely 
political ends. Second, the media institution is a predominantly informal one. While all 
institutions are shaped by a combination of formal rules and informal norms, for the 
media the balance between the two is disproportionately shifted toward the latter.3 This 
helps explains why so many individuals who work in the journalism institution have such 
difficulty articulating the means by which the institution operates (Ryfe 2006). 
Combined, this apolitical and informalized nature contributes to the media’s operation in 
the modern political realm as an accidental political institution. 
 
3 A note on terminology: Many sociologists studying the media from a new institutionalist perspective refer 
to informalized standards and practice as “rules.” I subscribe to a more political science-oriented 
terminology where “rules” are formally stated and clearly enforceable, whereas informal practices are 
instead referred to as “norms.” The media institution does have formalized rules. This includes those that 
are externally imposed like public policy (Freedom of Information Acts, Shield Acts) and court decisions 
(The New York Times Co. v. Sullivan) and intrainstitutional (style guides, editorial chains of command). 
However, most decision making operates based on informalized procedures, which I will refer to 
exclusively as “norms.” 
17 
 
The daily operation of the media institution is affected by several different types 
of norms (Boydstun 2013). The precise number and categorization of these norms is a 
source of division within the political communication disciple to the point where there 
remains a diverse collection of organizational schemas and typologies on the subject 
(Bennett 1996, Kaplan 2006, Shoemaker and Reese 1996, Strömbäch and Esser 2014b). I 
will not pile on by devising a new typology here. That said, I discuss several of the most 
influential types of norms: economics, technology, professionalism, and individual 
preferences. Ultimately, this dissertation concerns the influence of professionalism 
norms, and more specifically a set of values that comprise a key element of these norms. 
But understanding professionalism relative to other influences is important for 
contextualizing the theoretical and empirical contributions of this dissertation, making 
such a discussion valuable. 
Economic Motivations 
 
Most media outlets in America are privately owned businesses and are therefore 
subject to the same profit-seeking motivations other businesses face. This subjects them 
to the same laws of supply and demand that any capitalist organization plays by.  
Scholars following in an economic tradition have produced work highlighting the effects 
these economic laws have on media content. 
From a demand-side perspective, this means tailoring media content to audience 
demands. This applies to both type of content (Hamilton 2004) and the ideological slant 
of content (Puglisi and Snyder 2015). Supply-side economics theorizes that media outlets 
should take the cost of producing news into consideration (Hamilton 2004). This means 
that even if the audience has a strong preference for investigative news content and a 
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slightly weaker appreciation for soft news, if the soft news is significantly cheaper to 
produce then media outlets may avoid meeting audience preferences to maximize profit.  
Others have noted that increased media mergers, both horizontally and vertically, 
leads to circumstances where media corporations might actually be financially benefited 
in the long-term by sacrificing short-term profits that could be had by sticking to supply- 
and demand-side economics (Gilens and Hertzman 1999). As media outlets become 
increasingly entangled in corporatist entities that would seek to maximize profits in other 
ventures, disregarding the profits reaped directly from media content for greater profits 
from those other entities becomes more palatable. 
Some posit that different ownership structures might be willing to moderate the 
influence of economic incentives by being more or less insistent on profit maximization. 
Dunaway (2008) shows that local media outlets owned by publicly traded media 
companies tended to provide more horserace news content, presumably because of 
audience demand for such content (Iyengar, Norpoth, and Hahn 2004), while media 
outlets that were owned by an individual or not publicly traded were more willing to 
deliver less popular, more politically divisive substantive content.4  
Technological Imperatives 
 
News production and content is often dramatically shaped by the state of 
technology of the time. In part, this stems from the economic motivations described 
above. Improvements to printing technology made it cheaper to produce newspapers, 
which in turn affects the cost of supplying news, for example. But technological 
 
4 This aligns with historical work on individual media magnates who have from time to time put profits 
aside in service of a perceived public good (Tifft and Jones 1999). 
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innovation can also provide opportunities to fundamentally alter the means of producing 
news beyond adjusting economic calculus. For example, Mutz (2015) argues that 
improvements to cameras contributed to the rise of political debate programs that rely on 
close-up shots to incite uncivil visuals. And Usher (2014) argues that the rise of digital 
media led The New York Times newsroom to adopt more interactive, participatory, and 
immediate forms of news. 
That said, others suggest that the role of technology on newsmaking is overstated. 
Hindman (2009) suggests that the internet has largely replicated the analog media 
environment. And studies of multiple types of media outlets suggest similar newsmaking 
principles at work (Druckman 2005, Hayes 2014). Still, while conventional wisdom hot 
takes that posit each technological change as a fundamental alteration to the preceding 
norms of the media institution clearly overstate the case, it remains a distinct possibility 
that changing mediums do indeed affect newsmaking principles. 
Individual Preferences 
 
A separate, more psychologically grounded literature on newsmaking influences 
begins with a seemingly mundane observation: journalists are human beings. As such, 
they are predictably subject to all the same phenomena that guide typical thought 
processes. Journalists, like everyone else, display an asymmetrical bias toward negative 
information, for example (Soroka 2014). Notably, here the force acting on the 
newsmaking process operates at the individual level. It is the individual who shapes the 
news to reflect their own subjective sense of what is interesting, in line with the natural 
outcomes of evolutionary biology. 
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The same pattern works for the foundational insights into political behavior as 
well. The same group-based thinking that dominates how American citizens think about 
politics (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954, Campbell et al. 1960, Lewis-Beck et al. 
2008) explain how journalists make assumptions when covering various political topics, 
whether they be racial (Gilens 1999), gendered (Heldman, Carroll, and Olson 2005, 
Niven and Zilber 2001), or ideological (Patterson and Donsbach 1996). The core insight 
here is the same as the one posited in the famous Mr. Gates study: The practice of 
journalism leaves significant wiggle room for individual decision-making influenced by 
subjective perspectives (White 1950). 
Professional Norms 
 
Finally, the disciplines of sociology and communications have provided another 
key insight: Journalism is a profession and therefore has created and employed a series of 
standards and practices used to define what journalism is and is not, should and should 
not be.  
Many of these standards and practices are not formalized, but they do carry 
informal benefits and sanctions. Following the rules of journalism can come with awards, 
professional prestige, and increased financial compensation. Breaking from the rules of 
journalism can come with professional ostracism and removal from the profession 
entirely. As such, these standards and practices can extend quite powerfully over 
individual journalists. 
The literature on these professional values is broad. Generally, the literature can 
be classified into two categories based on the methodology employed. The first is 
grounded in content analysis methods. Some analyze media coverage and look for 
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patterns that define the reporting on the page or in the transcript (e.g. Harcup and O’Neill 
2001, 2017, Lang and Lang 1983). Others compare a sample of news reports against 
some predefined population of news events so as to measure not only differences within 
what is covered but also differences between what is and is not covered at all (e.g. Lee 
2009, Shoemaker, Danielian, and Bredlinger 1991). The second uses an ethnographic 
method. Scholars following in this tradition embed themselves in the newsrooms of 
journalists and study their behavior, noting what news events they encounter, which they 
chose to follow up on, and then how the coverage of those few selected topics is 
structured (e.g. Anderson 2013, Gans 1979, Tuchman 1978, Usher 2014).5 This literature 
is often more exploratory and descriptive, but still provides useful insights. Collectively, 
these studies lay out a procedure journalists and editors follow from the search for 
potential news items, to the selection of news stories, to the crafting of that story, to the 
placement of news stories into a collective news product. 
Coexistence of Newmaking Influences 
 
All of these theories have at least some veracity. The news is indeed shaped by 
the realities of economic motivations, technology, individual preferences of journalists, 
and professional norms. Collectively, these various newsmaking influence form a “media 
logic” (Altheide 2013).6 
 
5 For a critical review of many of these studies, see Cottle (2007). 
6 Communication scholars argue that, as elites increasingly utilize the media as an intermediary, media 
logic will become more pervasive in structuring politics (Kepplinger 2002). This represents a process 
known as mediatization (Asp 2014, Strömbäch 2008). With mediatization, succeeding in any political 
communication endeavor requires a keen understanding of and willingness to adapt to the media’s 
institutional logic (Deacon and Stanyer 2014). An elite, including a candidate, who wants to build an 
agenda through the media (e,g, Dalmus, Hänggli, and Bernhard 2017, Lang and Lang 1983) must find ways 
to accommodate the media’s collective preferences. This had produced several repercussions: the 
expanding role of a new class of communication specialists or “spin doctors” (Esser, Reinemannn, and Fan 
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If all of these influences are active in the newmaking process, then do they 
operate purely independently from one another? Not always. Sometimes they do indeed 
interact in meaningful ways. Indexing theory (Bennett 1990, Bennett, Lawrence, and 
Livingston 2007), which argues that news coverage will be shaped by the prevailing 
attitudes of political elites, is partially grounded in an interactive theory that sees the cost 
effectiveness of uncritically indexing elite attitudes being reinforced with professional 
assessments of objectivity, for example. There the norms build on each other, making the 
result a firmer part of news creation. 
At other times, the forces clash. Zaller (1999) shows how professional norms 
toward informative, critical coverage of elites can come into conflict with demand-side 
economics for titillating and scandalous coverage. The push and pull of the two is 
resolved depending on the extent of the market pressure. When market pressure is weak 
(when the news outlet faces less competition and therefore has a stronger hold on the 
audience), the professional value wins out. When market pressure is strong (when there is 
competition), economic motivations drive coverage. Hayes and Guardino (2010) show 
that when there is a general lack of disagreement between American domestic elites, 
journalists will still practice particular professional norms and avoid purely indexing the 
consensus that other newsmaking forces push them toward.  
 
2001), increasing efforts to subsidize the cost of news product through the dissemination of potential 
content and scheduling of pseudo-events that cede some agency to the media (Gandy 1982, Lancendorfer 
and Lee 2010, Sellers and Schaffner 2007, Turk 1986), and the proliferation of other strategic news 
management techniques (Pfetsch 1999, Sanders et al. 2011). I explain how elites might be able to engage 
with newsworthiness values as means of exercising more control over the media agenda later on in this 
chapter and in Chapter 4. 
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To be sure. there is still more work to be done on the interrelations of these 
various forces. But before such work can commence a stronger grasp on the individual 
forces in isolation is necessary. This dissertation aids in that effort in focusing on the role 
of professional norms. While the preceding work on professional norms is undeniably 
valuable, much of it has neglected the importance of context. Put simply, professional 
values are general but their application is specific. Because the media exists primarily as 
an institution in a context broader than just politics, the professional norms are developed 
for purposes other than achieving some sort of political end. Therefore, all journalists are 
taught the same (or at least remarkably similar) norms in journalism school. Norms that 
are reinforced as the reporter begin working at a news desk. But the application of these 
values is dependent on the circumstances that an individual journalist finds herself 
working in. Yet much of the academic work cited above has limited itself to descriptive 
analysis at the general level. This is important because the context-dependent (i.e. 
specific) application is where political repercussions can occur. Context matters. The 
theoretical contribution of this dissertation, which I now turn to, is to show how much. 
A Contextual Theory of Newsworthiness Values 
 
Having situated professional norms within a broader context of newsmaking 
forces, I now turn to a deeper dive into the successes and shortcomings of the literature. 
As discussed above, professional norms are informal standards and practices that 
journalists, as members of the profession, subscribe to. The process by which journalists 
come to know and implement these norms is unstructured but occurs primarily during 
formal education in journalism programs at universities and during early career 
socialization process as interns or cub reporters.  
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The values themselves can be traced to a number of origin points. Some argue 
that they are the necessary byproducts of working in a high-pressure, time-sensitive 
career (Tuchman 1978, Fishman 1980). Others note that technology, in addition to its 
independent effect on newsmaking, also dictates how the media structures content via 
professional norms as a secondary, indirect form of influence (Usher 2014). Because 
journalists conceptualize themselves as storytellers and because the conventions of 
storytelling are inextricably tied to the medium of the story, technological innovation that 
introduces functionally new mediums or significantly alters existing mediums can bring 
changes to the profession of journalism. And others argue that professional norms are 
means of standardizing content to the preferences of the audience (Iyengar, Norpoth, and 
Hahn 2004).  
Professional norms appear to be sticky but not permanent. Gans’s (1979) 
foundational work lists eight “enduring values.” Several decades later, in a revised 
edition to his work, Gans (2004 [1979]) notes that those same values appear to still be in 
place. Other ethnographers have also found that those values are still holding firm as well 
(Anderson 2013, Usher 2014). But there is still some room for new norms to develop and 
old values to be updated. As mentioned above, Usher (2014) argues that new professional 
norms of immediacy, participation, and interactivity have developed in recent years. And 
studies on the social history of objectivity in newsmaking identify several historical 
periods where the meaning of objectivity for journalists seems to shift to a new 
interpretation (Kaplan 2006, Schudson 1978). As such, professional norms appear 
durable but not permanent. 
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As mentioned above, the literature on professional norms is exceptionally broad 
and features perspectives from multiple disciplines. While the result has many of the 
advantages of robust pluralistic systems, it also features some of the weaknesses 
inevitable to independent academic institutions: it can be a bit disjointed. There is a 
tremendous range in scope, for example, with some studies serving as deep dives into 
single norms (Schudson 1978) and others documenting dozens of norms (Harcup and 
O’Neill 2001, 2017). Some studies cover similar topical ground and discuss related 
concepts but use entirely different names. And others propose typologies that are 
unrelated to the organizational systems used by others.  
That said, a careful survey of this diverse literature exposes a number of 
commonalities concerning an important subset of professional norms: newsworthiness 
values (Shoemaker 2006, Shoemaker, Danielian, and Bredlinger 1991, Strömbäch, 
Karlsson, and Hopmann 2012). Newsworthiness values represent the attributes journalists 
seek out in potential stories. The scholarly literature lists dozens, if not hundreds, of 
different types of newsworthiness values. For my purposes, I utilize a shorter list. These 
include conflict, timeliness, human interest, and simplicity, which are frequently 
mentioned across a number of studies.7 A survey of journalism textbooks (Table 2.1) 
reveals a similar list.  
The table also provides a number of additional newsworthiness values. My 
decision to limit the theoretical thrust of this dissertation to only four instead of a broader 
 
7 Informally, my own experience as a journalism student lines up with these norms as well. In my Intro to 
Journalism class, we were taught six newsworthiness norms. Thanks to the ingraining effect of biweekly 
quizzes, I can confidently report that those six were prominence, proximity, timeliness, conflict, 
unusualness, and human interest. Four of the five listed above appear in the above list. My belated gratitude 
to Prof. George Miller. 
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swath was motivated by two primary considerations. First, because these values are of 
particular importance due to the potential ramifications they could have. If the media 
does indeed prioritize content that meets these values then candidates and parties are 
incentivized to produce political messages and scenarios that meet these preferences. The 
end result is more conflict-laden, personalistic, shortsighted, and simplistic political 
messages and, subsequently, political contests. The normative implications of such an 
incentive structure are so significant that investigating the effects of these 
newsworthiness values in particular is a top priority. 
Second, because many of these other values provide only muddled theoretical 
expectations. Proximity can be ruled out due to the national media focus of this 
dissertation, as can prominent people given that candidates for party nominations almost 
uniformly meet that standard. Impact should likely be satisfied by the possibility that the 
candidate could win a major party nomination, thereby making them viable contenders 
for the most powerful political figure in the world. The only ones that remain that haven’t 
previously been listed are the infrequently mentioned audience demands (which I argue is 
best conceptualized as a potential source of newsworthiness values rather than a value in 
and of itself) and good visuals (likely important but hard to capture for the purposes of 
this project).  
As I mentioned, others have noted these norms. Some have even mentioned that 
they might carry political repercussions (Cook 1998). But I offer the novel theoretical 
contribution that the consequences these values produce can only be understood from a 
purely contextual lens. These values have been observed and documented in general. The 
ethnographic work cited above was done in newsrooms overall, not politics desks. The 
27 
 
content analysis was similarly applied to overall coverage, not any specific campaign or 
politics section. They are general media values, not political media values. 
It makes sense to study newsworthiness values, at least initially, in this manner 
given the media’s institutional identity. The media covers politics, yes, but that is not all 
that it does. News includes a much broader collection of topics than merely the political 
and so it needs norms that are not domain specific. But that consequently means that the 
media applies apolitical standards to craft political coverage. Doing so requires a 
translation of these general principles into the specifics of politics. The process of doing 
so is where the media’s status as an accidental political institution can create unintended 
political effects. As such, a politically minded and context-dependent study is needed to 
tease out the ramifications of the media’s general newsworthiness values. 
Practically, what this means is that while these values are internalized by all 
journalists, what constitutes “conflict” or “simple” varies according to the subject the 
journalist is covering. Separated from the context that the particular journalist will 
encounter, these values are unusably vague. Put another way, whether in a journalism 
classroom or as a new employee at a news desk, all would-be journalists are taught the 
same values. Some of those reporters will cover political campaigns while others will 
cover sports, popular culture, or technology. What these values mean varies between 
those contexts, although reporters in all of these contexts would agree on the importance 
of the criterion. 
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Table 2.1: Mentions of Newsworthiness Norms in Various Journalism Textbooks 
 Proximity Timeliness Prominent 
People 
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This is the core of the contribution of this dissertation project. I am examining a 
particular context, presidential primary contests, which is itself understudied. I am taking 
a generalized theory of newsworthiness values (that has existed in the communications 
literature and occasionally been cross-pollinated into political science in some limited 
capacities) and specifying it for this chosen context. I now turn to creating the 
contextualized hypotheses that will be tested. 
Hypotheses in Context 
 
Via the marriage of the particular context of presidential primaries (informed by 
the literature review conducted in the introductory chapter) and generalized theories of 
newsworthiness values (discussed in the preceding section), a new, context-dependent 
theory of newsworthiness values can be used to derive testable hypotheses of the 
relationship between candidate and media agendas in presidential primary contests.  
Importantly, these hypotheses should test two things. First, do newsworthiness 
values exert a substantively meaningful effect on media content in presidential primaries? 
And second, what are the political, context-based ramifications of these newsworthiness 
values? I proceed from this point in four sections, each corresponding to an empirical 
chapter that follows. 
Candidate-Induced Differences in Newsworthiness 
 
First, I consider the application of this context-dependent theory from the 
perspective of the candidate. This portion of the dissertation – Chapter 4 – deals with 
candidate-level variation in appeals to newsworthiness values. Other scholars have noted 
that when elites, or the specialists they employ (Esser, Reinemann, and Fan 2001), want 
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to build an agenda through the mass media as a means of affecting public opinion 
(Dalmus, Hänggli, and Bernhard 2017, Lang and Lang 1983), they can attempt to 
strategically manage the media by engaging in activities meant to placate the media’s 
content preferences (Pfetsch 1999, Sanders et al. 2011). Often this is done by leveraging 
the finite resources of the media via information subsidies, i.e. providing potential news 
stories that the media can accept as they are or use as inspiration for their own coverage 
(Crouse 1975, Gandy 1982, Lancendorfer and Lee 2010, Turk 1986). The most common 
forms of information subsidies are press releases, although other forms like events 
organized to attract media attention can also be an effective means of working with 
journalism’s newsmaking procedures (Sellers and Schaffner 2007). While there is some 
evidence to suggest that information subsidization or other forms of strategic news 
management can become more effective when techniques incorporate appeals to 
newsworthiness values (Flowers, Haynes, and Crespin 2003), in general we know little 
about how newsworthiness values could be used by political elites in a similar manner. 
My theory posits that journalists covering candidates on the trail will be looking for 
signals of values like conflict, human interest, and simplicity. How they come to be 
recognized will depend on the nature of political campaigns. As such, I turn to the means 
by which much of political campaigns are conducted, rhetoric, to argue that candidates 
can signal to journalists through the use of rhetorical newsworthiness cues.  
Conflict involves at least two parties with wants or needs that are incongruous and 
efforts by the parties to achieve their desires at the expense of the other. In politics this 
conflict is typically verbal attacks on explicitly specified targets. But, in primaries, this is 
not the most appropriate conceptualization. Given the multicandidate and intraparty 
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nature of these contests there is a very wide array of potential targets: co-partisans also 
vying for the nomination, cross-partisan elites, and organized coalition interests to name 
just a few. Some of this conflict, however, is made unlikely by the primary calendar 
(Haynes and Rhine 1998). A candidate can engage in a conflict with implicit or abstract 
targets. For example, by discussing an unpopular war but not explicitly mentioning the 
individuals who have overseen it or via an economically populist message where the 
targets are an abstract amalgamation of political and economic elites.  
Defining conflict by the rhetorical presence of a second, adversarial party is 
therefore not the best fit for how a journalist encounters conflict-laden messages in this 
particular context. Consider a second possibility: emotional appeals to anger. Scholars of 
emotion define anger as “a sense of displeasure plus the urge to do some of the things 
that remove or harm its agent” (Frijda 1988, p. 351). This displeasure can be found in the 
oppositional nature of conflict, while the “urge to do some of the things that remove or 
harm its agent” captures the active nature that conflict entails. Anger can also be a form 
of conflict expressed against an implicit or abstract entity, unlike defining conflict via the 
presence of an explicitly identified target. Candidates who have angrier speaking styles 
should therefore be more appealing to journalists’ sense of conflict as a form of 
newsworthiness, who will then respond with coverage more representative of the issues 
the candidate emphasizes. This leads to the first hypothesis: 
H1.1 (Conflict Hypothesis): Agenda similarity between a candidate and the media will be 
greater the more anger-laden language the candidate invokes. 
Notably, this does not preclude the possibility that attacks would also be 
perceived as invoking conflict. But many attacks will also be expressed via the use of 
32 
 
anger so they are also not going overlooked in the theoretical formulation. And while it is 
possible that an attack could be articulated without anger, I would argue that the specific 
context in which this theory is applied minimizes that possibility. While it is possible that 
a candidate could engage in non-angry conflict with another candidate, journalists should 
see an angry attack as inherently more conflict-laden than an attack prefaced by “I 
respectfully disagree.”  
Moving on to the human-interest value, journalists should be attracted to more 
relatable stories. In the context of a campaign, candidates can vary in this regard by 
differing in how often they invoke themselves. Campaigns that utilize more candidate-
centric rhetoric, i.e. making the candidate’s accomplishments, biography, or traits a larger 
part of the campaign agenda or otherwise utilizing a more personalistic style, should be 
more appealing to journalists’ preference for human-interest angles because they are 
offering a personified element to their campaigns. This leads me to the hypothesis that: 
H1.2 (Human-interest Hypothesis): Agenda similarity between a candidate and the media 
will be greater the more the candidate utilizes candidate-based appeals. 
I provide two distinct contextual definitions of rhetorical simplicity. First, 
journalists should find clear language to be more newsworthy. I refer to this as linguistic 
simplicity. More readily interpretable language should appeal to journalists because it 
will represent political speech that minimizes confusion and is most easily repackaged 
into news products. Second, reporters should find candidate messages that are narrowly 
focused to have a simpler structure to their agenda. I refer to this as narrative simplicity. 
Candidates who define their agenda with a small number of issues should have a more 
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straightforward message for journalists to convey in their coverage than candidates who 
embrace a wide array of issues. Therefore, the two rhetorical simplicity hypotheses are: 
H1.3 (Linguistic Simplicity Hypothesis): Agenda similarity between a candidate and the 
media will be greater the simpler the language the candidate invokes. 
H1.4 (Narrative Simplicity Hypothesis): Agenda similarity between a candidate and the 
media will be greater the narrower a range of issues a candidate message is focused on. 
Rules-Induced Differences in Newsworthiness 
 
Second, I consider how the nature of the primary process itself might affect how 
journalists interpret newsworthiness. Presidential primaries are unique among American 
elections for a number of reasons outlined in the introductory chapter. Two of the most 
salient differences are the multicandidate field and the long, serial process. Given the 
first-past-the-post nature of American politics, most elections are contested between only 
two candidates. While general elections may occasionally feature third-party candidates 
who get non-trivial percentages of the overall vote, primaries routinely feature far more 
numerous viable contenders. Furthermore, while general elections are commonly 
measured from the conventions to Election Day, a difference of usually 2-4 months, the 
first primary candidates often announce nearly a year before a single caucus or primary.  
The long, multicandidate nature of primaries should create a set of circumstances 
that systematically vary the timeliness and contextual simplicity journalists perceive the 
race, and therefore the candidates, as possessing. Starting with an application of 
timeliness, I expect that media responsiveness to a candidate’s agenda will, on average, 
decrease as the primary campaign goes on and the candidate’s agenda becomes old news.  
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H2.1 (Timeliness Hypothesis): Agenda similarity between candidate messaging and 
media coverage will be greater earlier in the primary campaign than later in the primary 
season. 
Second, I consider how the multicandidate nature of primaries and the volatility 
that introduces interacts with media preference for news stories that are simple. As the 
field expands to include more potential nominees, evaluating the messages of each 
candidate should become more complex. It will be harder for journalists to divine the 
most important fault lines between candidates and contextualize their agendas. And in 
reverse, the winnowing of the field should simplify the race for journalists as it narrows 
down the options of other potential issues to discuss instead of the candidates’ agendas. 
The introduction of new candidates into the race is accompanied by more permutations of 
potential comparisons among candidates and more arguments about what constitutes 
salient issues. This leads to journalists having more uncertainty as to the state of the race, 
while contractions in the size of the field should have an opposite, clarifying effect. In 
short, changes in the size of the field, fluctuations made possible by the multicandidate 
nature of primaries, should create variable circumstances of contextual simplicity. This 
leads to my second hypothesis: 
H2.2 (Contextual Simplicity Hypothesis): Agenda similarity between candidate 
messaging and media coverage will decrease when the field expands. 
Media Differences in Emphasis of Newsworthiness Values 
 
Third, I consider how professional values might vary across outlets. Prior research 
provides some reason to think that different media outlets might exhibit different 
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emphases of the same values (Cook 1998, Gans 1979), although others argue that the 
similarities are more significant than the differences (Druckman 2005, Hayes 2014).  
Investigating these media-level differences can provide insight into the origins of 
these newsworthiness values. Earlier in this chapter I described three theories as to why 
newsworthiness values form. These include routinization, technology, and audience 
preferences. Following the logic of these three theories leads to expectations for how 
different mediums can vary in predictable ways that would lead to differences in salience 
of newsworthiness values. Studying these differences can increase our understanding of 
the sources of these values. 
Doing so is important because having a better grasp on the sources of values is 
crucial to assessing how the media can improve in the future. For example, if we 
conclude that the media’s emphasis on conflict in coverage is leading to a normatively 
undesirable news product, the process of weakening the influence of that newsworthiness 
value is invariably tied to the value’s origin point. If the newsworthiness value of conflict 
originates in journalism’s need to satisfy audience demands, then the path to minimizing 
its influence would likely be increasing support for public media outlets in the short term 
and attempting to shift audience preferences in the long term. Such a remedy would be 
ineffective if the source of the newsworthiness values is technological, however. 
Starting with routinization, this theory hypothesizes that professional norms, and 
newsworthiness values as a specific class of those norms, stem from necessity on the part 
of the journalist. Each reporter has to sort through information pertinent to their beat, 
identify what is to become news, and then create that product daily and on deadline 
(Fishman 1980, Tuchman 1978). Because the task is onerous, journalists identify 
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standards that they can apply repeatedly to information they encounter as a consistent 
means of evaluation. As such, the origin point for the norms lies in the divination of a 
practical means of taking the near-infinite world of information and reducing it down to 
the finite “newshole.” 
This means that the influence of the resulting norms should be inversely related to 
the overall size of the newshole that medium presents. A transcript from a broadcast news 
program represents only a fraction of the news content in a newspaper, and as such 
reporters working for a broadcast news program need to be even more discerning in 
identifying what constitutes news. The space available to report on news is even broader 
in the 24/7 cable news medium and therefore the influence of newsworthiness values 
should be weaker still among these outlets if routinization theory is applicable. 
H3.1 (Routinization Hypothesis) The influence of newsworthiness values on agenda 
similarity between candidates and media outlets will be greater for media outlets with 
stricter space constraints. 
Technologically based theories argue that norms develop based on the form that 
the media outlet takes, forms that are a function of the tools available to journalists. Part 
of the professional self-conception of journalists is as modern-day storytellers. 
Storytelling is tied to the medium (Usher 2014), as literary and visual mediums lend 
themselves to distinct conventions. These conventions are a function of what is and what 
is not possible with the way the technology of choice permits a connection between 
storyteller and audience. For example, increased camera quality makes facial close-ups 
an aesthetically acceptable way of conveying an image and so they become more 
prominent in television news packages (Mutz 2015).  
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This theory suggests that visual and textual mediums should differ in their 
emphases of newsworthiness values. Visual mediums, whether broadcast or cable, have 
to match the text of coverage with images. While text mediums do include accompanying 
visuals, the content is still overwhelmingly rhetorical. This should create different 
storytelling conventions across the two types of news mediums, which in turn results in 
differing emphases of particular newsworthiness values. 
H3.2 (Technology Hypothesis) The influence of newsworthiness values on agenda 
similarity between candidates and media outlets will vary between television media 
outlets (either broadcast or cable) and text-based media outlets. 
The theory of newsworthiness values as formalizations of audience preferences is 
closely related to economic theories of news creation (Hamilton 2004). In this 
formulation, newsworthiness values are professional rationalizations for giving the 
consumer what they want. If the media prioritizes conflict, it is because that’s what the 
audience craves.  
This implies that media outlets differ in the prioritization of these values to the 
extent that their audiences differ in how they prioritize them. The ability to test this 
theory therefore depends on assessments of variation in audience patterns by media type. 
The literatures on political knowledge and selective exposure suggest that there are 
differences in the level of political sophistication audiences of particular media outlets 
possess. Broadcast television news audiences are generally less politically sophisticated 
(Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). Alternatively, the audience for partisan media tends to 
be the most politically interested, although the prestige press audience is not far behind 
(Stroud 2011). This implies that, if the audience preferences theory is to find support, 
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there should be variation in the utilization of newsworthiness values, and specifically the 
simplicity value, along these lines. It stands to reason that less sophisticated audiences 
will prefer simpler content while more sophisticated audiences will be more receptive of 
politically sophisticated content. Broadcast outlets should therefore prioritize simplicity 
more than any other media type, while partisan media outlets should prioritize simplicity 
the least.  
H3.3 (Audience Preferences Hypothesis) The influence of newsworthiness values, 
especially simplicity, on agenda similarity between candidates and media outlets will be 
greater for media outlets with less politically sophisticated audiences.  
Behavioral Implications 
 
Finally, do these differences in convergence matter for structuring vote choice in 
presidential primaries? The media effects literature, specifically concerning the role of 
agenda setting (e.g. Feezell 2018, Iyengar and Kinder 1987, King, Schneer, and White 
2017, McCombs and Shaw 1972), suggests that there is good reason to think so. And 
previous evidence suggests that agenda convergence between candidate and media can 
affect subjects in a lab setting (Hayes 2008). But the circumstances for that experiment 
were a statewide general election, not a presidential primary. The primary electorate is 
radically different than a statewide or national general electorate in terms of political 
opinions and their ultimate goal: to select a representative of a party, not a political 
officeholder. As such, it is important to test if the same effects hold in this context. 
H4.1 (Candidate Support Hypothesis): Subjects exposed to an electoral situation where 
the agendas of a primary candidate and the media have high convergence will be more 
supportive of the candidate than a control group. Subjects exposed to an electoral 
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situation where the agendas of a primary candidate and the media have low convergence 
will be less supportive of the candidate than a control group. 
In addition, it is worth considering the normative impacts of high or low 
convergence. As discussed at greater length in the concluding chapter, I argue that 
candidates are better arbiters of agenda focus than the media. The primary goal of any 
candidate when devising a messaging strategy is to identify and lay out the combination 
of issue appeals that will represent their “best case.” The media face a number of 
competing incentives, including satisfying their professional norms (which are not 
necessarily the same as finding the most informative and normatively desirable content). 
I argue that these competing incentives make the media more likely to wander away from 
content that is of actual use to primary voters. As such, I argue that voters exposed to 
high convergence will actually be best situated to correctly identify the candidate that 
they would support if they were exposed to a set of complete information, what is known 
in the literature as “correct” voting.  
H4.2 (Correct Support Hypothesis): Subjects exposed to an electoral situation where the 
agendas of a primary candidate and the media have high convergence will display more 
correct support than a control group. Subjects exposed to an electoral situation where 
the agendas of a primary candidate and the media have low convergence will display less 
correct support than a control group. 
I recognize that this claim may be divisive. Importantly, I am not suggesting that 
the media should be uncritical of candidates. Candidates might correctly identify the 
issues voters care most about but then exaggerate or outright lie about their proposals and 
qualifications on that issue. Instead, what I am suggesting is that the media should be 
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critical of candidates but about the issues that the candidate has identified as parts of her 
best case. Ultimately, however, this is an empirical claim and is therefore testable. 
Summary 
 
This chapter has given the reader a broad introduction to the institutional media, 
media logic, newsmaking, and journalism’s professional norms literatures and the 
position of newsworthiness values within these literatures. It describes the generalized 
nature of the professional values and expounds on the need for context-dependent 
formulations. It then lays out context-specific hypotheses to test the role of 
newsworthiness values in presidential primaries. These hypotheses are summarized in 
Table 2.2. In the next chapter, I discuss the data and methods that will be employed to 
test these hypotheses. 






4 1.1 Conflict Agenda similarity between a candidate and the 
media will be greater the more anger-laden 
language the candidate invokes. 
4 1.2 Human-
interest 
Agenda similarity between a candidate and the 
media will be greater the more the candidate 
utilizes candidate-based appeals. 
4 1.3 Linguistic 
Simplicity 
Agenda similarity between a candidate and the 
media will be greater the simpler the language 
the candidate invokes. 
4 1.4 Narrative 
Simplicity 
Agenda similarity between a candidate and the 
media will be greater the narrower a range of 
issues a candidate message is focused on. 
5 2.1 Timeliness Agenda similarity between candidate 
messaging and media coverage will be greater 
earlier in the primary campaign than later in the 
primary season. 
5 2.2 Contextual 
Simplicity 
Agenda similarity between candidate 
messaging and media coverage will decrease 
when the field expands. 
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6 3.1 Routinization The influence of newsworthiness values on 
agenda similarity between candidates and 
media outlets will be greater for media outlets 
with stricter space constraints. 
6 3.2 Technology The influence of newsworthiness values on 
agenda similarity between candidates and 
media outlets will vary between television 
media outlets (either broadcast or cable) and 
text-based media outlets. 
6 3.3 Audience 
Preferences 
The influence of newsworthiness values, 
especially simplicity, on agenda similarity 
between candidates and media outlets will be 
greater for media outlets with less politically 
sophisticated audiences. 
7 4.1 Candidate 
Support 
Subjects exposed to an electoral situation where 
the agendas of a primary candidate and the 
media have high convergence will be more 
supportive of the candidate than a control 
group. Subjects exposed to an electoral 
situation where the agendas of a primary 
candidate and the media have low convergence 
will be less supportive of the candidate than a 
control group. 
7 4.2 Correct 
Support  
Subjects exposed to an electoral situation where 
the agendas of a primary candidate and the 
media have high convergence will display more 
correct support than a control group. Subjects 
exposed to an electoral situation where the 
agendas of a primary candidate and the media 
have low convergence will display less correct 












Chapter 3: Methodology of Corpora Construction and Experimental Design  
 
In designing and testing these hypotheses, I made a significant number of 
methodological decisions that need to be appreciated in analyzing the empirical results in 
the chapters to come. To prevent these empirical chapters from being overwhelmed with 
methodological discussion and in the interest of scientific transparency, I discuss these 
various decisions here. To keep this chapter itself as accessible as possible, I have also 
attempted to make this chapter as parsimonious as possible by siloing the most technical 
aspects in Appendix A.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I discuss the most fundamental question 
related to all the analysis: Who counts as a presidential primary candidate? Next, I walk 
through the creation and processing of the Presidential Primary Announcement Corpus 
(PPAC) which is used in chapter 4 and 6. I then proceed to discuss the collection, 
parsing, processing, and modeling of the Presidential Primary Communication Corpus 
(PPCC), which is the primary data source for the analysis in chapters 5 and 6. Finally, I 
discuss the experimental design implemented in Chapter 7. 
Who Counts? 
 
The formal barriers to entry as a candidate for a party nomination are virtually 
non-existent. One merely need announce that they are a candidate and the task is 
essentially done. This was the path taken by Lawrence Lessig, a Harvard Law professor 
and campaign finance activist, in 2016. Lessig declared that he was seeking the 
Democratic nomination and by virtue of that announcement he technically was. Should 
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Lessig be included because he announced, even if it is improbable he ever would have 
been an actual contender for the party nomination? 
Formal barriers do exist further along the line. State party organizations can 
establish rules as to who appears on the ballot and the national party committees can 
establish rules as to who is allowed to appear in the debates. The barriers, however, are 
heterogeneous and subject to change. Some states attempt to or successfully alter rules to 
favor native candidates8, frontrunners9, or incumbent presidents.10 Furthermore, some 
candidates leave the race before any debates occur let alone actual voting. Tom Vilsack, 
then the lame-duck governor of Iowa, announced his candidacy for the Democratic 
nomination in November, 2006 but dropped out of the race by February, 2007. Even 
though he did not catch on, he was still a prominent Democratic figure who could 
conceivably have performed well in the caucus in his home state. Should he be ruled out 
because he did not make it far enough to encounter these hurdles? 
In dealing with these complications, I favor a system that weeds out the fringe 
candidates while also preserving those who were viable, if ultimately unsuccessful. I 
want only those candidates who were officially announced but actively campaigning. To 
generate such a list, I use Associated Press coverage of primary announcements as an 
initial starting point. The AP, as a newswire, should document the announcement of any 
person with a significant profile while ignoring only those who can safely be overlooked 
because, while they may have declared themselves candidates, they are unlikely to 
 
8 Weigel, David. “Ky. GOP rule change allows Paul to run for Senate amid his White House bid.” 
Washington Post, August 22, 2015.  
9 Levy, Clifford J. “McCain on Ballot across New York as Pataki Gives In.” The New York Times, 
February 4, 2000. 
10 Isenstadt, Alex. “Republicans to Scrap Primaries and Caucuses as Trump Challengers Cry Foul.” 
Politico, September 6, 2019. 
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commit to any actual costly campaigning. To build this list, I started by applying a 
Boolean search with phrases such as “running for President,” “jumped into the 
Presidential race,” and “announces candidacy” in Nexis Uni’s archive of Associated 
Press stories with a start date of 2 years before the nomination convention and an end 
date of the last primary for each election cycle. I downloaded the headlines of all of these 
stories and read through them to identify the candidates, saving the text of the story 
covering an announcement. If an AP story specifically referenced a candidate as running 
as a favorite son, then that candidate was not included in the database.  
I then further limited this list by seeking a specific date at which the candidate 
withdrew from the race, announced the suspension of campaign activities, or endorsed an 
opponent. Candidates who do not end their campaigns but do not amass any delegates 
going into the convention are clearly not bearing the cost of campaigning. Any candidate 
who met these two criteria was removed from the database. This took care of a handful of 
specific cases where announcements came from non-viable but still visible people that 
the AP covered for reasons beyond the sincerity of the campaign.11 Stories covering both 
the announcement and suspension of campaigns have been individually saved as .txt files 
and are available for review upon request. 
The results of this process were a list of candidates for the major party 
nominations from 1984-201612 that included 117 individual campaigns: 69 Republicans 
 
11 The most notable (and humorous) example of this is the actor Tom Laughlin, who “said his campaign 
started out as movie project about a Norman Schwarzkopf-like general who returns to the United States 
after a war only to find his county ‘in the toilet.’ The general decides to run for president to save the 
country.”  
12 I used this range of years because the C-SPAN wasn’t launched until 1979 and their archive prior to the 
1984 campaign is sparse. 
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and 48 Democrats. I then collected some observational data about these campaigns: 
candidate race, ethnicity, gender, prior work experience, etc.  




Using this list of candidates, I proceeded to collect a corpus concerning the formal 
announcement of the campaigns. I used the formal announcement rather than the 
announcement of the formation of an exploratory committee (or the less common 
announcement of the intention to consider forming an exploratory committee) because 
not all eventual candidates enter the exploratory committee phase and some candidates 
decide not to run after forming an exploratory committee, most notably Sarah Palin in 
2012.  
The corpus contains text representing both candidate messaging and media 
messaging. For the candidates, this text is the announcement speech or, in a few 
instances, announcement letters or emails.13 Announcement speeches were obtained from 
several databases, most notably the C-SPAN video archives and the American 
Presidencies Project (Peters and Woolley 2020). Between these resources, I was able to 
retrieve an announcement speech for 110 of the 117 candidates.14 
 
13 Jim Webb-2016, Joe Biden-2008 
14 In both 2016 and 2008, Hillary Clinton announced her candidacy via a short video rather than a formal 
speech. Carly Fiorina did the same in 2016. Al Sharpton’s 2004 campaign was run primarily through the 
media without many traditional campaign events, including an announcement. Orrin Hatch launched his 
2000 campaign via a press release. George H.W. Bush did not actively campaign against his primary 
challenger in 1992. The only candidate who does seem to have given a formal announcement speech that I 
could not retrieve was Elizabeth Dole in 2000. The Dole library at the University of Kansas reports that 
they do have a copy of the speech but that it is not currently available to the public or scholars. All of these 
candidates are omitted from the analysis. 
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The media messaging portion of the corpus includes news articles and stories 
about the candidates from a number of mainstream media outlets: The New York Times, 
the Washington Post,15 and ABC News,16 Fox, and MSNBC.17 For each media outlet, I 
searched the candidate’s name in Nexis Uni and downloaded all news items starting from 
the date of the candidate’s announcement and ending one week after the announcement. I 
then manually processed each story, removing those that mentioned the candidate briefly 
but were not principally about the candidate. In doing so, I also removed stories where 
the candidate was the subject of an attack from another candidate. That story or article 
was instead attributed to the candidate who carried out the attack. Including the story for 
both would have effectively double-counted the story and misrepresented the overall 
media environment. Articles from the print outlets that mentioned both candidates in a 
purely comparative manner were excluded, however this made up a relatively small 
segment of the overall corpus. Because transcripts from the television news channels, and 
especially the cable channels, had to be parsed at a finer grade of detail, often requiring 
extracting only a segment from a transcript for an entire program, I was able to separate 
the comparative pieces to include both candidates with greater ease. The product of these 
efforts was a collection of 2101 total media documents: 508 from The New York Times, 
 
15 The choices of The New York Times and the Washington Post are straightforward. Other studies have 
similarly focused on these major papers (e.g. Ku et al. 2003, Vavreck 2009), other news sources follow 
their lead (Crouse 1975, Protess and McCombs 1991), and they are well archived throughout the entire 
time frame I am interested in. 
16 I choose ABC News for pragmatic reasons. Of the three broadcast television news programs, it is 
archived the furthest back in the Nexis Uni database. 
17 Fox and MSNBC were included to account for the resurgence of partisan media in American politics. 
This portion of the corpus is not included in the analysis for chapter 4 and 5, however, as the goal of those 
chapters is to assess the role of news norms in the mainstream press. They are included in the replication 
analysis examining variation in newsworthiness values among media outlets in Chapter 6, however. Fox 
transcripts are available in Nexis Uni starting prior to the 2000 primaries. MSNBC transcripts become 




998 from the Washington Post, 172 from ABC News, 609 from Fox, and 420 from 
MSNBC. 
Content Analysis Procedures 
 
To measure the issue agenda of the candidates and the media in the corpus, I 
constructed a codebook based on a condensed version of the Comparative Agendas 
Project codebook18 (Baumgartner and Jones 2009) and topics I expected from the 
literature to be invoked by candidates and the media in campaigns (Hart 2000, Patterson 
1994, Seifert 2012). This codebook was applied to the corpus of text with each paragraph 
coded into one of 15 categories: domestic economy, government assistance programs, 
social issues, candidate-based appeals, international affairs, natural resources, education, 
immigration, trade, populism, government’s role, crime, American values, horserace, and 
a non-codable category to make the codebook exhaustive.19 This codebook was applied 
to the corpus by a single coder: me. The decision to personally hand-code was made to 
glean a richer understanding of the corpus and campaign history. A second coder was 
employed to double-code a randomly drawn subsample of 200 candidate speech 
 
18 The codebook can be reviewed at http://www.comparativeagendas.net/pages/master-codebook. 
19 Coding each paragraph into a single topic category was necessary to calculate the dependent variable. 
The codebook was implemented hierarchically with an initial attempt to code the paragraph into one of 12 
categories. If that was unsuccessful, I then considered if the paragraph fell into the horserace, American 
values, or non-codable categories. This hierarchical process was used because candidates frequently would 
frame issue content in an American values manner (i.e. “We need to ban abortion because the Founders 
guaranteed us a right to life”) while the media would frequently frame issue content via a horserace lens 
(i.e. “Will focusing her speech on economic policy affect her favorability ratings in the polls?”). An 
individual hearing the speech or consuming the media content would still get issue content from these 
appeals, so to prevent the exclusion of this meaningful issue content I sought to preserve it. A full 
explanation of coding procedures can be found in Appendix B. 
48 
 
paragraphs and 200 The New York Times coverage paragraphs (percentage agreement = 
79%, Cohen’s kappa = .76).20 
Measuring Convergence 
 
With the corpus of candidate speeches and media coverage coded by paragraph 
into a single issue category, I then assembled the data using a candidate-media outlet 
dyad as the unit of analysis. As an example, this means that Jeb Bush-NYT, Jeb Bush-
WaPo, and Jeb Bush-ABC are three separate units. For each unit, I calculated the 
percentage of the candidate’s speech that was in each issue category, omitting non-
codable. I then calculated the percentage of the media coverage for that unit that was in 
each issue category, once again omitting non-codable. With these percentages, I was able 
to calculate a convergence score. 
Convergence scores are a simple, easily interpretable, and conveniently 
continuous measure of how similar or dissimilar two agendas are (Hayes 2010, Hayes 
and Lawless 2016, Ridout and Mellen 2007, Sigelman and Buell 2004). Put plainly, 
convergence scores compare the proportions of attention dedicated to different issue 
topics in two different sets of text. The formula for convergence scores is as follows: 
𝐼 = 1 −  
|𝑐1 −  𝑚1| + |𝑐2 −  𝑚2|+. . . |𝑐𝑗 − 𝑚𝑗|
2
 
Where I denotes the issue convergence score, c refers to the proportion of the first actor’s 
agenda that was dedicated to issue j, and m refers to the proportion of the second actor’s 
 
20 A more thorough discussion of intercoder reliability procedures and results as well as several validation 
tests can be found in Appendix B. 
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agenda that was dedicated to issue j. I ranges from 0 (perfect divergence) to 1 (perfect 
convergence). 
If the candidate and the media outlet are talking about the same issues in similar 
proportions, the absolute value of the difference between the two will consistently be 
low, making the numerator small, resulting in a small quotient being subtracted from 1. If 
the candidate and the media outlet are talking about different issues or similar issues but 
in wildly different proportion, then the absolute values of the differences between the two 
will consistently be large, making the numerator large, resulting in a large quotient being 
subtracted from zero. 
Presidential Primary Communication Corpus 
 
I constructed a second, more expansive corpus to answer additional questions 
about how the structure of primaries affects candidate-media convergence by altering 
newsworthiness. This corpus uses the same initial list of candidates and media outlets 
(The New York Times, the Washington Post, ABC News, Fox, and MSNBC) but contains 
text from each from the start of each candidate’s campaign until its end. For the candidate 
who wins the nomination (and any candidates who refuse to withdraw or does not 
endorse another candidate), the end date is the day before the start of the party 
convention. Because Fox and MSNBC are not archived for the 1996 election, I limited 
this analysis to candidates and media coverage from 2000-2016. This still leaves 77 





While the American Presidency Project (Peters and Woolley 2020) once again 
served as a useful starting point for constructing this corpus, much of the text came from 
the C-SPAN video archives. The text that accompanies the C-SPAN video archives is 
either from the Federal News Service or from closed captioning. Some videos are not 
accompanied with a transcript.21 In those instances, I either transcribed the video myself 
if it was short or ran an MP3 version of the speech through an automated transcript 
service.22 The result of these efforts is a corpus of 2611 candidate speeches. 
To obtain the text of media coverage of these campaigns, I searched each 
candidate’s name on Nexis Uni with specified publication via Boolean search and then 
limited the results to the appropriate time frame. Once again, some of the stories that are 
associated with a candidate are not really about the candidate. Articles in The New York 
Times or the Washington Post may make mention of Ted Cruz but be primarily about 
another candidate or a different topic altogether. More strikingly, Fox and MSNBC 
transcripts are primarily for entire programs. So even if Ted Cruz was discussed in a 
segment from an hourly program like Hardball or Hannity, that segment is in a transcript 
along with everything else that was discussed. Each file had to therefore be assessed for 
relevance to the candidate. For some, especially the Washington Post and The New York 
Times articles in the era or search engine optimization, that could be accomplished via a 
cursory inspection of the headline. For many others, however, it required checking the 
contents of each file one by one.  
 
21 A representative from the C-SPAN archive informed me that this would be because C-SPAN does not 
own the rights to that particular video. 
22 Based on a qualitative inspection, the quality of these transcripts appears to be extremely high. They 
would struggle with some names like “Kucinich” but otherwise resulted in highly accurate transcripts. 
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Once the textual wheat had been separated from the chaff, I separated metadata 
from text via an automated process and constructed the media element of the corpus. 
Only news articles by The New York Times or the Washington Post are considered for 
analysis in Chapter 5. Even limiting the corpus in this manner for that chapter results in a 
collection of 29,336 separate documents. The ABC News, Fox, and MSNBC portion of 
the corpus is added to the analysis for Chapter 6. It adds an additional 23,399 documents. 
Topic Modeling 
 
This quantity of text is far too large for any sort of detailed content analysis. It 
would be extremely expensive and time-consuming to manually code all this text 
according to a predetermined codebook like the one used on the PPAC. Therefore, I turn 
to computational methods. 
A detailed discussion of different computational methods is beyond the scope of 
this chapter (see Grimmer and Stewart 2013), but as a parsimonious overview I will 
outline three broad classes of possibilities: dictionaries, supervised topical modeling, and 
unsupervised topic modeling. Dictionary methods use sets of specified words that a 
specially designed software applies to a collection of documents, tallies the sum of 
mentions, and outputs a result. Dictionary methods are only as good as the dictionaries 
themselves, and this presents the central dilemma. Given the breadth of the corpus 
constructed here, defining dictionaries that will adequately capture the heterogeneity of 
political topics discussed over 16 years would be remarkably difficult. And preexisting 
topical dictionaries, like the Lexicoder dictionaries, are designed to assess topics in 
legislation, not campaign contexts. My content analysis of announcement speeches 
resulted in several topics for which there are not preexisting dictionaries, like horserace 
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coverage or populism, that would need to be designed and validated. As simple and 
intuitive as dictionary methods might be, in this instance the realities of implementation 
of such a method are deceptively tricky. 
Supervised topic models come in a number of shapes and sizes, but the overall 
purpose of any of them is to take a pre-classified “training set” of documents that has 
been coded based on some guideline, examine what alignment of words can best explain 
that classification, and then replicate that pattern on an unclassified corpus. They are best 
used when the researcher has a strong grasp on what the topics of interest are. For my 
particular case, the training set would be the hand-coded PPAC, the topics would be the 
15 categories that I devised for that codebook, and the topic model would seek to 
replicate that 15-category coding scheme on the PPCC.  
There would be a number of clear advantages to such a method. A supervised 
topic model would lead to a coding scheme that is immediately comparable against the 
PPAC, for instance. But there are downsides as well. For starters, the content analysis 
performed on the PPAC could handle the inherent topical drift that occurs over decades 
in politics. Foreign policy speeches once concerned with the Soviet Union become 
focused on Kosovo become focused on Iraq become focused on Syria, for example. 
Without external interference, a supervised topic model would struggle with these 
distinctions. Trying to account for this would involve running a series of smaller 
supervised topic models on isolated sets of text, both for the training set and full corpus, 
which would be inefficient and likely lead to unstable results. 
More importantly, the training set would not be a random sample of text. It would 
instead be strongly correlated with time, as announcements come very early in the 
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electoral cycle by necessity. As such, it is possible that entirely new topics could emerge, 
for example around delegate math, that I do not account for. Or the probability that a 
given term is associated with a given topic could vary systematically later on in the 
primary process. This would be both plausible and devastating to the efficacy of such a 
topic model. 
This leaves unsupervised topic modeling. Unsupervised topic models are very 
similar to supervised topic models with one notable exception: they do not require a 
training set. Instead, they produce topics based solely on what best explains the alignment 
of words within documents. The researcher has no a priori effect on the topic output. 
Typically, this method is most appropriate when the researcher does not have strong 
expectations as to what the meaningful topics are before analyzing the text. A researcher 
interested in measuring emotional sentiment in a corpus cannot prevent an unsupervised 
topic model from producing an output primarily about issue frames. While I actually do 
have some theoretical insight into what topics I would like to consider, the loss of this 
control is worth it for the ability to prevent the issues that would likely arise from a 
supervised method. 
Specifying a Model 
 
Having settled on an unsupervised topic model, there is then the decision of what 
type. There are many varieties, including LSA (Landauer, Foltz, and Laham 1998), LDA 
(Blei, Ng, and Jordan 2003), expressed agenda model (Grimmer 2010), and dynamic 
multitopic model (Quinn et al. 2010). But given the concerns expressed above about topic 
drift across elections, I favor a method that can account for such an issue: Structural 
Topic Model (Roberts et al. 2014). What sets STM apart is that it allows for the inclusion 
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of covariates in the topic model itself. If the researcher expects that the use of topics 
across documents might vary systematically by some factor, that can be factored into the 
topic assignment. As an example, consider the theory of issue ownership (Petrocik 1996). 
This theory suggests that Democrats own issues of welfare policies while Republicans 
own foreign affairs. We might therefore expect that candidates of different parties would 
be differentially interested in invoking these issues or that the media covering candidates 
of those parties might be differentially interested in reporting on those topics. In such a 
scenario, the likelihood that a topic will appear in a document varies systematically by 
party. That can be accounted for by controlling for the party when specifying the model. 
Likewise, the year of the speech or media coverage can be entered into the model to take 
fluctuations in topic interest into account. This way, the model can recognize Syria as a 
distinct topic even though it is not a highly salient issue throughout the years in question 
in the same way unemployment or tax policy likely are. 
While I considered a number of different model specifications,23 I favored a topic 
model with the following covariates for the corpus analyzed in Chapter 5:  
• Candidate – Indicator variable that denotes a document is a candidate speech. 
Candidates could, and evidence from the content analysis suggests likely do, talk 
about different topics than the media. 
• GOP – Indicator variable that denotes a document that is either a speech from a 
Republican candidate or a media article about a Republican candidate. 
Republicans may, and evidence from the content analysis suggests likely do, talk 
about different topics than Democrats and have media coverage that emphasizes 
different topics than for Democrats. 
• Candidate*GOP – An interaction between Candidate and GOP. Republican 
candidates may talk about different topics than Democratic candidates or the 
media when covering Republican candidates. 
 
23 I also have run a number of more parsimonious models accounting for smaller combinations of these 
variables. The combinations of variables do not impact the results as much as adjusting the number of 
topics the model produces. 
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• Senator – Indicator variable that denotes that the candidate has been a U.S. 
senator. Senators will likely emphasize and have media coverage that emphasizes 
their senatorial accomplishments, which could be a distinct topic. 
• Governor – Indicator variable that denotes that the candidate has been a governor. 
Governors will likely emphasize and have media coverage that emphasizes their 
executive accomplishments, which could be a distinct topic. 
• Unusual Career – Indicator variable that denotes that the candidate comes from 
an untraditional career background for a presidential candidate, like a 
businessman or doctor. Candidates from such unconventional careers will likely 
emphasize and have media coverage that emphasizes their outsider status, which 
could be a distinct topic. 
• Woman – Indicator variable that denotes that the candidate is a woman. Women 
running for a nomination may emphasize and/or have media coverage that 
emphasizes their gender as a distinct topic. 
• Non-white – Indicator variable that denotes that the candidate is non-white. Non-
white candidates running for a nomination may emphasize and/or have media 
coverage that emphasizes their race as a distinct topic. 
• First run – Indicator variable that denotes that the candidate is running in their 
first primary. Candidates running in their first nomination race may emphasize 
different topics or have media coverage that emphasizes elements of their 
background that have not been previously vetted. 
• NYT – Indicator variable that denotes that the document is a The New York Times 
article. The New York Times might cover different topics from either candidates or 
the Washington Post. 
• Blog – Indicator variable that denotes that the document is a news article from a 
media blog (as opposed to the print edition). Blog posts may focus on topics that 
are of greater interested to an online audience. 
• NYT*Blog – An interaction between NYT and Blog. The New York Times and the 
Washington Post have a number of thematic blogs that may focus on specific 
issues. 
• NYT*GOP – An interaction between NYT and GOP. Media coverage of 
candidates from different parties could discuss different topics than candidates 
from either party in a way that is different across topics. 
• Y2000, Y2004, Y2008, and Y2012 – Indicator variables for different electoral 
years. Topics may vary in their usage across different elections. 
• Campaign Code – A categorical variable that denotes a unique ID for each 
candidate’s campaign. Different candidates may attempt to build their campaigns 




For the model of the corpus used in Chapter 6, all the above covariates are included 
plus several additional ones.24 
• Fox – Indicator variable that denotes that the document is a Fox News transcript. 
Fox News might cover different topics from nonpartisan media. 
• MSNBC – Indicator variable that denotes that the document is an MSNBC 
transcript. MSNBC might cover different topics from nonpartisan media. 
• ABC – Indicator variable that denotes that the document is an ABC News 
transcript. ABC News might cover different topics from partisan and print media. 
• Fox*GOP – An interaction between Fox and GOP. Fox news coverage of 
Republican candidates could discuss different topics from Fox news coverage of 
Democratic candidates, given its partisan nature. 
• MSNBC*GOP – An interaction between MSNBC and GOP. MSNBC coverage of 
Democratic candidates could discuss different topics from MSNBC coverage of 
Democratic candidates, given its partisan nature. 
 
Initial Text Processing 
 
Following standard procedure, I changed all words to lower case, removed 
punctuation, numbers, frequent “stop” words, and words that appeared very infrequently; 
and stemmed the remaining words so that distinct terms like “govern,” “government” and 
“governance” were all represented by the single word “govern.” After some initial test 
models, I discovered that the candidate names were overwhelmingly being used as 
anchor terms for the model. This was obfuscating any underlying patterns of the text. To 
 
24 Notably, all of those variables are described as affecting the distribution of topics across documents. 
There is another possibility, however. The usage of words in topics might systematically drift. For example, 
while terms like “ambassador,” “London,” “United,” and “Kingdom” might relate to a topic about our 
diplomatic standing with the United Kingdom, words like “Tony,” “Blair,” “David,” “Cameron,” 
“Theresa,” and “May” would pop in and out depending on the election in question. STM does have the 
ability to account for this issue, but it is very limited. Modeling topics as a function of words and covariates 
is computationally difficult, at least when compared to modeling documents as a function of topics and 
covariates. It drastically increases the computing time to do so on a corpus as large as mine. Furthermore, 
STM currently has limited ability to even do so. Only a single covariate can be included and it must be 
either binary or categorical in nature. I would not be able to model this issue with a series of covariates 
described above. As such, I simply make the assumption that this topic-content drift is relatively minor and 
will be handled by the presence of good, consistent anchor words. Following Roberts, Stewart, and Tingley 
(2016) I utilized spectral initialization. 
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remedy this, I simply dropped the names of the candidates as additional stop words.25 
Doing so dramatically improved the interpretability of the resulting topics. These 
procedures resulted in a matrix of vocabulary comprised of 110,910 unique words for the 
topic model of the corpus used in Chapter 5 and 133,497 unique words for the topic 
model of the corpus used in Chapter 6. 
Model Fit 
 
As for any data reduction technique, be it factor analysis or topic modeling, the 
number of specified topics (k) has significant impact on the results. Including too many 
topics can result in a single topic being broken into constituent parts and the loss of 
topical clarity while including too few topics can mean actually notable topics go 
undiscovered. The typical means of accounting for this is a Goldilocks method. You 
iterate the model specifying a series of k values and comparing model fit statistics and the 
validity of the topics it produces.  
Initially, I relied on the Lee and Mimno (2014) algorithmic method which seeks 
to “solve” the question of how many topics there are by identifying the convex hull in a 
low-dimensional space. This method also introduces a degree of randomness by 
necessity, and as such is not deterministic. But it does provide a useful starting point. 
When applied to the corpus of candidate speeches, The New York Times articles, and 
Washington Post articles (i.e. without ABC News, Fox, or MSNBC stories), this method 
 
25 As an example, when candidate names are not removed a topic on abortion will use the names of 
candidates most closely associated with that topic as anchor words (“rick,” “santorum,” “huckabee,” 
“keyes,” etc.). Once candidate names are removed, the high frequency words are more intuitive (“abort,” 
“parenthood,” “plan,” “prolif,” etc.). This removal was done prior to stemming the corpus and included 
both singular, plural, and possessive forms of candidate names. It did not include other conjugations (i.e. 
“Trumpian”) and so some iterations were stemmed back to these omitted words. The procedure was 
therefore imperfect, but successful in its intended goal. 
58 
 
suggested 82 topics would be appropriate. This is generally in line with the typical 50-
100 topics that are generated when applied to a corpus of this size.  
To verify that this estimation is appropriate, I ran versions of the model with the 
number of topics set from 50 to 100 at intervals of 5. Figure 3.1 presents those results for 
several useful measures. Semantic cohesion (Mimno et al. 2011) captures how closely 
linked the top words in a topic are, i.e. how high the rates of co-occurrence for the words 




most powerful anchors for a topic tend to appear together at a high rate then they are 
cohesive and suggest a unified topic. Exclusivity (Roberts et al. 2014) captures the other 
side of the coin: How unlikely are the top words from a topic to appear in another, 
unrelated topic? A well-fitted model attempts to maximize both semantic cohesion and 
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exclusivity, although in practice one typically comes at the cost of the other. The held-out 
likelihood (Wallach et al. 2009) measures the model’s performance on a set proportion of 
documents that are withheld from the original model. And the residuals (Taddy 2012) 
captures the sample dispersion as measured by the mean of squared adjusted residuals. 
The results paint a rosy picture for using 82 topics in estimation. Semantic 
cohesion, which typically decreases with more topics, spikes back up around 80. 
Exclusivity and held-out likelihood are both fairly linear but the slopes do seem to 
decrease around topic 75-80, suggesting that there is not much improvement to be had 
from increasing the number of topics after that point. Looking at the residuals (bottom-
right) suggests that there is not much improvement to be had after the 85th topic is 
incorporated. Overall, these metrics suggest that 82 topics would be an appropriate 
number. 
Given that the model with 82 topics appears to be the best fit in aggregate, it is 
worthwhile to get a sense of the individual topics’ performance on these metrics as well. 
Aggregate measures of mean semantic cohesion and exclusivity are handy but subject to 
the same outlier effects any average is. Each topic has its own score for both measures. 
Therefore, it is worthwhile to take a look at Figure 3.2, which plots each topic on both 





There are no topics occupying the bottom-left quadrant of the figure, and so there 
are no topics that are semantically incoherent and non-exclusive. There are a number of 
topics that are low on one of the two. Many of the low exclusivity topics are easily 
explained. Topics 12 and 42 cover the closely related issues of candidate authenticity and 
candidate relatability, respectively, for instance. The topics low in semantic cohesion are 
harder to explain. There does not appear to be a definitive pattern. But the overall 
conclusion from this figure is that the model fit appears to be quite good. Most topics are 
clustered in the quadrant that is high in both semantic cohesion and exclusivity and none 





Next, I turn to the model fit statistics for the topic model of the corpus analyzed in 
Chapter 6. The Lee and Mimno algorithmic method suggests the best fit for the data is an 
88-topic model. Given the dramatic increase in the size of the corpus and the increased 
diversity of sources, this minimal increase was slightly surprising. As such, I expanded 
the range of the number of topics I also modeled as a point of comparison. I iterated the 
model with a range of topics from 50 to 150 at intervals of 5. The results are plotted in 
Figure 3.3. 
Overall, the results are not as clear as for the partial corpus utilized in Chapter 5. 
All the trends tend to be far more linear. But looking at the axes provides some evidence 
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for the surprisingly restrained number of topics. The loss of semantic coherence with an 
increase of topics using this model is particularly sharp while the gains made in 
exclusivity and held-out likelihood are more minimal. The tradeoff between semantic 
coherence and exclusivity appears to be skewed against the former, leading to the 
selection of a smaller number of topics. Overall, I find evidence supporting the use of an 
88-topic model, although admittedly less supportive than for the partial corpus. 
 
Figure 3.4 plots the semantic coherence and exclusivity of each topic from the 
model of the full corpus. Once again, there are no topics in the lower-right corner, 
meaning there are no topics than are both incoherent and non-exclusive. There are a very 
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small number of topics that are low in exclusivity overall, and only a handful more than 
are semantically incoherent. The estimation of the individual topics appears to be good.  
Topic Validation 
 
Model fit statistics can be useful. But they are hardly the end-all, be-all. As with 
many other statistical methods, prioritizing model fit can negatively affect the ability to 
generalize from the model. And my goal is not to run the best model I can but to gain the 
most knowledge from the model I can. As such, a well-fitted model with nonsensical 
topic categorizations is of no use.  
Here, I take up an admittedly minor validation attempt. To do so, I investigated 
each topic for both the models of the partial corpus and full corpus by surveying the 
words most closely associated with that topic and also by reading documents that score 
highest on each topic. I then assigned my own label to each topic. The results, including a 
short excerpt of a representative document for each topic, can be found in Appendix A.  
With regards to the labels I assigned, I found that topics could be placed into a 
classification scheme. This typology was inductively created, but it does bear some 
resemblance to the one used in the hand-coded content analysis described above. While 
each topic has a unique label, I also created some overarching categories: American 
Values, Campaign Activities, Candidate Backgrounds, Candidates, Candidate Traits, 
Careers, Crime, Culture Issues, Economics, Education, Energy, Environment, Foreign 
Policy, Government Administration, Governing Philosophy, Horserace, Immigration, 





To measure convergence, I utilize the theta scores for each topic in each 
document. Theta measures the percentage match between a given topic and a single 
document. Each document therefore has a theta score for each of the 82 or 88 topics 
estimated by the topic models. I aggregated these theta scores into monthly time units for 
the candidate speech documents and media story documents separately so as to measure 
the agenda of each. I choose a monthly time unit due to data availability as a shorter unit 
of time, for example a week, led to a great deal of missingness in the series. Given the 
time series nature of this data, missingness could pose a significant problem and needed 
to be minimized. I calculated the average theta score for each topic for each 
candidate(media)-month which represented the proportion of the candidate’s(media’s) 
agenda dedicated to that topic in that month. I then merged the candidate-month and 
media-month data back together and calculated the convergence score between the two in 
the same manner as was done with the PPAC. 
Experimental Design 
 
Finally, to test the effect of media convergence in primaries on attitudes toward 
candidates and correct voting behavior I implement a laboratory experiment. Doing so 
requires a baseline where subjects receive information from a candidate about an issue, 
and then treatment groups where subjects are given that same message plus news stories 
that either converge or diverge from the issues the candidate talked about. The subjects’ 
attitudes toward the candidate are then measured and the hypotheses tested based on 
differences across treatment groups relative to the control group.  
Assessing correct voting behavior is important for two reasons. First, it requires 
measuring whether the vote choice was “correct.” Doing so can be difficult without 
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making severe assumptions about how voters should behave. To minimize the reliance on 
unnecessary assumptions, I utilize a measure based on one used by Lau and Redlawsk 
(2006). They provided subjects with more time and a more complete set of information 
after the experimental manipulation and allowed subjects to revise their vote choice. This 
approach is not necessarily perfect, but it allows subjects to approximate full information 
without the researcher simple assuming whom they should have voted for. The correct 
support hypothesis is supported if there are significant differences in information search 
behavior and vote switching across treatment groups relative to the control, specifically 
with subjects in the low(high) convergence treatment group spending more(less) time 
searching for more information and being more(less) likely to reconsider their vote 
choice.  
The second issue is how to assess what is a candidate’s “best case.” The 
normative argument I advance rests on the point that candidates are better incentivized 
and have greater resources to dedicate to finding what is the best information to win 
voters over to their side. They also have greater resources than I do. How am I to figure 
out what information would represent a candidate’s “best case”? 
To answer this, I leverage the limitations of generalizability from using 
undergraduate students as experimental subjects to my advantage. Candidates for the 
presidency frequently give speeches at large universities. One would presume that they 
would focus these speeches toward issues they think work best to win over such an 
audience. If I look at what issues real candidates used in real speeches at universities, 
then I can presumably approximate a candidate’s “best case” in such an environment. 
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With those discussions in place, I now turn to explaining the experiment. Subjects 
started with a pre-test asking for demographics and typical political questions (political 
interest, trust in media). Among those were questions concerning party registration. 
Subjects were assigned to a primary based on what party they choose. Subjects who did 
not identify with a party choose which party’s primary to participate in.  
Subjects were assigned to one of three groups within their party primary: one 
control group and two treatment groups. All subjects in all groups received a press 
release from a campaign containing excerpts of prepared remarks. The press release was 
modelled after those circulated by campaigns. The quotes themselves were taken almost 
verbatim from real speeches given by real candidates in recent party primaries. For 
subjects participating in the Democratic primary, they were from an event held by 
Elizabeth Warren at George Mason University. For subjects in the Republican primary, 
they were from a speech given by Marco Rubio at Iowa State University. Both 
candidates’ names were changed to the hypothetical “Senator Alex Simmons” to 
minimize the threat of strongly held attitudes toward prominent political figures to the 
internal validity of the experiment. This is especially important for the subjects 
participating in the Republican primary as the experiment might imply Marco Rubio was 
challenging incumbent President Donald Trump.  
In the control group, the subjects read a news articles on a miscellaneous topic 
(caramelizing onions) after reading this press release. In the high convergence treatment 
group, subjects read a news article summarizing the candidate’s remarks in the manner of 
a typical event coverage story. In the low convergence treatment group, subjects read a 
news article about the candidate’s policy on a topic not mentioned in the press release. 
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For both candidates, this other policy is foreign policy. Specifically, the article discusses 
a planned foreign trip. This topic was chosen for a few reasons. First, foreign policy was 
not prominently discussed by either candidate, keeping comparisons between the 
Republican and Democratic primaries as similar as possible. Second, as descriptive 
analysis in Chapter 4 shows, foreign policy is a topic the media reports on heavily, 
boosting the experiment’s external validity. Third, a foreign trip provided a means of 
discussing an issue unrelated to the candidates’ messages while still remaining neutral in 
tone and without supplying much new information. As such, what is materially varied 
between the two treatment groups is the convergence to the candidate’s message not the 
tone of the media coverage or the opportunity for more learning by the subject.  
Following this article, subjects were asked a number of questions about their 
attitudes toward the candidate, most notably if they think the candidate cares about the 
important issues, a feeling thermometer of overall warmth toward the candidate, and vote 
choice. After these questions, subjects were asked an attention check question (which 
issues were mentioned in the original press release).  
Following this battery of questions, subjects were offered a chance to peruse a 
PDF file containing more information about the candidate if they were interested. These 
files contained biographical information and policy positions pulled directly from 
campaign websites. Each file had a hyperlinked table of contents to help subjects identify 
the information they most wanted to see. Subjects were not required to spend any 
specified amount of time looking at the file and could choose not to open it at all if they 
preferred. Subjects were then asked if they would like to change their vote and, if so, 





This chapter discussed the methodology employed to test the hypotheses derived 
in Chapter 2. It discussed the construction of two corpora which will be analyzed in 
Chapters 4-6. It also discussed the experimental design employed in Chapter 7. Further 
information including codebooks, validation tests of measurements, and the experimental 
stimuli can be found in Appendix A. In the empirical chapters to follow I include only 
limited discussion of the creation and design of the data sources and instead focus the 
methodological discussion on the measurement of independent and control variables and 


















Chapter 4: The Effect of Rhetorical Newsworthiness Cues on Agenda 
Convergence 
 
''I spent the last four years at the Ethics and Public Policy Center giving lectures all over 
the country on radical jihadism and the 'Gathering Storm of the 21st Century.' I haven't 
done squat on moral, cultural issues.'' – Rick Santorum26 
 
As Rick Santorum launched his ultimately unsuccessful candidacy for the 2012 
GOP nomination, he took some time to complain to The New York Times about the media 
coverage he was receiving. Despite spending time out of government primarily as a 
consultant for a think tank specializing in foreign policy and an announcement speech 
dedicated mostly to blue-collar economic issues and his opposition to the Affordable 
Care Act, Santorum suggested he was being caricatured as only a “culture warrior.” He 
seemed frustrated at his inability to drive media coverage to the topics he wanted to talk 
about. 
Santorum is hardly an outlier in his ire. Many presidential primary candidates 
complain openly about the media not focusing on the “important issues.” And it seems 
likely that even those who don’t publicly express annoyance harbor some resentment that 
the media coverage doesn’t meet their ideal. But can candidates drive the topics of media 
fascination? Or is the news decided by features and forces outside the candidate’s 
control? 
Given the abundant evidence of media agenda-setting powers (Feezell 2018, 
Iyengar and Kinder 1987, King, Schneer, and White 2017, McCombs and Shaw 1972), 
candidates are right to fret about what the media are talking about. And there has been a 
well-deserved emphasis by political communication scholars on how the media agenda is 
 
26 As quoted in Seelye, Katharine Q. “’Culture Warrior’ Looks to Broaden the Battle.” The New York 
Times, June 6, 2011. 
70 
 
constructed as well (Boydstun 2013). But is the media agenda set regardless of the 
candidates’ actions or can candidates exert some influence through their messaging 
strategies? This chapter seeks to answer this question by applying the contextual theory 
of newsworthiness values discussed in Chapter 2 to the Presidential Primary 
Announcement Text Corpus (PPAC) described in Chapter 3. It shows how variation in 
the more readily adjustable features of candidate messaging can result in differing levels 
of appeal to journalism norms, in turn affecting the extent to which a candidate’s 
preferred messaging penetrates into the media agenda. 
Specifically, I argue that candidates can appeal to newsworthiness values by 
altering elements of the presentation of their agenda so reporters will detect conflict, 
human interest, and simplicity appeals, thereby finding their messaging more 
newsworthy. In the context of presidential primary announcements, I argue that candidate 
expressions of anger will be seen as conflict. References to a candidate’s backstory or 
personal brand will be seen as human interest. And the use of easily comprehensible 
language and narrow topical focus will be viewed as linguistic and narrative simplicity. 
Appealing to any of these values should increase the similarity between the candidate’s 
agenda and the media’s agenda when covering that candidate. Briefly, the results support 
my theory with regards to conflict and human interest, but not with regards to either 
simplicity hypothesis. 
Can Candidates Control the Conversation? 
 
All candidates face strong incentives to get their messages out into the media and 
therefore try to do so. But not all candidates succeed. How much of that success or failure 
has to do with the messaging strategies that candidates utilize? Or is the difference in 
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success effectively preordained by how the media assesses the candidate’s electoral 
fortunes or the candidate’s inherent traits like party, gender, or race? Put another way, if 
Rick Santorum was upset that the media didn’t adhere to the agenda he presented, is there 
something Rick Santorum could have done about it? 
The contextual theory of newsworthiness values suggests that there was. 
Candidates can get their message across if they design their message to be appealing to a 
reporter in the audience. The reporter on the trail will value the same general aspects of a 
story as any other journalists: traits like conflict, human interest, simplicity, timeliness, 
etc. But how they are likely to define those terms, how they will recognize them in the 
news events they cover is context-specific. Understanding both the general 
newsworthiness values and the context of primary campaign announcements therefore 
can lead to the derivation of testable hypotheses. 
The strategic news management (Pfetsch 1999, Sanders et al. 2011) and 
information subsidization (Crouse 1975, Gandy 1982, Lancendorfer and Lee 2010, Turk 
1986) literatures suggest that campaigns can leverage the finite resources and expertise of 
journalists to convey messages and build their agendas (Dalmus, Hänggli, and Bernhard 
2017, Lang and Lang 1983). These literatures are not incongruent with the contextual 
theory of newsworthiness values. But these literatures are primarily concerned with how 
interested entities can either solicit coverage or spin developing news stories via direct 
interaction with the media in the form of press releases or other means of controlling the 
flow of content. Political campaigns assuredly utilize such techniques, but they also 
engage in activities where contact with the media is only indirect and the ability to 
leverage such features of the newsmaking process are limited: rallies, town halls, meet 
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and greets, etc. Campaigns still express their agendas in such formats, and in fact are able 
to do so in a more thorough and pluralistic fashion than they can in short press releases. 
Journalists observe the candidates in such environments and draw impressions from those 
events that influence coverage. Yet the typical means of influencing the media’s agenda 
laid out in the strategic news management and information subsidization literatures, like 
formatting content to mimic news stories and distributing content in rhythm with the 
media’s production schedules, do not neatly apply. I argue that candidates can instead 
rely on rhetorical cues to appease journalism’s newsworthiness norms as a means of 
improving messaging success.   
I focus specifically on the newsworthiness values of conflict, human interest, and 
simplicity. These values are prominent in the academic literature, are commonly 
mentioned in journalism textbooks, and could create incentives for candidates to rely on 
normatively undesirable messaging strategies, justifying this focus. In campaign 
announcement speeches, where candidates often attempt to keep the focus primarily on 
themselves and therefore abstain from direct attacks (Haynes and Rhine 1998), conflict 
will largely be found in the invocation of anger. Scholars of emotion define anger as “a 
sense of displeasure plus the urge to do some of the things that remove or harm its agent” 
(Frijda 1988, p. 351). Anger therefore lines up closely with conflict, which also requires 
an adversarial entity and some sort of expressed or expected activity to pit the two against 
each other. Candidates who have angrier speaking styles should therefore be more 
appealing to journalists’ sense of newsworthiness, who will then respond with coverage 
more representative of the issues the candidate emphasizes.  
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H1.1 (Conflict Hypothesis): Agenda similarity between a candidate and the media will be 
greater the more anger-laden language the candidate invokes. 
Moving on to the human-interest newsworthiness value, journalists should be 
attracted to more relatable stories. In the context of a campaign, candidates can vary in 
this regard by differing in how often they invoke themselves. Candidates who mention 
their own biographies, accomplishments, and traits (which I collectively refer to as 
“candidate-based appeals”) should be more interesting to journalists because they are 
personifying their campaigns. This leads me to the hypothesis that: 
H1.2 (Human-interest Hypothesis): Agenda similarity between a candidate and the media 
will be greater the more the candidate-based appeals the candidate invokes. 
I provide two related contextual definitions of simplicity. First, journalists should 
find clear language to be linguistically simpler and therefore newsworthy, as it will be 
easier to relay to their audiences. Second, reporters should find candidate messages that 
are narrowly focused to have a simpler narrative structure. Candidates who define their 
agenda with a small number of issues should have a more identifiable themes for 
journalists to convey in their coverage than candidates who embrace a wide array of 
issues. Therefore, the two simplicity hypotheses are: 
H1.3 (Linguistic Simplicity Hypothesis): Agenda similarity between a candidate and the 
media will be greater the simpler the language the candidate invokes. 
H1.4 (Narrative Simplicity Hypothesis): Agenda similarity between a candidate and the 
media will be greater the narrower a range of issues a candidate message is focused on. 




To test these hypotheses, I utilize the PPAC. A full description of the corpus 
construction and coding procedures can be found in Chapter 3. As an abridged 
explanation, this corpus includes candidate announcement speeches and media coverage 
of those candidates by The New York Times, the Washington Post, and ABC News in the 
ensuing week for most candidates from 1984-2016.27 Each paragraph of all the text was 
coded into one of 15 issue topics via human-coded content analysis. The percentages of 
documents by each actor in each topic were then used to calculate a convergence score 
(Sigelman and Buell 2004) between the agenda of the candidate and the agenda of the 
media outlet. This means that the unit of analysis in the data is a candidate-media dyad 
where each media outlet is separate. For example, Donald Trump-The New York Times, 
Donald Trump-Washington Post, and Donald Trump-ABC News are three separate units 
in the data.  
Next, I turn to the covariates used to model convergence. To measure the amount 
of anger language a candidate uses, I utilized the NRC Word-Emotion Association 
Lexicon, or EmoLex. EmoLex is a dictionary built to measure emotions and positive-
negative affect using crowd-sourced coding of different common words and bigrams 
(Mohammad and Turney 2013). I applied the anger dictionary to the candidate speeches 
then calculated the percentage of each speech that was composed of anger words.28 As a 
robustness check, I also utilized the percentage of anger words according to the 
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) dictionaries. 
 
27 I retrieved an announcement speech for 110 of the 117 candidates. A description of which candidates are 
not included can be found in Chapter 3. These candidates are omitted from the analysis. 
28 Validation tests of this variable can be found in Appendix B. 
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One of the issues in the codebook is candidate-based appeals. I use the percentage 
of the candidate’s speeches that falls into this category as the primary variable testing 
H1.2. For robustness checks I also utilize the Authenticity score and percentage of “I” 
references from the LIWC dictionaries. 
Following Black et al. (2016), I measured linguistic complexity by running a 
number of different algorithms that assess linguistic complexity via the korpus R package 
then extracting factor scores from this first dimension of a Principal Components 
Analysis. 
To test H1.4, I calculated the inverse normalized form of Shannon’s H entropy for 
each speech. This has been used in political communication studies to measure the degree 
of agenda congestion (Boydstun 2013). The inverse normalized form can range from 0 to 
1, with higher scores reflecting an agenda that is more narrowly focused on a small 
number of issues and lower score reflecting an agenda that is broadly dispersed over a 
larger number of issues. 
I also include a number of candidate- and media-level controls. The candidate-
level controls include the party, race, gender, and dummy variables capturing previous 
work experience (governor and senator). To capture the electoral viability of the 
candidate, I retrieved polls around the time of the announcement for each candidate from 
the Roper iPoll archive. I prioritized polls that were released immediately prior to the 
announcement to capture the media’s understanding of the candidate’s in-the-moment 
viability, although in several cases I had to utilize polls that were in the field during the 
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announcement or a few weeks prior instead.29 The media-level controls include dummy 
variables for the Washington Post and ABC News. 






Before delving into models of agenda convergence, it is useful to look at broader 
patterns of issue agendas. Figure 4.1 plots the percentage of messages in each category, 
non-codable omitted, for all candidates and The New York Times, the Washington Post, 
and ABC News. 
Figure 4.1 makes clear that candidates, in aggregate, focus their attention on four 
primary topic categories: candidate-based appeals, the economy, international affairs, and 
American values. The other 10 categories are used much more sparingly. The media also 
spend significant attention on three of those categories. However, the media talk about 
candidate-based appeals more than the candidates themselves. For both the Washington 
Post and ABC News it is the most utilized category, while it is the second most 
commonly featured for The New York Times. Both the economy and international affairs 
are discussed extensively by all media organizations, the latter topic being particularly 
popular with ABC News. Finally, the media do not talk about American values almost at 
all, a finding that is in line with previous work on general elections (Hart 2000). Instead, 
 
29 Because early polling tends to proxy more for name recognition than electoral viability, I also replicated 
the analysis using a variable measuring the amount of early fundraising done by the candidate relative to 
their competitors. The results remain consistent. 
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the media focus a great deal of attention on the horserace, making it the most utilized 
category by The New York Times and second most utilized by both ABC News and the 
Washington Post. This also reinforces previous findings from general elections (Patterson 
1993, 2016, Searles and Banda 2019).30  
 
Next, I generated figures of these topic breakdowns independently for Republican 
and Democratic candidates as well as the media coverage of Republican and Democratic 
candidates. Interpretation of differences requires pause as each election year carries its 
own idiosyncrasies. But by aggregating 14 primaries (seven Republican and seven 
Democratic) across nine election cycles, some smoothing of these idiosyncrasies should 
occur. 
 
30 Difference-in-means tests, all candidates. Candidate appeals: NYT-Candidates β = .051, p = .027; WaPo-
Candidates β = .148, p < .000; ABC-Candidates β = .121, p < .000. Economic Appeals: NYT-Candidates β 
= -.063, p = .000; WaPo-Candidates β = -.064, p = .000; ABC-Candidates β = -.069, p = .000. American 
Values: NYT-Candidates β = -.140, p < .000; WaPo-Candidates β = -.162, p < .000; ABC-Candidates β = -
.143, p < .000. Horserace: NYT-Candidates β = .250, p < .000; WaPo-Candidates β = .187, p < .000; ABC-




Looking at just the speeches and media coverage of Republican candidates 
(Figure 4.2) produces results mostly in line with Figure 4.1. Republican candidates 
dedicate most of their agenda to the same four issues. The media similarly overrepresent 
candidate-based appeals relative to candidate speeches, cover the economy in roughly 
similar proportion to candidates, and completely ignore American values appeals. The 
media still dedicate a great deal of attention to the horserace when covering Republican 
candidates. It seems that the differences between candidates and the Washington Post 
coverage on international affairs appeals is bigger among Republican candidates than for 
aggregate candidates.31 
 
31 Difference-in-means tests, Republican candidates. Candidate appeals: NYT-Candidates β = .039, p = 
.187; WaPo-Candidates β = .146, p < .000; ABC-Candidates β = .179, p < .000. American Values: NYT-
Candidates β = -.148, p < .000; WaPo-Candidates β = -.161, p < .000; ABC-Candidates β = -.156, p < .000. 
Horserace: NYT-Candidates β = .266, p < .000; WaPo-Candidates β = .185, p < .000; ABC-Candidates β = 
.168, p < .000. International Affiars: NYT-Candidates β = -.029, p = .217; WaPo-Candidates β = -.054, p < 





This difference is borne out when looking just among Democratic candidates and 
the ensuing media coverage (Figure 4.3). While most of the results here are the same as 
those among Republican candidate-media dyads, The New York Times and the 
Washington Post cover international affairs at approximately the same proportion as 
Democratic candidates. That said, all media outlets discuss the economy with regards to 
Democratic primary candidates much less than the Democratic candidates.32  
Overall, these results suggest that the media possess a general bias toward 
candidate appeals and the horserace and away from American values. The Washington 
Post displays a bias toward covering Republican candidates’ economic appeals and both 
the Washington Post and The New York Times bias toward covering Democratic 
 
32 Difference-in-means tests, Democratic candidates. International Affairs: NYT-Candidates β = -.012, p = 
.731; WaPo-Candidates β = -.018, p < .616; ABC-Candidates β = -.015, p < .692. Economy: NYT-
Candidates β = -.068, p < .018; WaPo-Candidates β = -.072, p < .013; ABC-Candidates β = -.048, p < 120. 
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candidates’ international affairs appeals, although these observed differences by party are 
modest.  
Convergence in Context 
 
To give a sense of the distribution of convergence scores and make interpretation 
of results easier, I provide Table 4.1. Table 4.1 gives the top three issues discussed in a 
candidate speech and in the ensuing media coverage of one media outlet for three 
candidates: one approximately a standard deviation below the mean, one at the mean, and 
one approximately a standard deviation above the mean observed convergence score. It is 
useful to conceptualize what more or less proportional media coverage means in practical 
terms. 
Starting at the top row, in Jim Gilmore’s announcement speech he attempted to 
define his agenda around a single issue: international affairs. Other topics were 
comparatively marginal. And yet a person who only heard of Gilmore’s announcement 
via the Washington Post would get the impression that Gilmore’s candidacy was about 
his electoral position, his personality, and his policies on the environment. 
 







































































Jeb Bush did not have any single topic that made up as large a portion of his 
announcement speech. Instead he divided his attention between a broader number of 
topics, with the three most prominent being his personal appeal as a candidate, the 
economy, and international affairs. Once again, a majority of the media’s coverage was 
about Jeb’s candidate-based appeals or horserace coverage. Bush was seemingly 
successful at making himself the talking point, although he was unsuccessful in driving 
coverage to secondary issues. 
Finally, John Kasich’s announcement speech similarly focused on his own appeal 
as a candidate and the economy. The amount of candidate-based appeals in the media 
coverage by the Washington Post was proportional to his own focus on the subject. 
Furthermore, while there was again a large amount of horserace coverage, the third-most 
discussed topic by the Washington Post was the economy, Kasich’s second-most 
emphasized issue. 
Horserace coverage of candidates is a near constant, but there is still meaningful 
variation in the content of media coverage of presidential primary candidates. While the 
media do prioritize discussion of candidate-based appeals, candidates do not all 
experience the same amount of this coverage. Similarly, candidates appear differentially 
able to drive media coverage to other topics. Some cannot get their agenda into the 
coverage while others can. The ability to do so may have implications for how those 
candidates are perceived and evaluated by voters. 
Agenda Convergence 
 
I next analyze the level of candidate-media agenda convergence via three OLS 
regression models (Table 4.2). Model 1 serves as a baseline, regressing convergence on 
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the four independent variables, standardized to make interpretation of substantive 
significance easier. The percentage of anger words in the candidate speech is a positive 
predictor of convergence scores, as hypothesized. The difference between one standard 
deviation above the mean and one standard deviation below the mean is correlated with a 
difference of .05 in convergence, or a third of one standard deviation. The percentage of a 
speech dedicated to personal appeals is also a positive predictor of convergence. 
Furthermore, it is twice as substantively powerful.  
The readability score does not approach any level of substantive or statistical 
significance and so the linguistic simplicity hypothesis is unsupported by the baseline 
model. While the Inverse Shannon H Entropy measure, which captures how congested 
the speech is across the various topics, does meet the traditional threshold of statistical 
significance, it is in the opposite of the hypothesized direction. The magnitude is 
equivalent to that observed for the percentage of anger language, making it notable as 
well.33 
Model 2 incorporates the aforementioned control variables. The results from the 
primary independent variables remain almost identical. Anger words and candidate-based 
appeals remain strong, positive correlates of convergence scores. The congestion of 
topics is a negative correlate of convergence, albeit weaker. And the readability of the 




33 Post-hoc analysis revealed a significant outlier affecting this result. Newt Gingrich’s speech was 
exclusively coded as either economic or American values appeals, making it the highest observed value on 
agenda congestion, but coverage across all outlets focused primarily on his past scandals and comments on 
the Affordable Care Act. When Gingrich is excluded the coefficient shrinks by 25%. 
83 
 
Table 4.2: Effect of Newsworthiness Cues on Candidate-Media Convergence 
 Convergence 
 (1) (2) (3) 
% Anger Language (EmoLex), Standardized 0.025* 0.023* 0.017* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
% Candidate Appeals, Standardized 0.055* 0.055* 0.053* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Readability Score, Standardized -0.0005 0.001 0.0003 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Inverse Shannon H Entropy, Standardized -0.025* -0.025* -0.024* 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Poll Standing  -0.0001 -0.00001 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
GOP  0.002 0.004 
  (0.018) (0.024) 
Black  -0.023 -0.034 
  (0.032) (0.033) 
Woman  -0.009 -0.005 
  (0.064) (0.068) 
Governor  -0.017 -0.026 
  (0.020) (0.022) 
Senator  -0.010 -0.012 
  (0.020) (0.021) 
WaPo  -0.008 -0.009 
  (0.019) (0.019) 
ABC  -0.089* -0.088* 
  (0.021) (0.021) 
Constant 0.473* 0.510* 0.490* 
 (0.008) (0.025) (0.037) 
Observations 286 282 282 
R2 0.153 0.221 0.251 






Most of the candidate-level control variables are substantively uninteresting. The 
inherent features of the candidate – their race, their gender, or their previous work 
experience – were not strong differentiators in terms of convergence. Neither was the 
candidate’s standings in the polls at the time of their announcement. This suggests that 
being a viable candidate is an insufficient criterion for compelling media coverage. 
Turning to the media-level controls, there is no observed difference between 
coverage in The New York Times and in the Washington Post. But coverage on ABC 
News was significantly less representative of candidate agendas than its print 
contemporaries.  
Model 3 replicates the results from Model 2 but includes year fixed effects to 
control for any variation that is introduced across election cycles. The primary results are 
indistinguishable. Anger language remains a strong correlate with convergence, as does 
the percentage of candidate appeals.  
Robustness Checks: Alternative Measures 
 
So far, the results have been in line with the conflict (H1.1) and human interest 
(H1.2) hypotheses. The results for the simplicity hypotheses have either found no support 
(H1.3) or the evidence has been limited and run counter to expectations (H1.4). Here I 
more carefully check the results with regards to the first two hypotheses via alternative 
specifications and measures. 
Model 1 (Table 4.3) serves as a robustness check for H1.1 by using an alternative 
anger dictionary from a different source: LIWC. The results neatly replicate those found 
using the EmoLex anger dictionary. The identical results suggest the above findings are 
not just a quirk of the EmoLex dictionary.  
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I further test H1.2 via two measures that tap the same construct as candidate-
based appeals (Table 4.3, Models 2 and 3). These measures should also capture the 
essence of what resonates with journalists’ ingrained preference for human-interest 
stories but are distinct from any topic used to calculate the dependent variable: LIWC’s 
measures of “authenticity” and percentage “I” references. Both are positive and 
statistically significant predictors of convergence, although neither is as substantively 
powerful as the percentage of candidate appeals. Overall, the results provide further 
evidence in favor of H1.2. 
Table 4.3: Effect of Newsworthiness Cues on Agenda Convergence, Alternative Measures 
 Convergence 
 (1) (2) (3) 
% Anger Language (LIWC), Standardized 0.022*   
 (0.009)   
% Anger Language (EmoLex), Standardized  0.021* 0.014 
  (0.010) (0.010) 
% Candidate Appeals, Standardized 0.054*   
 (0.009)   
Authenticity (LIWC), Standardized  0.038*  
  (0.009)  
% “I” References (LIWC), Standardized   0.019* 
   (0.010) 
Readability Score, Standardized -0.004 0.007 0.002 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) 
Inverse Shannon H Entropy, Standardized -0.026* -0.027* -0.024* 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Constant 0.508* 0.486* 0.497* 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) 
Observations 282 282 282 
R2 0.221 0.156 0.115 
Notes: OLS regression; * denotes p < 0.05, one-tailed; All models control for candidate- and media-level variables but not presented 




As a final point, the Emolex anger measure used in the above results falls below 
the traditional threshold of statistical significance when the percentage of “I” references 
is included (Model 3). More importantly, the coefficient in that model (Model 3) is about 
a third that found in the other models. Incorporating the percentage “I” references 
strongly diminished the substantive significance of the use of anger language on 
convergence. The evidence continues to strongly support the human-interest hypothesis 
while there is evidence, albeit slightly more equivocal, for the conflict hypothesis. Both 
the linguistic and narrative simplicity hypotheses are still unsupported.  
Robustness Checks: Alternative Explanations for Results 
 
Finally, I consider several alternative explanations for the results presented so far 
via a series of robustness checks (Table 4.4). The first column accounts for the possibility 
that the media have certain issue topics that they would prefer to cover, including 
candidate-based appeals, and that it is not any prevailing newsworthiness value of 
human-interest stories that explains the observed results. The previous section, which 
used two measures unrelated to the topic of candidate-based appeals and found the same 
results, should alleviate some of these concerns. But to further account for the possibility 
I also control for the percentage of candidate attention to other topics the media have a 
proclivity for: economic, international affairs, and horserace appeals. While two of them 
(the percentage of the speech devoted to economic and international affairs issues) do 
meet traditional levels of statistical significance, the proportions of these appeals in a 
candidate’s speech are not nearly as substantively powerful correlates with convergence 
as the percentage of candidate appeals. This provides further evidence that it is something 
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specific about playing to the media’s preference for human interest stories that drives 
media coverage, not just addressing a topic the media prefers to cover overall. 
Table 4.4: Effect of Newsworthiness Cues on Candidate-Media Convergence, Robustness 
Checks 
 Convergence 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
% Anger Language (EmoLex), Standardized 0.025* 0.020* 0.030* 0.035* 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) 
% Negative Language (EmoLex), Standardized   -0.011  
   (0.012)  
% Emotion Language (EmoLex), Standardized    -0.023* 
    (0.011) 
% Candidate Appeals, Standardized 0.062* 0.070* 0.055* 0.053* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Readability Score, Standardized 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.0001 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
Inverse Shannon H Entropy, Standardized -0.030* -0.017* -0.026* -0.025* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
% Economic Appeals, Standardized 0.017*    
 (0.010)    
% Int’l Affairs Appeals, Standardized 0.016*    
 (0.010)    
% Horserace Appeals, Standardized 0.009    
 (0.009)    
Constant 0.506* 0.569* 0.510* 0.498* 
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) 
Observations 282 281 282 282 
R2 0.233 0.269 0.223 0.234 
Notes: OLS regression; * denotes p < 0.05, one-tailed; Convergence score in Model 2 omits horserace from calculation; All models 
control for candidate- and media-level variables but not presented here to preserve space. 
 
Model 2 tests if the results are substantively minor compared to the well-
established tendency of the media to game-frame coverage (Patterson 1993, 2016, Searles 
and Banda 2019). I treat horserace appeals as an excluded category in calculating 
88 
 
convergence scores. Using this variant of the dependent variable with the same covariates 
produces the same results. Anger and candidate-based appeals correlate with convergence 
separate from any effects on horserace coverage. 
Models 3 and 4 address potential explanations for the results pertaining to H1.1. 
While I argue that the theoretical mechanism underpinning the observed correlation 
between candidate anger and convergence lies in anger’s conflict-laden nature, there are 
alternative explanations that need to be accounted for. First, anger is a negatively charged 
emotion. The media tend to prefer negative news stories (Soroka 2012, 2014). Perhaps 
anger is correlated with convergence not because it is a signal of contextual conflict but 
because it is negative. To test for this possibility, I include the standardized measure of 
the percentage of negative affect words in the candidate’s speech, calculated by applying 
the associated EmoLex dictionary. If it is negativity, not conflict, driving the correlation 
between anger and convergence then including this control should mitigate the 
substantive strength of anger. But anger remains a powerful, positive correlate of 
convergence while negativity is weak and statistically insignificant. It would appear that 
the relationship between anger and convergence cannot be explained by anger’s negative 
affective charge. 
Second, perhaps it is emotional cues in general, and not specifically anger, that 
are enticing to journalists. An infrequently mentioned newsworthiness value is drama. 
Dramas revolve around strong displays of resonant emotions. It might be the case that 
anger is related to convergence because it is an emotional cue that draws audiences in 
(Newhagen 1998) not because it is a signal of contextual conflict. To account for this 
possibility, I added together the counts for all eight EmoLex emotion dictionaries, 
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divided the sum by the total word count, and then standardized that percentage. If it is the 
connection between anger and drama, a connection forged by its general emotional 
resonance, that is the mechanism behind the observed results then accounting for the 
aggregate level of emotionality in the candidate’s speech should weaken the relationship. 
Including the candidate’s aggregate emotional cues as a control variable does not 
diminish the effect of anger and the coefficient for the percentage of emotional appeals is 
in the wrong direction. This eliminates another alternative explanation for the relationship 
between anger and convergence and should inspire more confidence that it is indeed 
anger’s contextual conflictual nature than explains its substantive predictive power.  
Discussion 
 
This chapter demonstrates that candidates seemingly can influence the media 
coverage they receive by appealing to the professional values of journalists. The 
statistical evidence presented suggests that rhetorical conflict and human-interest cues, 
operationalized via the percentage of anger language and amount of candidate-based 
appeals, were important positive correlates of how closely the issue agenda of a candidate 
was approximated by the issue agenda of the media while the topical narrowness 
observed in the speech was, counter to expectations, a negative correlate. These results 
were largely consistent across different model specifications and using alternative 
measures. While the evidence does not definitively prove a causal argument, much of the 
evidence lines up neatly with the theoretical expectations in such a manner that inspires 
confidence. 
It is also important to understand some of the limitations of this analysis. By 
fixating on the announcement speeches, I have necessarily avoided saying much about 
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the rest of the primary process. This was required to make firmer comparisons across 
candidates. There is an incredible diversity in electoral circumstances when comparing 
across a long campaign season like primaries. This naturally makes it extremely difficult 
to theoretically or statistically account for all those differences at a fine-grained temporal 
scale. Put another way, comparing the media reaction to a Hillary Clinton speech in May, 
2015 and April, 2016 is difficult enough because of shifting political sands. Comparing a 
Hillary Clinton speech and ensuing media coverage in May, 2015 to a Alan Keyes speech 
and ensuing media coverage in December, 1999 is even harder. Both exist in very 
specific contexts that would need to be accounted for. Announcement speeches offer a 
way around that because of their formulaic and heavily eventized nature. An 
announcement speech event in 1984 looks about the same as one in 2016. This offers a 
natural means of “controlling” for a large number of contextual factors. That said, 
primaries continue long after the announcement speech and those shifting political sands 
can be immensely meaningful, even if they do make candidate-level comparisons 
difficult. As such, I study how the nature of primaries themselves affects candidate-media 
agendas in the following chapter. 
Furthermore, the research design employed cannot say much about why 
candidates choose the agendas they do. This leaves open a serious counterargument: 
Perhaps some candidates are more successful at conveying an agenda through the media 
because they choose an agenda the media would report on anyway. There is at least one 
real-world example that appears to line up with such an explanation. Gary Bauer began 
his announcement speech with the following: 
“I came here this morning with a fairly typical political speech. The kind 
of speech that many people will be giving in the weeks ahead as they 
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decide whether to run for the Presidency of the United States or not… In 
that speech I talk about the need to have lower taxes on the American 
family. About the need to downsize government and the need to get 
bureaucracy off the backs of the American people. I talk about us having 
an American foreign policy that we can be proud of again… I talk about 
all the issues that are going to be central to this campaign. But last night, 
along with probably every American, I watched the news. I read the 
headlines this morning and I decided that given what happen yesterday in 
America, the speech I intended to give today would not have risen to the 
occasion.” 
 
The night before his scheduled announcement speech, the Columbine school 
shooting happened. And so Bauer discarded the speech he had planned to give and 
instead gave one on the “culture of death” that he argued had pervaded American society. 
It is plausible that had Bauer stuck with the initial draft of his speech and simply ignored 
the dominant story of the day, the media would have ignored him entirely. So he played 
into what the media was inclined to report on. 
The point is certainly valid. Candidate agendas are not randomly assigned or 
exogenously imposed. But candidates are constrained by a series of considerations other 
than the media: public opinion (Damore 2005), domestic economic conditions (Vavreck 
2009), their party reputations (Petrocik 1996), the need to respond to those reputations 
(Sides 2006), the candidate’s electoral situation (Haynes, Flowers, and Gurian 2002), and 
the strength of their arguments (Riker 1996). Candidates are also likely constrained by 
idiosyncratic features like their reputations and the positions of their competitors. Bauer 
was well positioned to quickly transition his message in the aftermath of Columbine 
because his career as an activist on cultural issues made him a credible voice on the 
subject and he had the sort of relevant expertise that subsidized the cost of reacting to this 
particular change in the tides of issue saliency. In a candid interview with 
FiveThirtyEight after dropping out of the race, Eric Swalwell admitted that part of the 
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decision to focus his campaign’s agenda on gun control was the fact that none of his 
rivals for the 2020 Democratic nomination had identified that as a pivotal issue.34 
Constructing an agenda to echo the media’s current focus can mean eschewing all 
of these other considerations, which would be a costly decision. In fact, the constraint of 
the media seems minor in comparison. Crafting an agenda that matches the media’s 
preferred issue content that is not the candidate’s best case for persuading and motivating 
voters, donors, and elites would simply not be an effective electoral strategy. As such, 
while the methodology employed here is not well suited to disentangle this endogeneity, 
for theoretical reasons I argue that the potential threat is not significant. 
It is worth considering the implications of these findings. What does it mean that 
candidates are able to get their agendas covered by invoking more anger and candidate-
based appeals? It means that the candidates are incentivized to do so, which in turn means 
an increase in those types of messages. This could have important and normatively 
undesirable effects on the primary electorate as a whole. Research into the emotional 
underpinnings of racial attitudes has shown that invoking anger tends to increase the 
usage of symbolic racist attitudes (Banks 2014) and that anger is not a rhetorical option 
for black candidates (Phoenix 2019), for example. And encouraging candidates to define 
campaigns around themselves promotes messaging strategies that are unlikely to aid 
voters in comprehending the complexities of politics. When politics is understood as the 
interactions of a handful of political elites, the rules and coalitions that play important 
parts can disappear in the imagination of public consciousness. I return to these 





Chapter 5: The Effect of Volatile Fields on Media Coverage of Primaries 
 
“Imagine a sport where you spend 1 year [hopping] on one leg and not using the other, 
then suddenly having to run a marathon.35” – Zach Weinersmith, cartoonist 
 
This chapter takes up the question of how the structure of primaries intersects 
with the media’s professional newsworthiness values to affect news coverage of the 
candidates. Presidential primaries are radically different contests from the general 
elections that follow. They are long, sequential affairs in which candidates often start 
campaigning nearly a year before the first in a concatenation of caucuses and primaries. 
They are also multicandidate, leading to volatility in the field as candidates hop in and 
out of the race. How do these contextual campaign conditions affect the way the media 
perceives the newsworthiness of the race? 
Answering this question is important for two main reasons. First, experimental 
evidence shows that media emphasis of issues affects what issues the public thinks are 
most important (Feezell 2018, Iyengar and Kinder 1987, King, Schneer, and White 2017, 
McCombs and Shaw 1972). As such, if the structure of the primaries affects media 
responsiveness to candidate agendas then there is the potential for downstream effects on 
public opinion. Second, and relatedly, the parties should want the nominee to finish the 
primary having cemented a particular agenda in the minds of voters so he or she has 
established a national profile. They should want their nominee to have a head start in 
developing a recognizable brand. Therefore, understanding how the structure of primaries 





parties trying to devise a primary system that leaves them well positioned for the general 
election.  
The Rules of the Race and Newsworthiness 
 
I argue that the structure of the primary system should create a set of 
circumstances that systematically varies the newsworthiness, specifically the timeliness 
and contextual simplicity, journalists perceive the race, and therefore the candidates, as 
possessing. Starting with an application of timeliness, I expect that candidates will 
attempt to stay consistent or “on-message” in their agenda in order to maximize the 
chances that a potential primary voter will encounter their core message. This should 
contrast with the journalistic value of timeliness as the repetition of the message will 
naturally reduce its timely component relative to other, more zeitgeist-y approaches to 
discussing the race. Media responsiveness to a candidate’s agenda should, therefore, 
decrease on average as the primary campaign goes on and the candidate’s agenda 
becomes old news.  
H2.1 (Timeliness Hypothesis): Agenda similarity between candidate messages and media 
coverage will decrease over time. 
Second, I consider how the multicandidate nature of primaries and the volatility it 
introduces interacts with media preference for contextual simplicity in news stories. I 
argue that an expanding field should create a less contextually simple race. As the field 
expands to include more potential nominees, evaluating the messages of each candidate 
should become more complicated. It will be harder for journalists to divine the most 
important fault lines between candidates and convey their agendas. This should occur via 
two mechanisms. First, the introduction of new contenders creates more permutations of 
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pairwise comparisons between the candidates which makes the race appear more 
complicated as there are more ways of analyzing it. Second, more candidates means more 
messages, each offered with an argument that this is the most compelling campaign news 
of the day. Journalists reporting on the primary race will be aware of these myriad 
messages which will lead to uncertainty about the relative newsworthiness of any one 
candidate’s agenda. Over time, journalists will adapt to the field and so it is not the 
number of candidates per se that will lead to reductions in contextual simplicity but the 
shock of an expansion in the field, shifts that are only possible because of the volatility 
multicandidate races allow, that will affect newsworthiness. In contrast, contractions in 
the size of the field should have an opposite, clarifying effect. Winnowing (Haynes et al. 
2004, Norrander 2000, 2006, Steger, Hickman, and Yohn 2002) should make the 
messages of the candidates that remain simpler for journalists because the agendas will 
stand out more clearly against a less noisy electoral context of alternative messages. This 
leads to my second hypothesis: 
H2.2 (Contextual Simplicity Hypothesis): Agenda similarity between candidate messages 
and media coverage will decrease when the field expands. 
If the evidence supports the timeliness hypothesis, then I argue the parties should 
strongly consider shortening the primary season and providing incentives against early 
entry into the race, for example postponing party-organized debates. If the evidence 
supports the contextual simplicity hypothesis, then I argue the parties should consider 
what means are available to them to prevent marginal candidates from entering the race 
and temporarily obfuscating the contenders’ messages and how they might time the 
winnowing process to when voters will begin to tune in.  
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I take these points up briefly in the discussion section of this chapter and in 
greater depth in the final chapter. But before that, I turn to a brief explanation of the data 
and statistical methods employed in this chapter with the caveat that interested readers 
can find a much more detailed discussion in Chapter 3.  
Data and Methods 
 
This chapter utilizes a key portion of the Presidential Primary Communication 
Corpus (PPCC). It includes the speeches throughout the primary from all candidates from 
2000-2016 and the media coverage by The New York Times and the Washington Post 
during that same time frame. I limit the analysis in this chapter to only those two media 
outlets instead of the full corpus to gather a baseline estimation and to test the durability 
of the results with different topic model outputs. These two media sources are particularly 
appropriate to use as a baseline for several reasons: other studies have similarly focused 
on these major papers (e.g. Ku, Kaid, and Pfau 2003, Vavreck 2009) and other news 
sources follow their lead (Crouse 1975, Protess and McCombs 1991). Chapter 6 
replicates the analysis using other media outlets. A full description of how these texts 
were gathered can be found in Chapter 3. 
I measured the issue agendas of the candidates and the media by applying a 
Structural Topic Model (STM) to the corpus (Roberts et al. 2014). The Lee and Mimno 
(2014) algorithmic method suggested that an 82-topic model was a particularly good fit 
for the corpus. STM calculates what proportion of each document in a corpus (in this case 
speeches and news articles) aligns with each of the 82 topics. I used these proportions to 
quantify the degree of similarity between the issues the candidates discuss and the issues 
the media covers by calculating convergence scores (Sigelman and Buell 2004). More 
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specifically, I calculated these convergence scores for each candidate-media-month (i.e. 
Hillary Clinton-NYT/WaPo-January, 2016). This time period was chosen due to data 
availability, as a shorter unit of time, for example a week, led to a great deal of 
missingness in both the candidate and media series.  
This still left some missingness in the data. Most of this missingness is from 
candidates who have only 1-2 months in their series in which there was no candidate 
speech and/or media coverage. I addressed these instances via some limited logical 
interpolation. For those months with media coverage but no candidate speeches, I used 
the candidate agenda from the preceding month. If the corpus contained no candidate 
speech for the month of November, I made the assumption that the candidate’s agenda 
did not change from October. For those months with no media coverage at all, I 
interpolated a convergence score of 0. A candidate who got no media coverage 
necessarily did not get their agenda across. Given the cross-sectional time series nature of 
the data, these assumptions prevent significant loss of data from listwise deletion (as 
entire series would need to be removed because of one missing unit) while still being 
reasonable.36 
The data are cross-sectional time series. Each unit of the data is a candidate-
media-month. Convergence scores are a continuous variable warranting OLS. 
Given the serial nature of primaries, candidates are incentivized to remain largely 
stable in terms of their agenda as not all potential voters are paying attention. In addition, 
previous work on newsmaking forces establishes that momentum matters to the media 
 
36 A small amount of this missingness stems from marginal candidates who stay in the race despite failure 
to elicit significant support. Mike Gravel’s quixotic 2008 campaign was particularly sparse. Approximately 
75% of the 24-month series (the longest campaign in the data) featured no candidate agenda. I removed 
him from the analysis due to this sparsity, but kept all other candidates. 
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agenda (Boydstun 2013). What the media wants to cover is itself strongly influenced by 
what it has covered in the past. As such, from both the candidate and media perspective 
(i.e. both halves of the convergence formula) it is extremely likely that convergence 
represents a dynamic temporal process where what has happened in the past needs to be 
accounted for in modeling the present (Keele and Kelly 2006). Therefore, I utilize the 
Koyck distributed lag model.37  
As H2.1 establishes, I expect a downward trajectory for convergence over time. 
This hypothesis will be assessed by a descriptive analysis of the pooled convergence 
series. 
To test H2.2 on the role of the volatility in multicandidate fields on media 
coverage, I use the amount of change in the number of candidates competing in the race 
in that month. For example, two candidates jumped into the 2016 GOP primary race in 
April, 2015 (Marco Rubio and Rand Paul) and is therefore +2. The 2008 Democratic race 
saw one candidate join the race (Barack Obama) and one candidate leave the race (Tom 
Vilsack) in February, 2007 and is therefore coded as a 0 net change. This variable neatly 
captures the exogenous shock to convergence that H2.2 theorizes.  
I also attempted to replicate the results from Chapter 4. As such, I included 
measures of the amount of conflict, human interest, linguistic simplicity, and narrative 
simplicity rhetorical newsworthiness cues in the candidate’s messaging in that month. 
Conflict was measured via the LIWC anger dictionary. Human interest was measured via 
 
37 I examined the data for stationarity in a number of ways. First, I assessed if the averaged series possessed 
a unit root: DF = -6.130 (p < 0.01), ADF = -3.965 (p = 0.034, lag = 1), KPSS = 0.098 (p > 0.1, lag = 2). 
Second, I ran a series of panel unit root tests via the plm R package. Because all series must be the same 
length for those tests, I clipped all series to 8 months and dropped any shorter than that: LLV = -15.779 (p 
< 0.000), IPS = -13.802 (p < 0.000), MW = 717.005 (p < 0.000); all lags selected via AIC. Third, I ran 
these same tests on series by length. These results can be found in Appendix C. Together, they suggest that 
the data are stationary.  
99 
 
the LIWC authenticity dictionary. Linguistic simplicity was measured via the application 
of a series of readability measures and a principal component analysis to extract the first 
dimension (Black et al. 2016). And narrative simplicity was measured via the Shannon H 
Inverse Entropy measure (Boydstun 2013).  
There are far more news articles in the corpus than candidate speeches. This 
creates an imbalance in the data as there are more opportunities for a wide array of issues 
to be invoked by the media simply by virtue of the difference in quantity of text. To 
account for this, I control for the number of candidate speeches in a month. More 
speeches in a month should correlate with higher convergence. The interpolation of 
candidate agendas from preceding months in the data generation process outlined above 
likely created a source of measurement error that need to be addressed. As such, I control 
for whether or not the candidate agenda was interpolated in that time unit.38  
I also introduce a number of control variables for candidate-level factors that 
might matter. These include the party, gender, race, and prior work experience (an 
indicator variable of whether or not the candidate has worked in government before) of 
the candidate. I also include a measure of standing in the polls. For most candidates from 
2008-2016, this was assessed via the Real Clear Politics average on the first day of the 
month. For all other candidates, I used the earliest poll in the month found from the 
Roper iPoll archive.  
Studies of general election campaigns suggest that the competitiveness of the race 
should affect convergence (Hayes 2010). Measuring competitiveness of multicandidate 
races is difficult as the gap between two candidates is partially conditional on the number 
 
38 Because time units with missing media coverage were assigned a convergence score of 0, controlling for 
those units would introduce a perfect predictor into the model. 
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of other candidates in the race. To measure the competitiveness of the race, I utilized a 
modified Hirschman-Herfindahl index (Steger, Hickman, and Yohn 2002). This is a 
concentration metric which captures the number of “effective” candidates that are in the 
race. I first calculated each candidate’s share of the polls in each month. The number of 
effective candidates is equal to 1 divided by the sum of the squares of each candidate’s 
poll share. Prior literature suggests that more effective candidates in a race should 
correlate with lower convergence scores. Finally, I also use election year fixed effects to 




Convergence throughout the Primary 
 
Figure 5.1 plots the mean convergence scores per month throughout the primary. 
Given the cross-sectional time series nature of the data, analyzing means provides a more 
parsimonious assessment of H2.1 than examining the 76, separate series (although plots 
of those series are available in Appendix C). The top panel plots the mean convergence 
score by month, while the bottom panel applies a LOESS smoothing function and 




From a descriptive assessment of both, it would appear that the case for an overall 
negative trend throughout the duration of the primary is nonexistent. There does appear to 
be a noticeable initial decline over the first three months, more obvious in the top panel, 
but this appears to right itself over the subsequent months. H2.1 therefore sees no 
support. In fact, there is significant evidence for a positive temporal trend. Average 
convergence later on in the primary seems to be higher than in the early months. 
There is another possibility, however. Most campaigns end well short of a year 
and some only last a few months. Perhaps this apparent positive trend stems from which 
candidates remain so deep into the election season, not how the media is reacting to 




To test this possibility, I plotted the convergence scores per month of the two 
most prominent candidates for each primary race (Figure 5.2). When looking at just the 
top contenders, who typically campaign the longest, there does not appear to be a clear 
pattern of increasing convergence over time. Some series do display such a trend, most 
notably Santorum-2012 and McCain-2008, but the vast majority are better described as 
temporally stable. In addition, while the average convergence score only crosses .30 
during the aggregated trend’s highest peaks, many of these individualized series approach 
or cross that threshold routinely. Overall, then, it would appear that the apparent increase 
in mean convergence over time stems from the fact that the candidates still campaigning 
at month 17, 18, and 19 are those already best able to elicit media coverage of their 
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agenda. Agenda convergence instead appears to be stable across the campaign. 
Regardless, the timeliness hypothesis is unsupported.  
Effect of Change in Size of the Primary Field on Convergence 
 
Moving on, Table 5.1 presents several models designed to test H2.2.39 This 
hypothesis stated that an increase in the size of the primary field should be associated 
with a decrease in convergence. The first column (Model 1) tests this hypothesis while 
also attempting to replicate the findings from Chapter 4 and controlling for the 
aforementioned candidate-level controls.  
The results support the hypothesis. Each additional candidate entering the race is 
correlated with a reduction in the convergence score of each candidate by .005 on 
average. The largest change in the data, -7 candidates in the GOP race in February, 2016, 
would therefore project to a .035 increase for each Republican candidate in the race at 
that time, on average. This difference by itself is notable, but there is also a smaller 
dynamic effect as well. A -7 candidate change in the field in time t is correlated with a 
.005 increase in convergence in time t+1 outside of any further changes in the number of 
candidates in the race. 
The replications are a mixed bag. Neither the amount of authenticity language (to 
test the human-interest hypothesis) nor readability of the candidate’s speeches (to test the 
linguistic simplicity hypothesis) are substantively notable. The topic dispersion, 
measured via the Inverse Shannon H Entropy score and included to test the narrative 
simplicity hypothesis, is once again negative which runs counter to expectations.  
 
39 I ran Breusch-Godfrey tests on each model to test the null hypothesis that there is no serial correlation in 
the model. In all instances, the null hypothesis holds. 
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The amount of anger language, measured using the LIWC dictionary, is a positive 
correlate with convergence, however. Furthermore, the effect size is substantively quite 
large relative to the other variables. The angriest unit in the data (a month where Joe 
Lieberman’s average speech was 2.3% anger words) is correlated with a convergence 
score .067 greater than a month where the candidate used no anger language.40  
Units where the candidate agenda was interpolated using a previous candidate-
month agenda are correlated with substantially lower convergence scores, on average. 
While this undoubtedly reflects a coding decision made in the data generating process, 
there may also be some theoretical insight from this result. After all, situations where 
candidates do not reset their agenda may capture some element of timeliness. It could be 
that a candidate cannot simply put an agenda out and expect the media to continue to 
repeat it in the absence of a new message. The extent to which this is the cause as 
opposed to measurement error introduced from the interpolation, however, is impossible 
to parse at this time. As expected, monthly time units with more candidate speeches are 










40 I replicated the analysis with the EmoLex measure of anger in Appendix C. The results are consistent. 
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Table 5.1: Effect of Change in Number of Candidates on Agenda Convergence  
 Convergence 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Convergence, Lagged 0.137* 0.116* 0.112* 0.108* 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) 
Change in # of Candidates -0.005* -0.007* -0.007* -0.012* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
% Anger Words (LIWC) 0.029* 0.029* 0.028* 0.027* 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
% Authentic Words (LIWC) 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Readability 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Inverse Shannon H Entropy -0.291* -0.278* -0.292* -0.271* 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) 
Interpolated Candidate Agenda -0.076* -0.075* -0.072* -0.071* 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
# of Candidate Speeches in Month 0.003* 0.003* 0.004* 0.005* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Poll 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
GOP -0.008 -0.016* -0.033* -0.030* 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) 
Woman -0.020 -0.024* -0.028* -0.030* 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Nonwhite 0.009 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Non-governmental career -0.009 -0.007 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
# of Effective Candidates  0.008* 0.009* 0.010* 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Change in # of Candidates * Poll    0.001* 
    (0.0002) 
Constant 0.311* 0.271* 0.289* 0.277* 
 (0.032) (0.034) (0.037) (0.037) 
Observations 648 648 648 648 
R2 0.262 0.278 0.284 0.295 
Breusch-Godfrey Test Statistic 0.004 0.032 0.098 0.424 
Notes: All models OLS regression. * denotes p < .05, one-tailed. Models 3-4 include election cycle fixed effects. All Breusch-




Of the candidate-level controls, only one stands out. The candidate’s standings in 
the polls is a powerful positive correlate with convergence. Each additional percentage 
point increase is associated with an increase of .001. This also helps contextualize the 
substantive power of the change in the number of candidates. Figure 5.3 presents the 
predicted effect of 7 candidates dropping out of the race against the predicted difference 
of a 30-percentage-point increase in poll standing. The difference predicted by such a 
change in the size of the field equals the difference between a footnote in the race and a 
viable frontrunner. In this baseline model, the race, gender, and prior work experience are 
not statistically significant correlates with convergence, although the substantive 
magnitude of the coefficient for gender is notable. 
 
Notes: Plot of predicted difference in convergence from a 30-percentage-point increase in poll standing and a -7 difference in number 




Prior literature also suggests that the closeness of a race affects media 
responsiveness to candidate agendas (Hayes 2010). Perhaps the competitiveness of the 
race is an intervening variable that explains the observed relationship between changes in 
the size of the field and convergence. To account for this possibility, I calculated a 
modified Hirschman-Herfindahl index (Steger, Hickman, and Yohn 2002) for each month 
using candidate shares of polls. This measures the number of “effective” candidates in the 
race at that point in time. Including this measure (Model 2) does not dampen the 
substantive or statistical significance of changes in the size of the field. The number of 
effective candidates is indeed strongly correlated with convergence, but in the opposite of 
the expected direction. I find that as the number of effective candidates increases, which 
should capture how uncertain the outcome is, the media hews closer to candidate 
agendas.41  
The coefficients for the percentage of anger language, topic dispersion, 
interpolation of candidate agenda, number of candidate speeches, and poll standing all 
remain substantively large and statistically significant. In addition, two more candidate-
level controls cross the traditional threshold of statistical significance: party and gender. 
Republicans and women running in primaries appear from this model to have a harder 
time conveying their agendas through the mass media. The finding on candidate gender 
serves as an aggregate reinforcement to the literature on gender bias in elections (e.g. 
 
41 To account for the possibility that the number of effective candidates is not a similar enough measure to 
the distance in polling between two candidates – a primary with only 2 effective candidates can still be 
quite close after all – I utilized two other measures of the competitiveness of the primary: the poll standing 
of the frontrunner in that month and the difference between the poll standing of the frontrunner and second-




Heldman, Carroll, and Olson 2005). The amount of authenticity language and readability 
remain statistically insignificant correlates with convergence. 
Model 3 replicates the previous model while also including election year fixed 
effects. The results are once again stable. An increase in the size of the field remains a 
substantively powerful negative correlate with convergence. Candidates faring better in 
the polls, men, Democrats and candidates who utilize more anger language likewise are 
more successful at conveying their agendas via the media.  
So far, the results consistently support the contextual simplicity hypothesis. 
Expansions in the size of the field are correlated with reductions in convergence. But it is 
possible that this effect is not experienced equivalently among candidates. Perhaps 
frontrunners and marginal candidates experience the effect differently. Model 4 accounts 
for this possibility by introducing an interaction term between the change in the number 
of candidates and poll standing. The change in the number of candidates remains a 
statistically significant negative correlate with convergence while poll standing remains a 
statistically significant positive correlate with convergence. But the interaction term 
between them is positive and significant, implying that some of the decline in 




Notes: Poll standing values chosen based on mean (~12 percentage points) and standard deviation (~15 percentage points). Values 
for lagged convergence, inverse Shannon H Entropy, percentage of anger language, percentage of authenticity language, readability, 
number of effective candidates, and number of candidate speeches set to mean values. Interpolated candidate agenda set to 0, 
nonwhite set to 0, woman set to 0, GOP set to 1, non-government career set to 0, and election year set to 2008. 
 
Because interaction terms are frequently unintuitive, especially when dealing with 
two continuous variables, I plotted the predicted relationship between change in the 
number of candidates and convergence for three different values of poll standing: 0, 12, 
and 27 percentage points (Figure 5.4). For a candidate polling at 27 percent, an increase 
in the number of candidates actually has a positive effect on convergence. Among 
candidates who are polling worse, expansions in the field are correlated with sharp, 
significant decreases in convergence. This suggests that it is the lower tier of candidates 
who are most disadvantaged by the way the journalism newsworthiness value of 
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In this chapter I addressed the question of how the lengthy, multicandidate nature 
of presidential primaries affects the media’s coverage of candidate agendas. I argued that 
this atypically long campaign and the volatile fields of candidates should create natural 
dissonance with the preference of journalists for stories that are timely and simple. I 
showed that changes in the size of the field are correlated with candidate-media agenda 
similarity. An expansion in the primary field is correlated with a significant decrease in 
agenda convergence.  These results line up with the theoretical argument I offered which 
notes that expansions to primary fields should lead to a decrease in the contextual 
simplicity in the race as new electoral fault lines and pairwise comparison permutations 
are added. This contrasts with the media’s preference for simplicity in coverage, 
explaining the decline. Further analysis of the results suggested that this effect is 
primarily felt by candidates performing poorly in the polls, not by frontrunners.  
While I argued that a professional interest in timely stories should lead to 
declining agenda convergence over the course of the primary as the candidate’s agenda 
fades into old news, the results did not bear that out. While there did appear to be an 
initial decline in average convergence in the first three months of the primary season, this 
 
42 It is also possible that there are diminishing returns to expansions in the field. Put another way, two 
candidates entering the race may be more meaningful when it was a four-person race than when it was a 
fourteen-person race. To account for this possibility, I replicated the analysis with an interaction with the 
total number of candidates in the race during that month. The results, which can be found in Appendix C, 
do not support such an interactive effect.  
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trend quickly rights itself. The overall tendency of agenda convergence in primaries 
appears to be more akin to temporal stability than declining timeliness. 
These findings have important implications. Candidates want to get their 
messages out via the media, and the results presented here suggest that a stable field 
better positions them to do so. But it also appears that only those candidates who have 
middling or weak support are disadvantaged and are therefore incentivized to strongly 
prefer keeping new candidates from entering the race. While the frontrunners may still be 
able to get their messages out via the media, most candidates will not be in such an 
advantageous situation. Regardless, the candidates themselves are poorly positioned to 
affect the strategic incentives of their competitors. They also face a collective action 
problem: While competing in a shifting primary field is not ideal, the utility of candidacy 
trumps not entering the race for most candidates. 
Candidates need to rely on parties to structure the rules of primaries to keep the 
fields small. I argue that parties should do so. American political parties perform multiple 
duties but a major one is facilitating the selection of nominees who are best situated to 
win general elections. They should thus want to be sure that the candidate who is still 
standing at the end of the primary process is indeed the one whose message was 
appealing to the party’s base.  
With this in mind, it would not appear that there is a significant drawback in terms 
of media coverage to having a lengthy primary season. There may be other downsides, 
for example depletion of resources that could be reserved for the general election or voter 
fatigue, but looking exclusively at the effects on media coverage suggests that parties 
should not be overly concerned about candidates announcing that they’re running 12 
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months before a caucus or primary. Yet parties should think carefully about how they can 
structure their rules to constrain the fields from expanding beyond the most viable 
candidates who represent distinct perspectives within the party. In the concluding chapter 
I return to the question of how they might best do so. 
This analysis is not without its limits. A month is a particularly blunt unit of time 
and its use prevents analysis that could get at the way the serial nature of primaries 
structures media coverage. Statewide primaries and caucuses generally occur at weekly 
intervals and would therefore require daily estimates of convergence to study how 
temporal proximity to an electoral context affects media reactions to candidate agendas, 
but the PPCC does not include enough candidate speeches to make such an analysis 
feasible.  
More immediately, The New York Times and the Washington Post are two critical 
news outlets in the American political context, but they do not capture the array of news 
outlets that comprise the media environment. As such, the results of this chapter cannot 
shed light on the different ways different media might react to candidate messages or 
primary contexts. It might be the case that some media outlets prioritize anger or human 











Chapter 6: Exploring the Roots of Newsworthiness Values 
 
“Journalism: an ability to meet the challenge of filling space.” – Rebecca West43 
“The first rule of hurricane coverage is that every broadcast must begin with palm trees 
bending in the wind.” – Carl Hiassen44 
“News is what sells.” – Shanto Iyengar45 
 
The preceding two chapters have analyzed the effect of the media’s 
newsworthiness values on agenda convergence in primaries. The critical assumptions 
have been that the media exists as a single political institution, separate media outlets are 
actors that comprise that institution, and all of these actors are equally influenced by the 
norms and values of the institution.  
The quotes that preface this chapter should provide some reasonable skepticism 
on this last point. The stories that ultimately comprise the news are partially dictated by 
finite space constraints. In his famous gatekeeping study, White (1950) reported that the 
lack of space was the articulated justification for rejecting almost half of all wire stories 
that did not make the paper. But the amount of space to be filled varies dramatically by 
medium. Broadcast TV has a much smaller “newshole” than the typical newspaper. And 
the amount of space in a newspaper pales in comparison to the 24/7 cable news 
environment. Likewise, there appear to be some storytelling conventions that differ 
across mediums. Television cameras are better suited to showing “palm trees bending in 
the wind” than a print reporter who must describe the scene, for example. Furthermore, 
journalism as a product needs to be acceptable to the audience that finances it directly 
 
43 Original quote attributed to April 22, 1956 New York Herald Tribune, sec. 6 pg. 2. Retrieved from April 
10, 2000 The Edmonton Journal quote of the day, Opinion section pg. A10. 
44 September 8, 2004 The Gazette (Montreal), Editorial/Op-Ed section pg. A27. 
45 Iyengar, Shanto. 2011. Media Politics: A Citizen’s Guide (2nd Ed.) pg. 68. 
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through subscriptions or indirectly through advertising revenue. But the audiences of 
different media outlets may very well differ in what they care to read or watch. 
The goal of this chapter is to assess the level of heterogeneity in the application of 
newsworthiness values by media type. Do these differences across media outlets lead to 
different emphases of professional standards? Answering this question is important for 
two reasons. First, it is useful to scholars and practitioners of strategic news management 
as the results can help the cultivation of more nuanced and targeted media strategies. For 
example, if anger is a powerful correlate of convergence with newspapers but not 
television news outlets, a candidate who intends to build a base from the audience of the 
latter should know that anger will not be as effective a strategy.  
Second, answering this question could shed light on the origin point of these 
newsworthiness values. Newsworthiness values are a subclass of journalism’s 
professional norms. Why these norms have developed is itself an open question. 
Answering this question is vital for devising strategies to mitigate any normatively 
undesirable political repercussions of newsworthiness values, as described below. 
Why Professional Standards Develop 
 
Prior work has theorized that journalistic norms originate in response to an array 
of forces including the need to routinize a difficult job (Tuchman 1978), technological 
change creating new means of storytelling (Usher 2014), and audience preferences 
(Hamilton 2004). If the influence of a newsworthiness value is more powerful among 
news outlets with tighter space constraints, if would suggest that that newsworthiness 
value is primarily used by journalists as a standard to discern what stories are worthy of 
becoming news within their professional world of limited space and tight deadlines.  
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If the influence of a newsworthiness value varies based on the format by which 
the media outlet disseminates their news, text or visual, it would suggest that it operates 
as medium-specific method of crafting compelling content. Journalists conceive of 
themselves as storytellers, and the means of crafting a story are inextricably tied to the 
medium in the same way that novels tend to have different storytelling conventions from 
television or movies. As such, any differences across technological medium likely reflect 
a close relationship between newsworthiness values and journalism’s self-conception as a 
storytelling enterprise.  
And if the influence of newsworthiness values varies based on the preferences of 
the audience of that particular media outlet, it would suggest that they operate as a means 
of crafting an economically viable product. Audiences for the national newspapers and 
cable tends tend to be more politically interested and sophisticated than the audience for 
broadcast news (Stroud 2011). If a newsworthiness value, especially simplicity which 
should be most closely associated with the preferences of audiences with low political 
sophistication, is strongest among candidate-ABC News dyads then it would appear the 
newsworthiness value operates to create news content to match audience preferences. 
H3.1 (Routinization Hypothesis): The influence of newsworthiness values on agenda 
similarity between candidates and media outlets will be greater for media outlets with 
stricter space constraints. 
H3.2 (Technology Hypothesis): The influence of newsworthiness values on agenda 
similarity between candidates and media outlets will vary between television media 
outlets (either broadcast or cable) and text-based media outlets. 
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H3.3 (Audience Preferences Hypothesis): The influence of newsworthiness values, 
especially simplicity, on agenda similarity between candidates and media outlets will be 
greater for media outlets with less politically sophisticated audiences.  
It is not necessarily the case that all the articulated newsworthiness values will 
line up neatly behind only one of these hypotheses. It could be the case that values 
originate as means of accommodating multiple elements of media logic pressures. 
Hopefully testing the six hypotheses articulated in Chapter 2 and tested in various 
capacities in Chapters 4 and 5 in this manner will shed some exploratory light on the 
most significant driving forces at work, however. 
This exploration is important because, to the extent that these newsworthiness 
values are creating politically undesirable outcomes in presidential primary elections, 
which I take up in the following chapter, understanding the root cause of these values is 
important for devising a strategy to minimize the harm created in the short term and 
apply pressure to modify the values in the long term. As an example, if the 
newsworthiness value of conflict originates in journalism’s need to satisfy audience 
demands and prioritizing conflict is deemed an inefficient or otherwise harmful means of 
conducting mediatized campaigns, then the conclusion would likely be increased support 
for public media outlets in the short term and attempts to shift audience preferences away 
from conflict-laden content in the long term. Such a remedy would be ineffective if the 
source of the newsworthiness value for conflict is technological, however. 
I now turn to a brief discussion of the data and methods used to test these 
hypotheses in this chapter. As before, a more thorough explanation of the data can be 
found in Chapter 3.  
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Data and Methods 
 
This chapter utilizes both the Presidential Primary Announcement Corpus (PPAC) 
and Presidential Primary Communication Corpus (PPCC) to test these hypotheses. The 
first portion of the results section analyzes the PPAC, including the partisan media outlets 
that were not included in Chapter 4. Each paragraph of speeches and media coverage was 
coded via a content analysis procedure (described in Chapter 3) into one of 15 topic 
categories. A convergence score (Sigelman and Buell 2004) was calculated for each 
candidate-media outlet dyad. These convergence scores measure how similar the agenda 
of the candidate was to the agenda of the media outlet by comparing the proportions of 
each agenda that falls into each of the topic categories. Convergence scores are 
continuous measures that range from 0 (perfect divergence, i.e. the agendas are 
completely unrelated) to 1 (perfect convergence, i.e. the agendas overlap to the point of 
being identical).  
As in Chapter 4, I model these convergence scores using four measures that proxy 
for how newsworthy the rhetorical patterns of the candidate are. These include the 
percentage of anger language as measured by the EmoLex dictionary (to measure the 
amount of rhetorical conflict cues), the percentage of the speech comprised of candidate-
based appeals (to measure the amount of rhetorical human interest cues; LIWC’s 
measures of Authenticity and “I” Language used for replications), the readability of the 
speech (to measure the linguistic simplicity of the candidate’s rhetoric), and how 
topically narrow the candidate’s speech is as measured by the Shannon Inverse H 
Entropy score (to measure the narrative simplicity of the candidate’s rhetoric). I also 
control for the poll standing of the candidate at the time of the announcement. Because 
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several of the models include small samples, I do not include other candidate-level 
control variables. 
I model each media type (newspapers, broadcast TV news, cable news) 
separately. I also modeled candidate-Fox News and candidate-MSNBC dyads to account 
for the possibility that focusing on the similar cable news format overlooks significant 
differences created by the different partisan loyalties.46 Given the multiple 
newsworthiness variables, running separate models is more parsimonious than 
introducing a series of interaction terms.    
The second portion analyzes the PPCC including ABC News, Fox News, and 
MSNBC which were not included in the analysis in Chapter 5. The agenda of each 
document was measured via applying a Structural Topic Model (STM) to the entire 
corpus (Roberts et al. 2014). This model generated a measure of the proportion of each 
document that matched each of 88 topics. I used these proportions to calculate 
convergence scores at candidate-media type-month units (i.e. Hillary Clinton-ABC 
News-January, 2016). Media types included newspapers, ABC News, Fox News, and 
MSNBC.47 Missingness within the candidate-media type series were dealt with in a 
number of ways. First, in time periods where there was no candidate speech, I 
interpolated the candidate’s agenda from the preceding month. The assumption is that the 
candidate’s agenda did not change without the presence of evidence to the contrary. I 
control for units with an interpolated agenda in all models. Second, I interpolated a 
 
46 Splitting this data in this manner leads to some small-n models. ABC News often avoids reporting on the 
announcements of the less prominent candidates. Fox News was launched in 1996, making 2000 the first 
campaign cycle where transcripts are available. While MSNBC was also launched in 1996, Nexis Uni does 
not have transcripts prior to November, 1999 (by which time every candidate had already entered the race). 
As such, 2004 is the first electoral cycle for that media outlet. 
47 The sample for both Fox News and MSNBC is sufficiently large that there was no need to combine the 
two in analysis of this corpus to achieve greater statistical power. 
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convergence score of 0 to any remaining candidate-media type-month unit with 
missingness. The assumption underlying this decision is that the failure to receive any 
media coverage is akin to failure at conveying an agenda through the media. These 
decisions prevent excessive listwise deletion (which would be necessary given the time 
series nature of the data) while still remaining theoretically justifiable. However, some 
fringe candidate’s speech and media series were excessively sparse, which would have 
necessitated extensive interpolation, and I opted to remove these candidates instead as 
they would have functioned as extreme outliers.48 
To test the timeliness hypothesis by media type I plotted the convergence series 
for the top two candidates from each race over time. I used the top two candidates rather 
than an aggregated series based on the results from Chapter 5 which showed that trends 
can appear based on which candidates are campaigning at certain phases of the primary 
election cycle rather than any trend in media agenda responsiveness. 
I once again modeled each media type separately rather than via a single model 
with multiple interaction terms for parsimony. I modeled these candidate-media type-
month convergence scores with five primary independent variables. These include the 
LIWC measure of the average amount of anger language used by the candidate in 
speeches that month (to measure the amount of rhetorical conflict cues; EmoLex anger 
dictionary used as a replication), the LIWC measure of the average amount of 
authenticity language used by the candidate in speeches that month (to measure the 
amount of rhetorical human-interest cues), the average readability of the candidate’s 
speeches in that month (to measure the linguistic simplicity of the candidate’s rhetoric), 
 




how topically narrow the candidate’s agenda was that month via the Shannon Inverse H 
Entropy score (to measure the narrative simplicity of the candidate’s rhetoric), and the 
amount of change in the size of the primary field in that month (to measure the contextual 
simplicity of the race). I controlled for a number of candidate-level variables including 
the poll standing of the candidate in that month, the number of speeches in the corpus for 
the candidate in that month to deal with the imbalance of quantity of text between 
candidates and the media in the corpus; and the party, race, gender, and prior work 
experience (an indicator variable for if the candidate has previous government 
experience) of the candidate. 
Because the data is cross-sectional time series and because there is reason to 
suspect that the value of convergence in one time period will be influenced by 
convergence in a preceding time period (Boydstun 2013), I employ a Koyck distributed 
lag model (Keele and Kelly 2006).49  
Results 
 
Medium Differences in Coverage of Announcement Speeches 
 
To start, I replicated the analysis from Chapter 4 while separating out candidate-
media dyads by media type. Model 1 is comprised of candidate-newspaper (The New 
York Times and the Washington Post). Model 2 is comprised of candidate-ABC News 
 
49 I tested for the presence of a unit root via two procedures. First, I aggregated the panel data into a single, 
averaged series and conducted Dickey-Fuller and KPSS tests for each candidate-medium series. 
Newspapers: DF = -4.739 (p < .01), KPSS = .071 (p > .1, lag order = 2). ABC News: DF = -3.939 (p = 
.026), KPSS = .154 (p = .043, lag order = 2). Fox News: DF = -5.203 (p < .01), KPSS = .078 (p > .1, lag 
order = 2). MSNBC: DF = -4.073 (p = .021), KPSS = .102 (p > .1, lag order = 2). Second, I conducted a 
series of panel unit root tests. Because panel unit root tests require each series to be of equal length, I 
dropped all series less than 8-months long and trimmed all longer series to that length. The results can be 
found in Appendix D. 
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dyads. Model 3 is comprised of candidate-cable news dyads (Fox News and MSNBC). 
Models 4 (Fox) and 5 (MSNBC) separate these two outlets.50 Table 6.1 presents the full 
results while Figure 6.1 presents the coefficients for the four newsworthiness value 
variables across media type. 












% Anger Language 0.029* 0.021 0.009 0.013 0.005 
 (0.010) (0.026) (0.014) (0.020) (0.020) 
% Candidate Appeals 0.057* 0.052* 0.070* 0.064* 0.073* 
 (0.009) (0.021) (0.014) (0.020) (0.020) 
Readability Score -0.003 0.017 0.020 0.028 0.013 
 (0.009) (0.024) (0.014) (0.020) (0.020) 
Shannon Inverse H -0.034* -0.012 -0.051* -0.035* -0.070* 
 (0.009) (0.023) (0.012) (0.017) (0.017) 
Poll -0.0002 0.0001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
Constant 0.493* 0.408* 0.479* 0.501* 0.455* 
 (0.010) (0.025) (0.017) (0.022) (0.026) 
Observations 208 74 121 68 53 
R2 0.222 0.102 0.312 0.251 0.434 
Notes: Model 1 consists of only candidate-newspaper dyads. Model 2 consists of only candidate-ABC dyads. Model 3 consists of 
only candidate-cable news dyads. Model 4 consists of only candidate-Fox News dyads. Model 5 consists of only candidate-MSNBC 
dyads. Percent anger language, percent candidate appeals, readability score, and Shannon Inverse H standardized for ease of 
interpretation of substantive significance. All models OLS regression. * denotes p < .05, one-tailed  
 
Starting with the usage of candidate anger, the only media type that seems to 
respond strongly to this method of invoking conflict is newspapers. The coefficient is 
large and statistically significant. All the other coefficients are positive, as expected, but 
 
50 An analysis of differences in convergence between partisan candidates and partisan media outlets can be 
found in Appendix D. 
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none are as large as for newspapers. That these coefficients are not as substantively 
powerful undermines the possibility that the lack of statistical significance is purely 
attributable to the smaller sample the other models utilize. This evidence suggests that 
perhaps rhetorical anger is a particularly enticing form of conflict to journalists who need 
words to convey conflict in their storytelling, which supports H3.2 
 
All media types display a strong relationship between the usage of candidate 
appeals and convergence in announcement speeches. There also does not appear to be 
much of a pattern in terms of magnitude either. The coefficients are slightly larger for the 
cable news outlets, but the differences are sufficiently small that this hardly counts for 
evidence in support of H3.3. Based on these results, human interest would appear to be a 
newsworthiness value equally practiced by different media types. 
 I attempted to replicate this finding using two alternative measures of rhetorical 
human-interest cues, the LIWC measures of authenticity and “I” Language, to see if this 
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newsworthiness value did appear to be equivalently used across mediums. The models 
using these variables can be found in Appendix D, while the coefficient plots are 
presented in Figure 6.2. The results are slightly more suggestive. The coefficients for all 
media outlets for both measures are positive and most are statistically significant, an 
impressive feat considering the small n in several of the models. While all of the 
coefficients lie within the confidence intervals of the others, the coefficient for 
newspapers is consistently among the smallest. Given that this is consistent across three 
different measures of rhetorical human-interest cues, I take this as suggestive, and 
caveated, evidence in support of H3.2 
 
Moving on to readability, an interesting pattern emerges. None of the coefficients 
reach traditional levels of statistical significance, but the coefficients are positive for both 
ABC News and cable news (and for both Fox News and MSNBC when analyzed 
separately). Meanwhile, the coefficient for newspapers is slightly negative. While there is 
significant overlap in the confidence intervals around these coefficients, perhaps there is 
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a difference between text- and visual-based news mediums in how they react to linguistic 
simplicity that is masked by splicing data into such small categories. To account for this 
possibility, I replicated the model with an interaction term between the readability score 
and an indicator variable of whether the media outlet was print of television. The 
predicted interactive effect is presented in Figure 6.3. At the most readable, i.e. the 
simplest language, there is no discernible difference between TV and print media in terms 
of convergence. But among the least readable speeches, the gap between TV and print is 
quite large. This finding suggests that linguistic simplicity is indeed correlated with 
greater success at conveying an agenda through the mass media but that this is only true 
among television news outlets. This is once again consistent with an argument that there 
is something specific about the medium in which a journalist is telling a story that affects 





Finally, across all media types, a more narrowly tailored candidate message was 
negatively correlated with convergence. The coefficients for all but ABC News are 
statistically significant as well. The cable news outlets appear to display a slightly more 
negative relationship between narrative simplicity and convergence, followed by 
newspapers and then ABC News. While this pattern would be suggestively supportive of 
the audience preferences hypothesis (H3.3), all of these coefficients run counter to 
expectations. The results suggest that all media outlets prefer candidates who create 
campaign narratives with more complex agendas, the media outlet with the least 
sophisticated audience just displays the weakest preference for narrative complexity 
rather than the strongest preference for narrative simplicity. 
Media Differences in Coverage throughout Presidential Primaries 
 
Next, I replicate the analysis of the PPCC performed in Chapter 5 but using the 
full corpus (i.e. including ABC News, Fox News, and MSNBC) and separated by media 
type. I begin with descriptive analysis of the candidate-media type convergence trends to 
examine medium differences in response to the timeliness hypothesis. The results from 
Chapter 5 suggested that trends can appear in the aggregate series from which candidates 
are campaigning at certain stages in the primary election cycle, with the candidates still 
active in month 12 and onward being those who are already most capable of driving 
media narratives. As such, I analyze the individualized trends of the top two candidates 





Figure 6.4 presents the candidate-newspaper dyadic series. There is no consistent 
evidence for any decline in convergence over time, which replicates the findings from 
Chapter 5 with a variant of the topic model. Some of the series appears to display slight 
positive trends (Santorum-2012, Romney-2008), and one appears to show a decline 




Figure 6.5 displays the results for the candidate-ABC News dyads. Once again 
there is no evidence for the timeliness hypothesis. Interestingly, several of the series 
display a curvilinear trend with convergence sharply declining in the middle of the series 
before undergoing an equally sharp increase (Cruz-2016, Santorum-2012, Dean-04). In 




 The candidate-Fox dyads (Figure 6.6) are almost uniformly consistent across 
time. The same can be said for the candidate-MSNBC dyads (Figure 6.7). For Fox News, 
the only candidate who displays any sort of trend is McCain-2000 and the trend runs 
counter to the timeliness hypothesis. For MSNBC, that McCain-2000 trend likewise 
trends positive, as do Bradley-2000 and Santorum-2012. 
 In summation, across each medium there was no support for the timeliness 





Moving on, I tested for medium-level differences in the effects of rhetorical 
newsworthiness cues (anger language, authenticity language, linguistic simplicity, and 
narrative simplicity) and for contextual simplicity by regressing the convergence scores 
on the relevant independent variables and controls separately by candidate-media type. 
The results can be found in Table 6.2 and Figure 6.8. 
The percentage of anger language used by candidates is a positive, statistically 
significant correlate with convergence in the model of candidate-newspaper dyads (Table 
6.2, Model 1). This replicates the findings from Chapter 5 as well. Anger is unrelated to 
convergence across all other media outlets, however. This suggests that rhetorical anger 
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% Anger Words (LIWC) 0.025* 0.011 0.002 0.015 
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.013) (0.016) 
Authenticity Language (LIWC) 0.00001 0.001 -0.0002 0.0003 
 (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
Readability Score 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Inverse Shannon H Entropy -0.347* -0.130 -0.361* -0.180* 
 (0.058) (0.087) (0.073) (0.088) 
Change in # of Candidates -0.008* -0.008* -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Convergence, Lagged 0.128* 0.167* 0.231* 0.195* 
 (0.037) (0.040) (0.041) (0.043) 
Interpolated Candidate Agenda -0.068* -0.050* -0.034* -0.110* 
 (0.012) (0.021) (0.016) (0.021) 
# of Candidate Speeches in Month 0.003* 0.008* 0.004* 0.007* 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Poll Standing 0.001* 0.002* 0.001* 0.001* 
 (0.0003) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.001) 
# of Effective Candidates 0.009* -0.001 0.013* 0.014* 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
GOP -0.017* 0.009 0.055* -0.036* 
 (0.009) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) 
Woman -0.031* -0.029 -0.042* -0.026 
 (0.014) (0.020) (0.017) (0.021) 
Nonwhite 0.004 -0.014 -0.008 -0.020 
 (0.011) (0.017) (0.014) (0.016) 
Non-governmental career -0.013 -0.006 0.031* 0.011 
 (0.009) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) 
Constant 0.321* 0.145* 0.271* 0.183* 
 (0.032) (0.046) (0.039) (0.046) 
Observations 648 587 612 508 
R2 0.287 0.225 0.285 0.250 
Breusch-Godfrey Test Statistic 0.236 1.026 0.207 0.155 
Notes: All models OLS regression. * denotes p < .05, one-tailed. Model 1 includes only candidate-newspaper dyads. Model 
2 includes only candidate-ABC News dyads. Model 3 includes only candidate-Fox News dyads. Model 4 includes only 






cues are particularly influential among journalists working in written mediums. This lines 
up well with H3.2.  
No clear pattern in medium-specific effects of authenticity language on 
convergence appear from the results. None of the coefficients are substantively large 
(even given the wide distribution of this particular variable) or statistically significant. 






The interactive effect between readability and television news does not emerge in 
the analysis of convergence throughout the primary. Readability instead displays a 
generally weak effect on convergence among all media types, which is unsupportive of 
any of three hypotheses. 
Narrative simplicity is once again negatively correlated with convergence counter 
to H1.4. Interestingly, the effect is much weaker in the model of ABC News coverage, 
especially when compared to newspapers and Fox News and newspapers. Similar to the 
results presented with the PPAC earlier in this chapter, the pattern of the results is similar 
to that articulated in the audience preference hypothesis, but once again it appears that 
media outlets with the least sophisticated audiences are the least enticed by narrative 
complexity rather than the most enticed by narrative simplicity. 
Finally, the net change in the number of candidates in the race, a measure of the 
contextual simplicity of the primary, displays a notable heterogenous effect. Among 
newspaper outlets, an increase in the size of the field is correlated with an aggregate 
reduction in convergence. This replicated the results from Chapter 5 using a different 
topic modeling. A similar effect is observed in the model of ABC News. In fact, the 
coefficient is nearly identical in terms of magnitude. But a change in the size of the field 
does not display this negative relationship in the models of Fox News or MSNBC 
coverage. This pattern matches closely with the routinization hypothesis. 
Table 6.3 presents a summary of the results presented in this chapter. Two 
conclusions can safely be drawn. First, the effect of anger as a rhetorical newsworthiness 
cue is derived primarily from its utility as a means of storytelling in text-based mediums. 
Second, the effect of expansions in the size of the primary field, which I theorized should 
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affect the contextual simplicity of the race, is rooted in the need of journalists to wrangle 
with finite time, space, and expertise in crafting news coverage. Media outlets with larger 
“newsholes” are not affected by the volatility of the primary field nearly as much as those 
with tighter space constraints. 
Other results are more equivocal. There is some slight support that two other 
rhetorical newsworthiness cues – authenticity as a measure of human interest and 
readability as a measure of linguistic simplicity – are tied to the storytelling conventions 
of the technological mediums. But the patterns are not as consistent and so more 
theorization and research are necessary to draw firmer conclusions. Both the timeliness 
and narrative simplicity hypotheses have been thoroughly unsupported throughout this 
dissertation and find no more evidence here. 
Table 6.3: Summary of Results of Hypothesis Tests 
Hypothesis Corpus Hypothesis Supported 
H1.1: Conflict  
Hypothesis 
PPAC 3.2 Technology Hypothesis (Strong) 
PPCC 3.2 Technology Hypothesis (Strong) 
H1.2: Human-interest 
Hypothesis 
PPAC 3.2 Technology Hypothesis (Weak) 
PPCC None 
H1.3: Linguistic Simplicity 
Hypothesis 
PPAC 3.2 Technology Hypothesis (Strong) 
PPCC None 
H1.4: Narrative Simplicity 
Hypothesis 
PPAC 3.3 Audience Preferences Hypothesis (Weak) 




H2.2: Contextual Simplicity 
Hypothesis 






The goal of this chapter was to look for consistent and clear patterns in which 
media types prioritize the various newsworthiness values. The emphasis on consistency 
was meant in reference to across corpora: I recognized the possibility that an emphasis on 
conflict could stem from the storytelling prerogative while the emphasis on human-
interest elements could stem from appeasing audience preferences for relatable content. 
Ideally, the results would have presented a set of evidence that lined each of the 
newsworthiness values up behind one of the three hypotheses – routinization, technology, 
and audience preferences.  
No such clear image appears. If we analyze the results in aggregate, however, 
some trends appear. First, most of the rhetorical newsworthiness cues appear to derive 
their influence with the media primarily from their connection to the storytelling 
conventions of various mediums. This is most notable in reference to the usage of 
candidate anger as a cue of conflict which was strongly and consistently correlated with 
convergence with newspapers but not with visual news outlets. But there was some 
suggestive evidence to support the technological hypothesis with regards to the human-
interest and linguistic simplicity hypotheses, namely that both are more prominent among 
visual news mediums, although this finding appears much more strongly in analysis of 
the PPAC.  
Second, contextual simplicity seems to matter most to news outlets with 
significant space constraints. ABC News, The New York Times, and the Washington Post 
displays the strongest negative correlation between increases in the size of the primary 
field and convergence, while the negative effect among both MSNBC and Fox News is 
substantively more muted. This lines up well with the routinization hypothesis which 
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suggested that news outlets with larger “newsholes” are better positioned to 
accommodate complex primary contests. That said, the “newshole” for newspapers is 
larger than for broadcast news, and so that the coefficient for ABC News is not more 
negative than for newspapers is reason for pause. It might be the case that partisan news 
outlets, regardless of their space constraints, may be more dedicated to disentangling 
even the most volatile of primaries. Further analysis than included nonpartisan cable 
news outlets and partisan newspapers would be needed to rule this possibility out for 
sure. 
I have repeatedly referred to these findings as suggestive. That is because there is 
a distinctive lack of consistency as to the origin points of these crucial newsworthiness 
values. This lack of consistency emphasizes a limitation of this analysis. Even though this 
project represents the most expansive examination of media in presidential primary 
campaigns to date, the scope of the data still does not fully capture the population of the 
communication environment. This is true in two respects. First, only five news outlets are 
considered. The media environment is clearly much larger. This most obviously affects 
the interpretation of results concerning ABC News as a representative of the entire class 
of broadcast news. Second, the time frame observed includes a dramatic period of change 
for mass media. Perhaps some of these newsworthiness values have also shifted by 
medium over the course of electoral cycles. By collecting speeches and media coverage 
going back further, it might be possible to identify if this is the case. While this chapter 
thus serves as a starting point in the analysis of medium-level differences in the emphasis 
of newsworthiness values in presidential primaries, more research is still needed before 
anything resembling a last word can be uttered. 
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This chapter concludes the analysis of the effect of newsworthiness values on 
agenda convergence in primaries. The following chapter shows why the effect these 
newsworthiness values matter. It uses a novel experimental design that leverages the 
typical weakness student samples create in external validity to test how differences in 

























Chapter 7: The Effect of Convergence on Political Behavior 
 
“The music is nothing if the audience is deaf.” – Walter Lippmann51 
 
The preceding empirical chapters have shown how newsworthiness values like 
conflict, human interest, and simplicity shape media coverage of candidate agendas in 
presidential primaries. They have shown how candidate rhetoric and the format of 
primaries interact with these newsworthiness values to lead to different outcomes of 
candidate-media agenda convergence. And they have shown how different media types 
vary in their prioritizations of these newsworthiness values. 
What these chapters have not yet explored are the effects of convergence on the 
consumers of candidate and media agendas: the primary electorate’s news audience. 
Journalists are not a large enough class of voters to secure victory and the outcomes of 
nomination races are not determined by directly comparing media content. It is the people 
watching television news broadcasts or reading articles about the candidates who are 
pivotal in the post-reform era (Polsby 1983). The purpose of this chapter is to examine 
how high or low convergence affects the primary electorate. It is important to do so 
because voter attitudes are what structures the process and outcomes of primaries, which 
in turn have significant downstream effects on the general election and the reputations of 
political parties. 
Connecting Candidate, Media, and Public Agendas 
 
 
51 From A Preface to Morals, pg. 321. 
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Prior literature provides ample reasons to suspect that media coverage affects 
public opinion in a number of important regards (Feezell 2018, King, Schneer, and White 
2017, McCombs and Shaw 1972) and that these effects can matter electorally (Hayes 
2008, Lau and Redlawsk 2006, Vavreck 2009). I follow with this tradition by arguing 
that the degree of convergence between candidate and media agendas should affect 
support for candidates. Those who see high convergence between candidate and media 
agendas should be more supportive of candidates, while those who see low convergence 
should be less supportive. Reinforcement of messages from different sources make the 
effect of candidate messages more impactful on how voters evaluate the candidate, while 
deviation between the two muddles the waters of voters’ attitudinal processing. 
H4.1 (Candidate Support Hypothesis): Subjects exposed to an electoral situation where 
the agendas of a primary candidate and the media have high convergence will be more 
supportive of the candidate than a control group. Subjects exposed to an electoral 
situation where the agendas of a primary candidate and the media have low convergence 
will be less supportive of the candidate than a control group. 
I also argue that candidates are better positioned than the media to identify what 
voters need to read or hear. Candidate agendas will contain the most heuristically useful 
information for voters, so repetition of that information by an alternative source will 
improve voter performance while low convergence should create normatively undesirable 
voting behavior as voters encounter unnecessary or distracting information that 
obfuscates the important messages. Put simply, when subjects are exposed to high 
convergence they will be better at approximating what they would do if they were fully 
informed – needing less time to search for more information, being more locked in to 
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their vote choice, and being less likely to change their vote – than if they are exposed to 
low convergence. 
H4.2 (Correct Support Hypothesis): Subjects exposed to an electoral situation where the 
agendas of a primary candidate and the media have high convergence will display more 
correct support than a control group. Subjects exposed to an electoral situation where 
the agendas of a primary candidate and the media have low convergence will display less 
correct support than a control group. 
Demonstrating the behavioral ramifications of the differences in convergence that 
newsworthiness values create will show the significance of these values beyond the niche 
interests of political communication scholars. It will also be instrumental to setting up a 
discussion on the normative impact of newsworthiness values in structuring coverage of 
presidential primaries and if changes to our primary system are warranted. I turn to that 
discussion in the concluding chapter to this dissertation. For now, I begin by describing 
the data and methods used in this chapter. 
Data and Methods 
 
To test these hypotheses, I employ an experimental design to manipulate exposure 
to high and low convergence settings. Doing so provides causal insight into the effect of 
convergence on attitudes and political behavior that observational research by itself 
cannot provide. In this section I lay out the basics of the experimental design, with the 
caveat that a more thorough discussion can be found in Chapter 3. 
The process of crafting an experimental design is complicated by H4.2, however. 
Undergirding that hypothesis is an assumption that candidates are better situated and 
incentivized than others to identify the collection of appeals that voters will be most 
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interested in. If that is indeed the case, then candidates are better at figuring out their 
agendas than I would be as well. If I simply created a candidate’s agenda to exercise full 
internal control on the stimuli, I would not be satisfying this assumption. I get around this 
by leveraging a limitation of the population from which the subjects of the experiment 
were drawn. The subjects in the experiment are all college students and so I crafted the 
candidate agendas using speeches by presidential primary candidates given on college 
campuses. For the Democratic primary, the candidate’s agenda was based on a speech 
given by Senator Elizabeth Warren at George Mason University on May 16, 2019. For 
the Republican primary, the candidate’s agenda was based on a speech given by Senator 
Marco Rubio at Iowa State University on January 30, 2016. 
Subjects came to a laboratory setting and were assigned to a computer to 
participate in the study. The study began with a pre-test questionnaire52 which asked 
about several demographic characteristics, political attitudes (most notably media trust), 
and party ID. Two attention check screener questions (Berinsky et al. 2019) were 
included in this section as well.53 Based on self-reported partisanship, subjects were 
assigned to participate in either a Democratic or Republican primary. Pure independents 
were allowed to choose between the two. Of the 397 subjects, 295 participated in the 
Democratic primary while only 102 participated in the Republican primary.54 
All subjects then received a press release from a hypothetical candidate’s 
campaign that contained excerpts from an upcoming scheduled speech. This candidate 
was “Senator Alex Simmons.” For all subjects in the Democratic primary, these excerpts 
 
52 The full questionnaire can be found in Appendix A. 
53 The results by level of attention can be found in Appendix E. 
54 The results by party primary can be found in Appendix E. 
141 
 
were from the aforementioned speech by Sen. Warren. For all subjects in the Republican 
primary, these excerpts were from Sen. Rubio’s speech. Each press release featured one 
quote that was modified slightly to mention a hypothetical rival for the nomination: 
“Governor Nick Turner.” Hypothetical candidates were used primarily because there is 
an incumbent Republican president contemporaneously with the study. I was concerned 
that Republican subjects might assume that Sen. Rubio was challenging the incumbent 
president in a primary which would contaminate any effects. 
Subjects were then given a news article. This represented the true experimental 
manipulation. For subjects randomly assigned to the control group, this news article was 
on an apolitical topic: caramelizing onions. For subjects randomly assigned to the high 
convergence treatment group, the news article was a traditional piece of event coverage. 
It merely summarized the remarks from the press release. For subjects randomly assigned 
to the low convergence treatment group, the news article discussed the candidate in 
relation to an issue not mentioned by either campaign’s press release: foreign policy. 
Specifically, the article discussed rumors that the candidate was planning a trip abroad to 
meet with several world leaders. As Chapter 4 showed, coverage of primaries features 
significant coverage of foreign policy and international affairs making it a realistic topic 
for my purposes. Several candidates in recent primaries have actually carried out such 
trips including Mitt Romney and Ben Carson, while Barack Obama did so after he had 
clinched the nomination, making this particular frame realistic as well. Finally, the 
planning of a foreign trip was an easy frame with which to create a news article that was 
not overtly negative. It was important that the only thing that is manipulated in the low 
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convergence treatment is that the media is not echoing the candidate’s message, not that 
the media was directly weighing in on the quality of the candidate’s messaging.55 
After reading the news article, subjects were asked a battery of questions about 
their support for Senator Alex Simmons. Most important among those were their 
agreement with the statement “Senator Alex Simmons is focused on the important 
issues,” a feeling thermometer measuring their “warmth” toward the candidate, and their 
vote choice when asked to cast a ballot between Senator Alex Simmons and Governor 
Nick Turner. Subjects were also asked two more attention check screener questions and 
given a list of issue topics and asked to identify all those mentioned by the candidate’s 
press release. This serves as a manipulation check. 
Subjects were then offered a chance to learn more about Senator Alex Simmons. 
They were given a hyperlink to a PDF file with a collection of biographical information 
and policy positions. I constructed these documents by collecting actual information from 
the real candidates’ campaign websites. The PDFs included a linked table of contents that 
helped subjects locate information they thought particularly important. The PDFs were 
also searchable. Subjects were told they could spend as much time perusing this 
information as they liked. How long the subjects spent on this full information page was 
timed. After clicking past the full information page, subjects were asked if they would 
like to revote. If they selected yes, they were once again asked to choose between Senator 
Alex Simmons and Governor Nick Turner. The experiment then concluded and subjects 
were debriefed. 
 
55 Copies of the experimental stimuli can be found in Appendix A. 
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I test H4.1 using three measures of support for the candidate. First, the subject’s 
level of agreement on a 5-stage Likert scale with the “focused on important issues” 
statement. This measure was recoded to range from 0 (strongly disagree) to 1 (strongly 
agree). Second, the subject’s feeling thermometer rating of the candidate which ranged 
from 0 to 100. Finally, their vote choice (voting for Senator Alex Simmons coded as 1 
and voting for Governor Nick Turner coded as 0). I expect subjects in the high 
convergence treatment group will be more supportive of Senator Alex Simmons relative 
to the control group while subjects in the low convergence treatment group will be less 
supportive of Senator Alex Simmons relative to the control group. 
I test H4.2 using an additional three measures of “correct” voting behavior. First, 
the total time spent on the full information page. Subjects who spent longer searching for 
more information necessarily think that such behavior is necessary to remedy uncertainty. 
I expect subjects in the low convergence treatment group will spend more time on the full 
information page than subjects in the control group, while subjects in the high 
convergence treatment group will spend less time on the full information page than the 
control group. Second, whether the subject opted to revote (coded as 1 if they did and 0 if 
they didn’t). And third, among those subjects who opt to revote, whether or not the 
subject changed their vote choice. This variable is coded as 1 if the subject choose 
Senator Alex Simmons initially but subsequently voted for Governor Nick Turner or vice 
versa, coded as 0 if the subject’s vote choice was consistent across both iterations, and 
coded as a missing value if the subject did not opt to revote. I expect subjects in the low 
convergence treatment group will be more likely to opt to revote and more likely to 
change their vote choice than those in the control group, while subjects in the high 
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convergence treatment group will be less likely to opt to revote and less likely to change 
their vote choice than those in the control group. 
The primary independent variables are assignment to either the high convergence 
or low convergence treatment groups with assignment to the control group as the 
baseline. For all models I utilize OLS. This is appropriate for the feeling thermometer and 
time on full information page variables given their continuous nature. It is also debatably 
appropriate for the “important issues” variable given its ordinal distribution. For the 
remaining three variables – vote choice, opting to revote, and changed vote – it is less 
obviously appropriate. Linear probability models are inefficient as they violate several 
key assumptions. They are more parsimonious than logit or probit models, however, and 
considering the randomized experimental set-up means a simple difference of means test 
is sufficient to test the hypotheses, this is the most approachable and readily interpretable 




Effect of Convergence on Support for Candidates 
 
Table 7.1 presents the result of the OLS regressions of the effect of assignment to 
the high convergence or low converge, relative to the control group, on measures of 
support for the hypothetical primary candidate Sen. Alex Simmons. Model 1 uses the 
level of agreement with the statement, “Sen. Alex Simmons is focused on the important 
issues” as the dependent variable. The responses have been rescaled to range from 0 
(strong disagreement) to 1 (strong agreement). Those in the low convergence group 
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agreed with the statement less than those in either the high convergence or the control 
groups, although given how high the agreement was with the statement overall the 
substantive significance is underwhelming. The difference is less than one-fifth of the 
distance between somewhat and strongly agreeing with the statement. Furthermore, and 
counter to expectations, those in the high convergence treatment also agreed with the 
statement less than those in the control, although the difference is extremely small. Still, 
as the difference in means tests graphically presented in Figure 7.1 show, the low 
convergence and high convergence treatment groups are not statistically distinguishable. 
Overall, then, the evidence on this measure is only mildly supportive of H4.1. 
Table 7.1: Effect of Treatment Group on Support for Candidates 
 Important Issues Feeling Thermometer Vote Choice 
 (1) (2) (3) 
High Convergence Treatment -0.019 0.649 0.009 
 (0.025) (2.135) (0.045) 
Low Convergence Treatment -0.040* -0.162 -0.010 
 (0.024) (2.044) (0.043) 
Constant 0.811* 64.864* 0.856* 
 (0.017) (1.476) (0.031) 
Observations 395 397 394 
R2 0.007 0.0004 0.001 
Notes: * denotes p < .05, one-tailed. All models OLS regression. 
 
The evidence for this hypothesis is even more lacking when examining other 
measures. Model 2 uses the feeling thermometer score the subject gave Sen. Alex 
Simmons as the dependent variable. The experimental stimuli appear to have caused no 
differences in how warmly subjects felt toward the candidate. Model 3 estimates a linear 
probability model with the vote choice of the subject, where those who voted for Sen. 
Alex Simmons are coded as 1 and those who voted for the rival Gov. Nick Turner are 
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coded as 0, as the dependent variable. Here again we see no significant differences 
between the treatment groups. That said, the overall proportion who opted to vote for 
Sen. Alex Simmons was extremely high. It appears likely that the lack of any real 
information about the rival Gov. Nick Turner prevented the creation of a realistic voting 
circumstance. 
 
Altogether, the evidence that convergence leads to changing support for 
candidates as hypothesized is weak. While exposure to the low convergence treatment 
appears to have slightly lowered evaluations of the dedication of the candidate to 
important issues, the difference was marginal and it was the only observed negative 
difference. Exposure to the high convergence treatment did not improve assessments of 
the candidate on any of the primary variables of interest. There was one additional 
finding worth mentioning, however. The post-treatment questionnaire included questions 
measuring support for the candidate on several other dimensions – strong leader, 
electable, cares about people, and not a political insider – meant to obfuscate the purpose 
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of the study.56 Assignment to the high convergence treatment increased assessments of 
the electability of the candidate and the substantive magnitude was nearly twice that 
observed for the effect of the low convergence treatment on attitudes about the candidate 
focusing on important issues. It may be that low convergence does create uncertainty 
about the issue prioritizations of the candidate while high convergence is a signal that the 
candidate is good at eliciting favorable media coverage, which is itself viewed as a 
prerequisite for viability. Admittedly, such a precise finding was not hypothesized and 
the experimental design was not crafted to identify such a phenomenon. The findings are 
suggestive, however, and future studies should attempt to identify if this is indeed the 
case. 
Effect of Convergence on “Correct” Voting Behavior 
 
After answering the questions on support for Sen. Alex Simmons, subjects were 
allowed to peruse a document with an extensive collection of biographical information 
about and policy positions from the candidate. Afterwards they were asked if they would 
like to re-cast a vote and then offered a chance to do so. This process was implemented to 
assess how “correctly” the subjects voted the first time (Lau and Redlawsk 2006). 
Subjects who were confident that they had arrived at the correct answer initially should 
have no need to perform a more in-depth information search, re-cast a vote, or change 
their votes. Because high convergence between candidates and the media should help 
voters make sense of the electoral situation, while low convergence will create more 
 
56 Models regressing treatment group assignment on these measures can be found in Appendix E. 
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confusion and uncertainty, I hypothesized (H4.2) that the experimental stimuli should 
lead to differences in a series of “correct” voting behavior. 
Table 7.2 tests this hypothesis on two such behaviors. Model 1 examines the 
effect of treatment group assignment on the amount of time, in seconds, spent on the 
webpage with the full collection of candidate information. The high convergence group 
spent a little more than 2 seconds, on average, on the page than the control group, which 
is a negligible amount of time. But the low convergence group spent an average of almost 
6.5 more seconds on the page. While this coefficient does not cross the threshold into 
statistical significance, it is substantively interesting. That is a 25-percent increase in time 
spent on the page.  
Table 7.2: Effect of Treatment Group on Correct Voting Behavior 
 Time on Full Info Page Opted to Revote 
 (1) (2) 
High Convergence Treatment 2.326 -0.012 
 (4.427) (0.045) 
Low Convergence Treatment 6.410 0.074* 
 (4.239) (0.043) 
Constant 24.442* 0.129* 
 (3.062) (0.031) 
Observations 397 395 
R2 0.006 0.012 
Notes: * denotes p < .05, one-tailed. All models OLS regression. 
 
Model 2 estimates the effect of assignment to each treatment group, relative to 
assignment to the control group, on the probability of opting to re-vote using a linear 
probability model. The coefficient on the high convergence treatment group is signed as 
hypothesized but is substantively small and statistically insignificant. The coefficient on 
assignment to the low convergence treatment group, however, is substantively large. 
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Those who read the news article about Sen. Alex Simmons’s planned foreign trip were 
more than 7-percentge-points more likely to opt to revote after being allowed to peruse 
more information. Considering only 13 percent of those in the control group choose to do 
so, this is quite a significant jump. This magnitude is captured graphically by the 
difference in means in Figure 7.2. 
 
Because of the infrequency of subjects opting to revote (only 60 out of 397), not 
much can be definitely said about vote switching. The pattern is quite striking, however, 
even with a caveat about small sample size taken into account. As Figure 7.3 shows, 
subjects in the low convergence group who opted to revote, which they were more likely 
to do in the first place, were more than twice as likely to change their votes as those in the 




The results were more supportive of H4.2 than they were of H4.1. Subjects in the 
low convergence treatment group spent longer searching for more information about the 
candidate when offered the opportunity, were then more likely to opt to revote, and 
among those that opted to revote more likely to change their vote than subjects in the 
control group who received an identical press release but simply did not read a news 
article about the candidate planning a foreign trip. Low convergence between candidate 
messaging and media coverage prompted significantly different behavior among subject 
once they were offered more information about the candidate. High convergence did not 
lead to more “correct” voting, as was initially expected, but it seemingly did no harm 
either.  
Mechanisms Behind Observed Results 
 
So far, the results of the experiment have been unsupportive of the attitude change 
hypothesis (H4.1) but partially supportive of the correct voting hypothesis (H4.2). High 
convergence between candidate and media messaging did not seem to increase support 
for the candidate or “correct” voting behavior relative to the control group. While low 
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convergence did not seem to decrease support for the candidate, low convergence did 
cause less correct voting behavior. 
Next, I turn to unpacking why this is. What is the mechanism driving this pattern 
of results? While this is not the primary intent of this experiment, which is simply to 
demonstrate that convergence in primaries has the potential to create notable behavioral 
repercussions, it is possible to examine some suggestive evidence. I specifically consider 
two distinct, but not mutually exclusive, possibilities. First, it may be the case that 
repetition of the candidate message (or the lack thereof) affects the recall of the issue 
cues and therefore increases(decreases) the likelihood that the candidate’s message is 
remembered when making attitudinal or behavioral decisions. Second, perhaps there is a 
source cue effect. It may be that seeing the media specifically repeat (or not) a 
candidate’s message denotes some sort of additional information or context that affects 
evaluations. Here, the fact that the media does not co-sign the candidate’s message is 
seen as a signal that leads to more uncertainty. 
To test the former, I compare performance on a recall task. After evaluating the 
candidate but before viewing the full information page, each subject was given a list of 
24 issues and asked to identify the ones the candidate mentioned in their press release.57 I 
calculated the percentage of issues that were correctly identified and subtracted the 
percentage that were incorrectly identified. The measure therefore theoretically can range 
from -1 to 1.  
 





Figure 7.4 plots the difference in means on this measure by experimental group 
assignment. The low convergence group, on average, displayed significantly poorer recall 
of the candidate’s issues than either the control or high convergence groups. While the 
high convergence group did perform the best on the recall test, on average, the difference 
between the high convergence and control groups was minimal and the confidence 
intervals overlap extensively. This provides suggestive evidence that low convergence 
obscures the issue positions of candidates and thereby leads to higher uncertainty as to 
what the subject’s correct vote should be. That high convergence doesn’t affect support 
for the candidate or correct voting is because the repetition does not dramatically improve 
reception of the message (at least in such a simplified communication environment). 
That the repetition explanation appears to line up well as an explanation for the 
observed results does not preclude the possibility that a source cue effect could also be at 
work. To test this second possibility, I replicated the analysis from the preceding two 
sections while incorporating an interaction between treatment group assignment and self-
assessed trust in the media, which was measured in the pre-test survey. If there is a source 
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cue effect, we should expect that the effects of either treatment group on support for the 
candidate will be affected by how trustworthy the subject finds the source.  
The patterns by which media trust should condition treatment effects are 
heterogeneous and so I provide Table 7.3 to simplify. For all candidate-support measures, 
a source-cue mechanism should mean that the hypothesized effects of low and high 
convergence are strongest among those who trust the media the most and mitigated for 
those with the lowest trust in the media. For those who trust the media, and therefore are 
most receptive to the implicit message that seeing the media repeat or avoid a candidate’s 
agenda conveys, seeing the media diverge from the candidate should be interpreted as 
particularly damning while high convergence should convey an added stamp of approval. 
These effects should be muted for those who are most distrustful of the media as a source 
of legitimation of a candidate’s agenda. 
Table 7.3: Expected Interactive Effects between Treatment and Media Trust 
 Low Media Trust High Media Trust 
Candidate Support Low Convergence More supportive Less supportive 
High Convergence Less supportive More supportive 
Information Search Low Convergence More time Less time 
High Convergence More time Less time 
Opted to Re-vote Low Convergence Higher probability Lower probability 




For the measures of “correct” voting, a source cue mechanism should operate 
differently. Among those with high trust, there should be little effect of treatment on 
correct voting. Those who trust the media should interpret either high or low convergence 
as heuristically useful information and find no reason to perform a more extensive 
information search or doubt their original vote choice. To those who trust the media, high 
convergence should confirm that the candidate’s agenda is worth prioritizing while low 
convergence is easily reconciled by simply ignoring the candidate’s agenda and focusing 
on what the media says. Among those with low trust in the media, both high and low 
convergence should prompt longer information searches and a higher probability of re-
voting relative to those in the control group with low media trust. The subjects in the high 
convergence treatment group with low media trust should be skeptical that the media is 
truly fulfilling their duty by echoing the candidate’s agenda. The subjects in the low 
convergence treatment group with low media trust could reconcile the agenda 
incongruence by simply accepting the candidate’s agenda as important, but it is more 
likely that they instead remain skeptical and engage in further confirmatory behavior. The 
evidence for this source cue mechanism can be found in the plots of the interactive 
effects between treatment group assignment and media trust in Figures 7.5 and 7.6.58 
 
 




In general, the results do not line up well with the source cue explanation. Starting 
with the models of support for the candidate, there were no noticeable interactive effects 
between the treatment groups and media trust. Given the high overall support for the 
candidate across all conditions, this is not all that surprising. But even allowing for that, 
the interactive effects of media trust on treatment group assignment tended to run in the 
opposite of the expected directions. Those in the high(low) convergence treatment group 
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with high media trust supported the candidate less(more) than those in the same treatment 
group with low(high) media trust. 
The results were only slightly more supportive of the source cue mechanism 
among the models of “correct” voting behavior. The interactive effects between treatment 
group assignment and media trust on information search time run counter to expectations. 
Those who report the highest trust in the media spent the longest searching out more 
information across both treatment groups. These subjects should have been the most 
willing to accept the media’s judgment on campaign reporting as the essential 
information and yet they were the ones who were the most compelled to search out more 
information. There was some evidence for a source cue mechanism in the model of 
probability of opting to re-vote, however. Those assigned to the low convergence 
treatment group who distrust the media were the most likely to opt to reconsider their 
vote choice as expected. But no such trend appears for those who distrust the media in the 





Overall, the evidence is suggestive of a repetition mechanism underpinning the 
observed effects while being mostly unsupportive of a source cue mechanism. More 
research would be needed to test for sure that this is indeed the case, but this should serve 





This chapter examined the attitudinal and behavioral ramifications of high and 
low convergence among primary voters via an experiment. I argued that high 
convergence between candidate and media messaging should lead to high levels of 
support for the candidate while low convergence should lead to the opposite. I also 
argued that convergence should have normative implications as well. Because candidates 
are better incentivized to correctly identify the agenda that will be most useful for their 
audience than journalists, diverging from the candidate’s agenda should mean relying on 
a less heuristically efficient collection of issues. I tested hypotheses distilled from these 
arguments using a lab experiment where subjects were exposed to a press release from a 
candidate and a news article that was either a) apolitical, b) discussed similar issues as the 
candidate, or c) discussed a different issue from anything mentioned by the candidate. 
Subjects were asked about their attitudes toward the candidate and then provided a 
chance to peruse more information as well as reconsider their vote. 
Low convergence between the candidate and the media caused significant 
changes in “correct” voting behavior. Those assigned to that treatment group spent more 
time searching for more information about the candidate, were more likely to opt to 
revote, and more likely to subsequently change their vote than those in the control group.  
It appears that the most likely mechanism underpinning this result is an 
obfuscating effect. Low convergence interferes with the ability to recall the candidate’s 
agenda, which then may affect certainty about if the candidate is really the right choice. 
In other regards, the results do not conform to expectations. First, neither high nor 
low convergence appeared to have much of an effect on support for the candidate. Across 
several measures, especially agreement that the candidate is focused on the important 
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issues and probability of voting for the candidate, support was uniformly high. I expect 
that without much information about the other contender for the nomination, subjects 
defaulted to accepting the only real intraparty option they had been given. A replication 
where more information is given about other contenders or one using a real candidate 
contemporaneously with a primary season where attitudes may be more diverse might 
produce a different result. Additionally, it might be the case that high and low 
convergence affect different attitudes. While low convergence did decrease agreement 
that the candidate is focused on important issues, albeit only substantively weakly, high 
convergence had a strong positive effect on agreement that the candidate is electable. 
Perhaps low convergence does make the candidate’s agenda appear less important, while 
high convergence sends a signal about how politically skilled the candidate is. 
Second, high convergence did not improve correct voting behavior. It seems the 
repetition of the message had only a slight positive effect on recall of the candidate’s 
message relative to the control group who received the same candidate agenda. Perhaps if 
subjects were more purely reliant on the media to receive the candidate’s message, rather 
than getting so much directly from the candidate, high convergence would have been 
more effective. It is possible that this experimental manipulation was, altogether, simply 
too weak. 
This study involves other limitations, many of which are common to lab 
experiment design. It involves measuring attitudes and behavior in a context that subjects 
are unlikely to encounter in the real world. Real nomination races do not involve 
hypothetical politicians. The information environment is rarely dominated by a single 
candidate the way this one was. And real voters do not go around reading campaign press 
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releases. But primaries do frequently involve candidates with little name recognition, 
some of whom go on to be real contenders in the race like Senator Rick Santorum in 
2012, Senator Bernie Sanders in 2016, or Mayor Pete Buttigieg in 2020. These candidates 
begin with little more pre-existing voter attitudes than the hypothetical Senator Alex 
Simmons. Information environments can become temporarily lopsided (Sides and 
Vavreck 2013) and may even remain so under specific conditions (Sides, Tessler, and 
Vavreck 2018). And while voters may not read press releases, they do encounter the 
unmediated versions of candidate messages in TV advertisements and on social media. 
As such, the external validity of the experiment may not be so far off reality as it initially 
appears. 
The sample that comprises the subjects of the study is not representative of 
primary electorates. Primary voters are not exclusively college undergraduates at state 
research universities on the East Coast in the Big Ten Conference. In fact, younger voters 
are specifically underrepresented in primary electorates. But the behavioral effect this 
study identifies is psychological, not demographic. There is no reason to suspect that 
younger, college-educated subjects would be particularly likely to have their recall 
abilities affected by low convergence. If anything, the trajectory of human cognitive 
abilities suggests low convergence’s effect should be weakest among that particular 
group. Furthermore, college students represent a particularly valuable population who 
primary candidates regularly target specifically via in-person appearances. As such, it is 
particularly feasible to estimate candidates’ version of a specifically targeted agenda, in 
turn facilitating the sorts of tests of normative implications performed here. While the use 
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of college students as a subject pool may limit generalizability, the value brought in other 
regards makes the tradeoff worthwhile. 
As a final note on limitations, there is a normative counterargument that this study 
is not well-suited to respond to empirically. Perhaps low convergence stems from a 
process of translating a niche message to a mass audience. The press releases created for 
this experiment were based on real speeches given by candidates at college campuses. 
Neither mentioned foreign policy, while media coverage overall tends to discuss foreign 
policy extensively in presidential primaries, as documented in Chapter 4. Perhaps college 
students do not care much about foreign policy, and therefore candidates do not broach 
the topic when speaking to them, but the wider electorate does care about foreign policy, 
and so the media reports extensively on foreign policy because their audience is broader 
than just college students. 
While this specific example is unlikely given the public’s overall disinterest in 
foreign policy issues (Berinksy 2007, Saunders 2012), the general point that the media 
may serve a translational role that is normatively useful is worth considering. However, 
even this normative best-case scenario makes the media an inefficient conduit for primary 
campaigns. This requires assuming that the media will serve the interests of the broadest 
audience, which in turn means heterogeneity within primary electorates is poorly 
handled. Situations in which party interests are uniform, for example during times of war 
or economic crises, may be well suited to primaries organized via the mass media. But 
any time in which the electorate has diverse interests will in turn lead large segments of 
the primary electorate, if not pluralities, to higher rates of incorrect voting behavior as the 
media ignores their interests to translate for whichever group represents the broadest 
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audience. Additionally, it is unlikely that such a translational role would serve the 
interests of candidates who appeal to historic outgroups who represent smaller portions of 
party electorates like racial or ethnic minorities or LGBTQ voters. As such, while this 
study cannot empirically tackle the possibility that the media is not simply normatively 
harmful but is instead serving an additional, translational purpose, I contend that even 
this translational purpose would be inconsistent with pluralistic democratic primary 
elections. 
Finally, the implications of these findings are significant and worthy of deeper 
consideration. Among the low convergence treatment group, subjects spent more time 
searching for additional information about the candidate once provided the opportunity. 
They then were more likely to opt to re-vote and then, among all those who opted to re-
vote, more likely to change their vote. It is unlikely that these subjects would be provided 
an easily navigable and searchable collection of biographical information and policy 
proposals for a candidate. It stands to reason that, without that opportunity to peruse a 
collection of full information, these subjects would be unlikely to change their minds 
about the candidate. In that case, they would simply support the wrong person.  
This incorrect voting is obviously inefficient. It also fundamentally undermines 
heuristic-based assumptions of democratic theory (Lupia 1994, Popkin 1991, Sniderman, 
Brody, and Tetlock 1991). While heuristics can themselves lead to decision errors 
(Kuklinski et al. 2000), in general it is understood that voters can use heuristics to 
overcome their general lack of knowledge about politics in electoral contexts (Delli 
Carpini and Keeter 1996, Downs 1957). What this study suggests is that when the media 
diverges from the candidates’ agendas, at least some voters, and very likely quite a few of 
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them, will not be getting the right heuristics. Taken collectively, this dissertation also 
says that a key reason they won’t be getting the right heuristics is because the media will 
be prioritizing particular newsworthiness values in how it structures coverage. 

























Chapter 8: The Future of Media-Centric Primaries 
 
This dissertation sought to explain why some presidential primary candidates 
have more success than others in conveying their campaign agendas through the media. I 
argue that the answer lies in the role of newsworthiness values in structuring how 
journalists process and react to candidate messages. Newsworthiness values are traits 
journalists use as standards of delineating “good” from “bad” news content. When the 
newsworthiness of a candidate’s message or the context surrounding that message is 
high, journalists should hew closer to the candidate’s agenda as it will satisfy 
journalism’s quality standards, reducing the chances the journalist’s attention will wander 
elsewhere. The primary concerns of this dissertation are the newsworthiness values of 
conflict, human interest, simplicity, and timeliness. 
I argue that these newsworthiness values need to be understood as contextually 
dependent. While all journalists are taught these values in some form or fashion, how 
they are understood while on the beat depends on the characteristics of the context the 
journalist interacts with. Without taking the nature of the context into account 
beforehand, newsworthiness values tend toward becoming tautologic constructs: if it 
became news then there must be conflict in here somewhere. I argue that anger in 
candidate speeches will be a powerful source of conflict cues. I also argue that candidates 
talking about their own personal appeal or otherwise using personalistic, authentic 
language will be a form of human-interest cues. I propose three different forms of 
simplicity. First, linguistic simplicity, or the tendency to use highly readable language. 
Second, narrative simplicity, or the tendency to focus on a small number of issues. And 
third, contextual simplicity, or the complexity of the race itself which can vary with the 
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volatility the introduction of new candidates generates. Finally, I argue that candidate 
agendas should decline in timeliness over the course of the primary as the candidate’s 
message fades into old news. 
To test the effect of these contextualized newsworthiness values on the degree of 
success a candidate has at transmitting their agenda, I rely on a combination of human-
coded content analysis, computational text analysis, and dictionary-based text analysis. I 
constructed a corpus of announcement speeches and media coverage of those 
announcements from 1984-2016, the Presidential Primary Announcement Corpus 
(PPAC), that I coded at the paragraph level based on a pre-set topic codebook. I also 
constructed a corpus of candidate speeches and media coverage throughout the primary 
cycle from 2000-2016, the Presidential Primary Communication Corpus (PPCC), which 
was analyzed via a Structural Topic Model (Roberts et al. 2014). I measured the degree 
of overlap between the agenda of the candidate and the agenda of the media when 
reporting on that candidate via convergence scores (Sigelman and Buell 2004). 
In Chapter 4, I showed that the amount of anger language and candidate-based 
appeals used by a candidate in their announcement speech were positively correlated with 
the degree of agenda convergence they received from The New York Times, the 
Washington Post  ̧and ABC News. These results were stable across myriad specifications 
and using alternative measurements. Counter to expectations, neither linguistic nor 
narrative simplicity were positively correlated with agenda convergence.  
In Chapter 5, I showed that expansions in the size of the primary field in a given 
month, a measure of declining contextual simplicity, were negatively correlated with 
agenda convergence between candidates and The New York Times and the Washington 
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Post in that month. I also showed that these declines are primarily felt by the candidates 
performing poorly in the polls. Counter to expectations, there was no tendency toward 
declining convergence over time. Instead, convergence appeared to be mostly stable over 
time. Finally, I successfully replicated the positive effect of candidate anger on 
convergence found in Chapter 4. 
Why do the media focus on the newsworthiness values of conflict, human interest, 
and simplicity, or at least the specific forms I articulate in this dissertation? I take this 
question up in Chapter 6. Based on prior literature I devise three potential explanations. 
First, newsworthiness values stem from the need to sift through a large quantity of 
potential news and find those that will become content. Newsworthiness values are 
therefore heuristics used to routinize a difficult aspect of the profession and so should be 
strongest among the outlets that need to be the most discerning. Second, newsworthiness 
values operate as conventions for crafting compelling content practiced because 
journalists conceptualize their craft as that of storytelling. Because storytelling 
conventions vary based on the medium of the story, the effect of newsworthiness values 
will depend on the nature of the medium. Third, newsworthiness values are means of 
identifying content that the audience demands. Newsworthiness values will therefore 
vary across outlets as their audiences vary, namely in terms of political interest and 
sophistication. Notably, I do not suggest that all newsworthiness values must necessarily 
stem from one and only one of these potential explanations.  
The results suggest that anger is a newsworthiness cue that derives its effect from 
being an effective storytelling role in text-based mediums. The effect of contextual 
simplicity, on the other hand, appears to be tied to its value as a means of routinization of 
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news production. ABC News and newspapers react more strongly to changes in the size 
of the field while 24-hour cable news outlets, which have more space to fill and so do not 
need to be as discerning in what can be included in their news product, are not as 
impacted by this volatility. There was also suggestive evidence that the human-interest 
and linguistic simplicity newsworthiness cues stem from the media’s storytelling identity, 
with both being strongest among visual news mediums.  
In Chapter 7, I explore the behavioral ramifications agenda convergence has in 
presidential primaries via a laboratory experiment. I find that exposure to either high or 
low agenda convergence had little effect on attitudes toward a candidate; those exposed 
to low convergence were slightly less likely to agree with the statement that the candidate 
“focused on the important issues,” those exposed to high convergence were more in 
agreement with the statement that the candidate was “electable,” but there were no 
significant differences in other measures such as a feeling thermometer or vote choice. 
But exposure to low convergence did have significant negative effects on measures of 
“correct” voting behavior. After measuring attitudes toward the candidate, subjects were 
allowed to peruse more information about the candidate and then allowed to reconsider 
their vote. Subjects in the low convergence group spent more time perusing this 
information, were more likely to opt to re-vote, and (among those who opted to re-vote) 
were more likely to change their vote. Subsequent analysis suggested this was driven by a 
decline in recall of the candidate’s message upon exposure to low convergence 
conditions. While this may mean that low convergence inspires real-world voters to do 
additional information searches, the reality is that information searches are not as heavily 
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subsidized as they were in lab conditions. It is more likely that these secondary 
information searches never occur and voters simply choose wrong. 
I began this dissertation with several examples of candidates succeeding and 
failing at driving media agendas from the 2016 primaries. Let’s return to a specific one. 
Donald Trump was highly successful at driving a message focused on immigration, trade, 
and appeals to his own personal characteristics and brand. Why was he able to do so? His 
rhetorical style was extremely anger-laden and personalistic, traits which the media prizes 
as newsworthy. Additionally, the Republican primary field was highly volatile with 
candidate consistently jumping in from March through September, 2015. This volatility 
reduced contextual simplicity, but within that time frame Trump was rising in the polls 
and staking an electoral position that insulated him from reductions in convergence. But 
the other candidates were not faring so well, creating a gap between Trump and his rivals 
especially among the audiences of broadcast and newspaper mediums. And so the 
newsworthiness values of the media very powerfully favored his agenda while the 
agendas of many of the other contenders went overlooked because their rhetoric and 
circumstances were not as enticing to journalists. 
Evidence from scholarly studies of agenda setting (Feezell 2018, Hayes 2008, 
Iyengar and Kinder 1987, King, Schneer, and White 2017, McCombs and Shaw 1972) 
and priming (Bartels 2006, Iyengar and Kinder 1987, Krosnick and Kinder 1990) suggest 
that the differential outcomes created by these newsworthiness values can have profound 
impacts on public opinion. Furthermore, while the proliferation of partisan media (Stroud 
2011) and narrowcasting (Bennett and Iyengar 2008) has empowered audiences to choose 
what news they consume and therefore seemingly mitigated the influence of mass media 
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(Arceneaux and Johnson 2013), Chapter 6 reinforces previous work (Hayes 2014) that 
shows that these partisan news outlets still rely on similar newsworthiness values. The 
important downstream ramifications of newsworthiness values on public opinion are 
therefore vital to note. 
Furthermore, while the results suggested only minimal change to evaluations of 
candidates, Chapter 7 did find significant normative implications of low convergence. 
Low convergence led to lower rates of “correct” voting behavior. Voters exposed to 
candidate and media messages that discussed different issues evidently felt the need to do 
more intensive information searches when provided the opportunity, information searches 
that they would be unlikely to undertake in the real world because such activity normally 
carries a much higher opportunity cost (Downs 1957) when not subsidized as it was in 
the lab setting. If the information searches never occur and instead voters are only relying 
on their initial impression gleaned from encountering candidate and media agendas, then 
these voters will simply choose wrong.  
As a result, the media’s failure to deliver heuristically useful information 
obstructs how voters process candidate agendas, which can lead to the selection of 
candidates who aren’t preferred by the party’s electorate. There has been a great deal of 
discussion among political scientists about whether primaries, which vest power in the 
party in the electorate, are a preferable means of selecting a party’s standard-bearer than 
other methods that prioritize appealing to coalitions within the party. But as long as 
primaries are media-centric affairs, the newsworthiness values of journalists will make 
them an inefficient means of accomplishing even their own goal. 




The normative consequences described should be addressed. But by whom and 
how? I consider four actors involved in the primary communication process: the 
candidates, the voters/media consumers, the parties, and the media.  
Candidates 
 
Candidates are the most directly positioned to affect agenda convergence via 
leveraging newsworthiness values. If low convergence leads to inefficient voting 
behavior, then candidates should increase their appeals to newsworthiness values to 
solicit higher convergence. The evidence in this dissertation suggests that they should 
therefore use angrier and personalistic rhetoric and coordinate to maintain stable fields. 
But these changes in candidate behavior would either carry their own normative costs or 
be highly unrealistic. 
For starters, anger rhetoric affects voters by making them more motivated to vote 
(Valentino et al. 2011), but more stubborn in their preferences and less likely to consider 
ranges of options (Marcus et al. 2005, Groenendyk and Banks 2014). This stubbornness 
is particularly concerning in primaries where there are often more than two options and 
voters lack party ID or clear ideological differences to guide their choices. Incentivizing 
the use of anger in candidate rhetoric to drive media narratives therefore can lead to a 
more rigidly thinking electorate, in turn creating precisely the sorts of incorrect voting 
high convergence is supposed to avoid. Additionally, this stubbornness could make 
unifying the base after the nomination has been conferred a more arduous task and 
advantage candidates who enter the race with established bases of support at the cost of 
those who need to build a coalition of supporters through campaigning. 
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Furthermore, anger is a foundational emotion to symbolically racist attitudes 
(Banks 2014). When angry, voters will rely more on their symbolically racist attitudes 
when evaluating their alternatives, which in turn can work to the detriment of African 
American candidates or any candidate speaking out on racial justice issues. This is 
compounded by the fact that other incentive structures prevent Black candidates from 
utilizing anger messages (Phoenix 2019). Newsworthiness values that prioritize anger 
therefore incentivize the use of a rhetoric cue denied to Black candidates that will also 
prime a large contingent of voters to rely on attitudes that will work to the detriment of 
African American candidates when used by their competitors. 
Encouraging candidates to define campaigns around themselves is not particularly 
preferable. It promotes messaging strategies that are unlikely to aid voters in 
comprehending the complexities of politics. When politics is understood as the 
interactions of a handful of political elites, the rules and coalitions that play important 
parts can disappear in the imagination of public consciousness. That the media logic that 
increasingly undergirds presidential primary campaigns incentives candidates to rely on 
candidate-centric and angry messages therefore has the potential to create perverse 
behavioral and electoral repercussions that diminish the capacity to hold the proper actors 
accountable retroactively (Achen and Bartels 2016) and promotes the sort of cults of 
personality crucial to demagoguery. 
And candidates are not well positioned to affect the strategic considerations of 
others. Candidates cannot do much to affect the utility that a competitor gains from 
entering the race, especially considering the increased platform that can come to even 
those who do not ultimately win. Candidate attrition is guided by each individual 
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campaign carrying out a multifaceted decision-making process (Damore, Hansford, and 
Barghothi 2010, Haynes et al. 2004, Norrander 2006) and other campaigns have minimal 
capacity to affect those facets and speed up winnowing. There is little that one campaign 
can do to keep the field itself stable. 
In sum, the candidates do have tools available to them to appeal to the 
newsworthiness values of the media, specifically by utilizing anger and personalistic 
appeals in their rhetoric. But these types of messages carry a cost, and one that we are 
better off not paying. We must look elsewhere for a solution. 
Voters 
 
The primary means of executing change available to voters are their media and 
information preferences. The evidence from Chapter 6 suggests that voters, as a 
contingent of media consumers, cannot shift the media’s newsworthiness values 
themselves as those values do not appear to exist as a means of creating content to match 
audience demands. But voters can choose to consume news that is higher in convergence 
and less driven by the most harmful of these newsworthiness values. ABC News, as a 
stand-in for broadcast news overall, consistently was the most divergent from candidate 
agendas while The New York Times, the Washington Post, Fox News, and MSNBC were 
all similar in their convergence levels.59 
Among these outlets, it is hard to say which is preferable. Increasing the audience 
of text-based outlets increases the incentive of candidates to rely on anger in their rhetoric 
 
59 Fox News appears to be higher than other outlets in convergence toward the agendas of Republican 
candidates as well, while converging less toward the agendas of Democratic candidates than other outlets. 
As such, if prioritizing only high convergence then Fox News would appear to be the most preferable 
source of information about Republican primary candidates among Republican voters of the media outlets 
included in the analysis. 
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as there will be greater utility to conveying the candidate’s agenda in that medium, while 
increasing the audience of cable news increases the incentive to rely on personalistic 
messaging for that same reason. Perhaps it is the case that one of these options is 
preferable, but clearly neither is ideal. 
Alternatively, voters could take more of an onus on themselves and be less reliant 
on the media as a source for information about the campaigns. Voters could do more 
thorough searches of the information campaigns provide via social media and their 
campaign websites, for example. Changes to the communication technologies employed 
by campaigns certainly make that possibility more feasible, but the lack of an 
accompanying change to the total hours in a day diminish the viability of this as a path 
forward. Furthermore, as I have articulated previously my argument is that the media is 
not well suited to deciding which issues are most important for voters, not that the 
media’s proper role is that of a stenographer. The media have a vital role to play in 
providing context and holding candidates to account on the issues that the campaigns 
promote. Asking voters to remove the media as a conduit and instead seek their 
information directly from candidate-voter communication risks opening the floodgates to 
campaign-disseminated disinformation, which in turn would carry its own heavy 
normative cost. The voters/media consumers therefore have only poor or infeasible 
options available to them to rectify the normative problem at hand. 
Parties 
 
The national parties can structure some of the rules of their nomination 
campaigns, although significant influence is vested in the state parties. Some of these 
rules could conceivably be used to affect the rhetoric incentives of candidates. For 
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example, it is conventional wisdom, backed up by some evidence (Haynes and Rhine 
1998), that candidates refrain from too much mudslinging prior to the Iowa caucus 
because supporters of candidates who receive less than 15% of the vote in the precinct on 
an initial ballot are allowed to switch allegiances and the candidates do not want to 
alienate anyone. Even past the caucus, the multicandidate format of primaries may 
disincentive attacks as candidates do not want to accidentally advantage the campaigns of 
uninvolved bystanders. Likewise, prioritizing primaries in large states where retail 
politics is more difficult or otherwise less essential than in Iowa and New Hampshire may 
shift the emphasis away from politics of glad-handing and baby-kissing that often 
accompanies personalistic rhetoric.  
But changing the order or structure of primary contests would not deal with the 
incentive structure imposed by media-centric primary campaigns. The parties could set 
the rules so that relying on anger or personalistic messaging is less advantageous but the 
tradeoff would still be declining agenda convergence, which in turn would lead to less 
correct voting. These sorts of changes do not deal with the fundamental problem imposed 
by preferences for certain rhetorical newsworthiness cues. 
Parties can restructure the rules to recalibrate candidate entry and exit, however. I 
argue they should do so with the goal of preventing marginal candidates from entering 
the race and keeping major candidates who represent diverse perspectives within the 
party coalition in the race until we near the point when most voters are tuning in. This 
should mean setting high standards for the avenues of legitimization, like participation in 
the debates, to decrease the utility of those hoping to catch on after some grand moment 
of political spectacle. Furthermore, by condensing the primary calendar the increase in 
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convergence that accompanies winnowing could be timed to when voters in battleground 
states start studying up. For many voters, learning about the candidates is left to when 
casting a ballot is imminent. Since convergence increases in response to winnowing, the 
primary calendar should strategically place major winnowing events in accordance with 
when the most pivotal voters, namely those located in the states that our Electoral 
College and first-past-the-post format determines are the most valuable, begin to tune 
into the race. By limiting the race to only viable candidates and strategically timing the 
winnowing window the parties can improve the odds that the nominee is chosen after 
clear contrasts are accurately processed and debated by the primary electorate. 
The parties do have another means of addressing the normative concerns created 
by the effects of low convergence and the tradeoffs to improving convergence. They 
could simply circumvent the media-centric primary process entirely by returning to the 
smoke-filled rooms. This means of candidate selection carries its own issues, but 
debating them isn’t necessary. This is simply too unrealistic a turn at this point. The 
general trajectory is to further restrict the party’s say in the nomination of a standard-
bearer, primarily through the reduction in superdelegates. As such, this direct means of 
recalibrating the primary system is unfeasible, and it is only the indirect means described 
above that are worthy of consideration. 
Media 
 
Changing how the media covers primaries would be the best means of solving the 
posed dilemma among the options articulated here. It is the only option where the 
newsworthiness values that give rise to low convergence can be directly addressed. 
Chapter 6 suggests that the appeal of anger as a cue of the conflict newsworthiness value 
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likely stems from the storytelling conventions of the mediums. Text-based outlets reacted 
most strongly to candidate anger while television outlets reacted much more tepidly. In 
addition, there was suggestive evidence that two more newsworthiness cues – candidate-
based rhetoric and linguistic simplicity – similarly stem from this same storytelling 
motivation due to their particular strength among visual news mediums.  
This complicates the solution as it is not as simple as transitioning television news 
to more text-based storytelling conventions or vice versa. Both create issues via the 
storytelling practices they use. Instead, the media should downplay the role of storyteller 
in the journalism education and socialization process and instead recommit to the media’s 
role as a watchdog. Doing so would lead to less journalistic emphasis on story traits like 
conflict and human interest and encourage journalists to follow closely with what 
candidates are saying. Furthermore, embracing the identity of watchdog can mean not 
merely repeating or indexing what elites have to say (Bennet, Lawrence, and Livingston 
2007) but rather critically analyzing the agendas of candidates against their proposals and 
prior accomplishments. Being a watchdog can mean allowing candidates to set the 
agenda but then playing an important and active role in how voters process and evaluate 
that agenda. 
Such a cultural shift among journalists is easier to imagine than some other 
proposals (Patterson 2013). After all, a role as a political watchdog is part of the 
journalist’s existing self-conception (Bennett 1996). What I propose is merely a 




In practice, such a shift would of course come partnered with complications. 
Important to the theoretical argument of context-based appreciations of news norms was 
that journalism is not purely a political endeavor. While I make the case that such a shift 
of professional identity would improve the way the media covers presidential primary 
campaigns, and politics more generally, those are not the only beats that occupy 
journalists. Would a strong emphasis on the watchdog role of journalists lead to better 
coverage of pop culture? Sports? If not, how can we create a teaching and socialization 
system that can isolate the areas where journalists should be more akin to watchdogs 
from those where journalists should act more as storytellers and impart those differing 
prioritizations? 
The answer likely lies in an earlier emphasis of domain-specific training during 
journalism school education, which in turn puts added burdens on journalism programs. 
But for the media to act as an effective conduit of information in presidential primaries, 
such a change is necessary. 
Additionally, while the evidence presented in this dissertation suggests that the 
influence of anger and candidate-based appeals are not tied to the demands of audiences, 
it is worth considering what would happen if demand for watchdog journalism coverage 
of primaries were low enough to lead to a significant drop-off in audience size. Given 
how volatile the media economy has been in the digital marketplace, could journalism 
survive such a shift in professional identity if it came at the cost of ad revenue or 
subscriptions?  
It is possible to cheaply produce watchdog journalism, however. Attending a 
candidate’s event and hewing close to their message is, by itself, not terribly costly even 
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if performing a critical analysis of the candidate’s message does require time and 
expertise. This low cost can partially offset a declining demand. Furthermore, if such a 
cost did accompany a declining emphasis of storytelling in campaign coverage, then the 
best way to compensate would be to allow other parts of the news product to subsidize 
the campaign coverage by retaining their storytelling virtues. Such solutions, while 
imperfect, are more realistic than proposals to shift to alternatives like expansions of 
publicly financed media. 
This solution would not address the effect that contextual simplicity has on 
convergence. That effect was tied to the size of the “newshole” the media outlet has to 
fill. As such, it is tied to a more tangible phenomenon than the self-conception of 
journalists. Remedying this would require an expansion of space and/or time available to 
journalists to fill with news content. In part, this should be rectified by the continued 
proliferation of digital news. Otherwise, it is hard to address via any specific policy or 
change in the nature of the profession. 
Instead, this is best addressed by the parties as described above. That in 
conjunction with a shifting emphasis of political reporting away from the role of 
storyteller and toward the role of watchdog should mitigate the problems that 
newsworthiness values create in presidential primaries. They can create a version of 








Appendix A (Chapter 3) 
 
Appendix A.1: Codebook and Coding Procedures for Issue Topic Hand-coding of PPAC 
 
Goals for Coding 
The goal of this coding project is to code presidential primary candidate speeches 
and media coverage of those presidential primary candidates into distinct issue 
categories. All text will be coded at the paragraph level. This coding will be aggregated 
and used to build variables for a series of statistical analyses. The precise nature of the 
variables and the statistical analyses cannot be disclosed at this time to prevent potential 
bias in the coding procedure. If the coder would like to know about the overall research 
project, they may request that information upon completion of their coding task. 
Notable Features of the Codebook 
The codebook designed and implemented here has three primary features. 
1.) Exhaustive – The issue categories are completely exhaustive, meaning that every 
paragraph can be placed into one of the issue categories, with none going un-
coded. 
2.) Exclusive – By a set of coding principles described below, each paragraph can be 
coded into only one issue category. 
3.) Hierarchical60 – While there is only one coding question to answer for each 
paragraph and each paragraph will be placed into only one category, there is a 
 
60 This hierarchical method was employed given the asymmetric usage of the American values and 
horserace categories and the tendency of candidates and the media, respectively, to use those categories as 
a means of framing discussion of other topics (i.e. a candidate discussing America’s historical roots as a 
reason for why we need to be more involved in spreading democracy in the Middle East, media coverage of 
how a candidate’s economic policy proposals will affect their standing in the polls). Because a person 
listening to the speech or consuming the media coverage would still get some information about a topic, at 
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hierarchy to the issue categories. The coder should first attempt to place the 
paragraph into a category on the first level. If the paragraph does not fit into any 
of those categories, then the coder may code the paragraph into whichever of the 
categories on the second level is most appropriate. 
Coding Question and Coding Principles 
Each paragraph should be coded based on answering the following question: “Which 
issue category is this paragraph mostly about?” Because it is possible for a paragraph to 
contain references and appeals to multiple issue categories, however, there are several 
caveats, called coding principles, which can be useful for answering this question. 
1.) If there are multiple categories invoked by a paragraph, does the hierarchical 
nature of the coding scheme alleviate the issue? For example, if there are 
references to issue code 1 (domestic economy), which is a 1st-level category, and 
issue code 13 (horserace), which is a 2nd-level category, then the paragraph should 
be coded as issue code 1. 
2.) If there are multiple categories invoked by a paragraph, and they are on the same 
hierarchical level, is one issue code category invoked more than others? For 
example, if a paragraph contains 3 appeals to issue code 1 (domestic economy) 
and 1 appeal to issue code 4 (candidate-based appeals), then the greater number of 
references to issue code 1 means it should be coded into that issue category. 
3.) If there are multiple categories invoked by a paragraph, and they are all on the 
same hierarchical level and invoked in equal proportion, which is mentioned first? 
 
the very least a relevancy heuristic that the candidate cares about and prioritizes that topic, it was 
determined that the best way to avoid excessive confusion in those cases would be to default to the topic 
not the frame. 
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For example, if a paragraph is a list of issues, including (in order) single 
references to issue code 1 (domestic economy), issue code 5 (national security), 
issue code 9 (international trade), and issue code 14 (crime), then it should be 
coded as issue code 1 since that one came first. 
Note that if none of these coding principles assist in placing the paragraph into an 
issue code category, it almost assuredly belongs in issue code 15 (non-codable). 
Coding Instructions 
After reading through these instructions and being provided a chance to ask 
questions, the coder will be given a spreadsheet with 100 paragraphs randomly drawn 
from the candidate speech database and 100 paragraphs randomly drawn from the New 
York Times media coverage database. The coder will be required to do a minimum of 25 
from each with the PI as a practice set. After completing that minimum amount, the coder 
can request more practice reps if they would like to do so, up to the full set of 100 
paragraphs for each spreadsheet. The coder can terminate the practice session after that 
minimum amount but before completion of each spreadsheet at any point if they so 
choose. 
After the practice coding, the coder will be provided a spreadsheet with 200 
paragraphs randomly drawn from the candidate speech database and 200 paragraphs 
randomly drawn from The New York Times media coverage database. The coder will take 
these spreadsheets and code each paragraph, skipping none, into an issue category listed 
in the table below and following the above guidelines by typing the issue code number 
into the “issue_coder2” column in the respective spreadsheet. This can be done at any 
point in the following week. At no point may the coder request guidance from the PI of 
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this project on how to code any specific paragraph or on general coding principles. All 
such questions need to be addressed in the training session. Upon completion of the 
coding task, the spreadsheets should be returned to the PI. 
Issue Category Brief Descriptions 
The following table includes the titles of the 15 issue categories, the numeric code 
for each category, and a brief description of the what that category entails. In the Issue 
Category column, issue category titles that appear in Italics are in hierarchical-level 1 and 


















Appendix Table A.1.1: Topics in Codebook of PPAC 





1 Paragraph primarily about American unemployment, labor 
policies, taxes, economic growth, various markets (housing, 
banking, manufacturing, etc.), etc. 
Government 
Assistance 
2 Paragraph primarily about healthcare policy (i.e. 
Obamacare/ACA, Medicaid, Medicare, etc.), Social Security, 
welfare (i.e. TANF), general social safety net policies, etc. 
Social Issues/ 
Civil Rights 
3 Paragraph primarily about issues including abortion (i.e. Roe v. 
Wade), gay marriage (i.e. DOMA, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, 
Obergefell v. Hodges; civil rights (generic or reference to Civil 
Rights Movement); advocacy organizations for historically 
oppressed groups, etc. 
Candidate 
Appeals 
4 Paragraph primarily about traits (i.e. intelligence, honesty, 
leadership skills), backstory (i.e. discussions of childhood, talk of 
parents), or generic accomplishments (i.e. productive legislator, 
successful businessman) of the candidate. 
International 
Affairs 
5 Paragraph primarily about American relationship with foreign 
countries, including discussion of treaties, allies/enemies, war, 




6 Paragraph primarily about energy policy, natural resources, 
climate change, natural disasters, or environmental policy (i.e. 
EPA, Clean Water Act) 
Education 
Policy 
7 Paragraph primarily about education policy, including discussion 
of federal education standards (No Child Left Behind, Common 
Core), school choice, higher education grants, etc. 
Immigration 
Policy 
8 Paragraph primarily about immigration policy, border security, 
rates of immigration (either documented or undocumented), etc. 
International 
Trade Policy 
9 Paragraph primarily about international trade agreements 
(NAFTA, TPP), tariffs, trade deficits, etc. 
Populist 
Appeals 
10 Paragraph primarily about generic anti-elite appeals, including 




11 Paragraph primarily about generic appeals to what government 
should and should not be doing, including discussion of core 
conservative and liberal values 
American 
Values 
12 Paragraph primarily about generic values and trajectory of 
America, including appeals about freedom, liberty, justice, etc. 
Horserace 13 Paragraph primarily about polls, fundraising amounts, generic 
endorsement counts, campaign strategy, campaign staffing, state 
of the race, etc.  
Crime/Gun 
Policy 
14 Paragraph primarily about prison policy, crime rates, death 
penalty, gun regulations/2nd Amendment, etc. 





Appendix A.2: Reliability and Validity Tests of Topic Coding of PPAC 
 
Intercoder Reliability 
 It is important to show that the coding here would be reproduceable by another 
scholar. To demonstrate this, I trained another coder on the codebook presented in 
Appendix 3A and then gave them a coding task of 200 randomly drawn candidate speech 
paragraphs and 200 randomly drawn The New York Times coverage paragraphs. The 
results of this intercoder reliability test can be seen in Appendix Table 3B.1. The Cohen’s 
kappa estimates are within the general range of acceptable reliability.  
Appendix Table A.2.1: Intercoder Reliability Statistics of Issue Topic Coding 
 Candidate 
Speeches 
Media Coverage All 
% Agree 81.00% 77.00% 79.00% 
% Expected Agree 11.97% 15.90% 11.62% 
Cohen’s kappa .78* .73* .76* 
Standard 
Deviation 
.03 .03 .02 
Notes: * denotes p < .05, one-tailed        
             
Validity 
I consider both construct convergence and divergence validity by comparing how 
similar the hand-coding is to a related measure and how different the hand-coding is from 
unrelated measures (Quinn et al. 2010). To assess construct convergence validity, I 
compare my estimates for some of the topics against a dictionary-based coding scheme: 
the Lexicoder Topic Dictionaries (Albugh, Sevenans, and Soroka 2013). These 
dictionaries are built to estimate the topics created in the Comparative Agendas Project, 
which also serves as the starting baseline for my own codebook. There is enough overlap 
to make testing a majority of the categories possible. I was able to combine the various 
dictionaries to reasonable facsimiles of 10 of my codebook categories: domestic 
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economy, government assistance programs, social issues, international affairs, natural 
resources/environmental policy, education, immigration, trade, government’s role 
appeals, and crime. I applied these dictionaries to the candidate speeches and calculated 
the percentage of the total words in the speech which fell into each dictionary category 
for each speech. I then checked the correlation between the percentages generated from 
hand-coding and the percentages of total words. The results are presented in Appendix 
Table 3B.2. The columns are the percentages based on the Lexicoder dictionaries, while 
the rows are the percentages based on hand-coding. 
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.3755 -.2014 -.0288 -.0281 .1247 -.0013 .0590 -.1205 -.0513 -.0414 
Gov’t 
Assistance 
-.0403 .1568 -.2149 -.1869 -.0015 .0536 .2303 -.2224 -.1842 .1150 
Social  
Issues 
-.1229 .1744 .2147 .0008 -.1308 -.1033 -.0676 .0112 -.0421 -.0330 
Int’l  
Affairs 
.0139 .1312 .0930 .3577 .2095 -.0399 -.0746 .3812 .1468 .0505 
Natural 
Resources 
.1138 -.0624 -.2303 -.0113 .2608 -.0442 .1238 .0145 -.0369 -.1833 
Education -.1410 -.0621 -.0569 -.1783 -1614 .6544 .0500 -.1682 -.1056 .1803 
Immigration -.0016 .0491 -.1347 .1527 -.0480 -.1108 .1709 .0218 -.0368 -.1156 
Foreign 
Trade 
.0933 -.0223 -.0405 .0704 .0864 -.0749 .0186 .1987 .0474 -.0122 
Gov’t  
Role 
-.0528 -.0850 -.0791 -.0336 -.1854 -.0284 -.1286 .0462 .3167 .0235 
Crime -.0863 .1318 .2150 .0990 -.0155 .1199 .1440 -.0004 .0242 .3280 
 
Notes: Hand-coded topic categories are the rows, Lexicoder topic categories are the columns. Values are Pearson’s correlation coefficients. Bolded 
numerical values represent the test of construct convergence validity. 
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Construct convergence validity can be assessed by how strongly the hand-coded 
measure (rows) correlate with its Lexicoder copy (columns). These correlation 
coefficients have been bolded. For all ten categories, these correlations are positive. For 
seven of the categories – domestic economy, social issues, international affairs, natural 
resources/environmental policy, education, government’s role appeals, and crime – the 
correlations are also above .2, which considering the drastically different scale of the 
measurements is at least a modest signal of construct convergence validity. This evidence 
is encouraging, if not conclusive. 
Construct divergence validity can be assessed by how weakly correlated the 
measures of one hand-coded topic category is with the other, unrelated Lexicoder topic 
categories. From this assessment, five of the categories seem to have strong construct 
divergence validity: domestic economy, international affairs, education, government’s 
role, and crime. For each of these topics, the hand-coded measure is correlated with the 
other Lexicoder topic measures either weakly or negatively. In addition, the hand-coded 
categories for natural resources/environment and trade display moderately strong 
construct divergence. Each is divergent from most of the other categories, although there 
are one or two that are almost as strongly correlated as the matching category.  
The results are murkier for the other three categories. The hand-coded measure of 
government assistance is also closely correlated with the Lexicoder measures of 
immigration and crime. The hand-coded measure of social issues is correlated with the 
Lexicoder measure of government assistance programs. And the hand-coded measure of 
immigration is closely correlated with the Lexicoder measure of international affairs. 
While this is not perfect divergence, there is still significant separation for these three 
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hand-coded categories from most other topics and the overlap observed may very well 
reflect genuine obliqueness between the issues. After all, immigration is naturally related 
to international relations and a number of government assistance programs have been 
racialized in American political discourse (Gilens 1999). Given that the hand-coding and 
dictionary approaches are measure of different scales – proportions of speeches versus 
counts of words – which naturally hinders comparisons, these results overall suggest 
good construct convergence and divergence validity for the majority of the topic 
categories and moderate construct validity for the remainder. 
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Appendix A.3: Validation of Topics in PPCC (for Chapter 5) 
 
Appendix Table A.3.1: Topics from STM of PPCC Used in Chapter 5 
Topic  Label High Frequency Words Excerpt 




support, right, marriag, 
social, gay 
“In endorsing same-sex marriage on Wednesday, President Obama has offered voters the shar
pest possible contrast with his presumptive Republican opponent, Mitt Romney, on a social is
sue that polls show still evenly divides the country.” 
2 Culture Issues: 
Race 
black, african, american, 
polic, said, white, live 
“’Bernie Sanders has made an unequivocal statement against reparations. He's saying he, und




school, educ, student, 
colleg, program, 
children, teacher 
“Think about it: we're asking America's teachers to meet our greatest obligation for the future
. We're asking them to educate and help mold our children. Yet we pay them far less than oth




like, hes, one, polit, isnt, 
doesnt, say 
“There is just something about taking serious political issues and trying to extract something 




debat, attack, question, 
issu, say, candid, critic 
“Before the debate, an angry and bitter Mr. Gingrich had promised that he would now focus o
n contrasting his record with Mr. Romney's.” 
6 Careers: Senate senat, vote, bill, 
democrat, kennedi, 
legisl, pass 
“Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Texas) and his conservative allies are vowing to block the renewal of the 
Export-Import Bank by any means necessary, which could mean blocking a must-pass transp
ortation bill later this month.” 
7 Careers: Military 
Service 
veteran, war, militari, 
vietnam, servic, serv, 
command 
“Four thin-hulled swift boats came down the Bay Hap River at the end of another bloody ope
ration. Their mission was to transport American commandos, ethnic Chinese Nung mercenari
es and the reluctant South Vietnamese forces known as Ruff Puffs on raids in the Vietcong-c
ontrolled Mekong Delta.” 
8 Foreign Policy: 
Iraq 
iraq, war, troop, 
american, presid, 
afghanistan, iraqi 
“So it seems worthwhile to point out that, by Mr. Obama's own account, neither U.S. comma




job, economi, econom, 
work, busi, american, 
creat 
“Last week we got news that the share of Americans at work or looking for work is at a 38-ye
ar low. More than 6 million people are working part-time jobs when they'd prefer full-time. R




black, white, american, 
wright, race, racial, polit 
“SEN. BARACK Obama's mission in Philadelphia yesterday was to put the controversy over 
inflammatory statements made by the Rev. Jeremiah A. Wright Jr., his spiritual mentor and 
pastor for 20 years, behind him.” 
11 Foreign Policy: 
Mexico 
mexico, mexican, 
hispan, latino, border, 
wall, build 
“In a fiesta of indignation, Mexicans have been lopping off presidential candidate Donald J. T




12 Candidate Traits: 
Authenticity 
 
say, presid, democrat, 
like, seem, polit, new 
“To the Editor: It's disappointing that Nicholas D. Kristof essentially calls for Howard Dean t
o dumb down and put on a folksy act (column, Dec. 6). This says more about the American el
ectorate than anything else.” 
13 Candidates: 
Bernie Sanders 
democrat, said, vermont, 
support, campaign, 
presid, secretari 
“Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont met with Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. for an hour 
on Thursday to discuss campaign finance reform, college affordability and other issues at the 
heart of Mr. Sanders's campaign for the 2016 Democratic presidential nomination.” 
14 Culture Issues: 
Religious Right 
church, christian, god, 
faith, evangel, religi, said  
“At a meeting with hundreds of conservative Christian leaders Tuesday, Donald Trump impli
ed that Hillary Clinton's religion is unknown, despite her longtime profession of her Methodis
t faith.” 
15 Careers: House hous, committe, white, 
congress, washington, 
member, republican 
“Democrats doubled down Tuesday night on their push to end the House Select Committee o
n Benghazi by seeking a vote on a floor amendment to kill the panel. The move by Rep. Loui





email, depart, state, 
inform, secretari, 
investig, classifi 
“FBI Director James B. Comey said Tuesday that while Hillary Clinton and her staff were "e
xtremely careless" in how they handled emails while she was secretary of state, the bureau w




speech, presid, speak, 
audienc, address, crowd, 
deliv  
“Presenting himself as an uplifting alternative in a Republican race filled with fear mongering 
and negativity, Gov. John Kasich of Ohio urged voters on Tuesday to reject what he called ‘t
he path to darkness’ in this year's election. ‘This path solves nothing,’ Mr. Kasich said in a ha




money, rais, fundrais, 
donor, pac 
“It's not just Bernie Sanders's fundraising that is staggering. The senator from Vermont mana
ged to spend roughly $46 million in March alone, the same amount he raised, based on figure
s released by his campaign Wednesday night.” 
19 Culture Issues: 
Abortion 
abort, parenthood, plan, 
life, right, issu, prolif 
“’Faithful to the 'self-evident' truths enshrined in the Declaration of Independence, we assert t
he sanctity of human life and affirm that the unborn child has a fundamental individual right t




court, law, judg, case, 
justic, suprem, feder  
“I'm no fan at all of Donald Trump, but maybe he did put his best people on the task of selecti




said, gop, florida, 
support, sen, republican, 
hes 
“Florida Sen. Marco Rubio re-upped his attacks on GOP presidential front-runner Donald Tru
mp on Friday, repeating some of the lines he used during Thursday night's Republican debate 
but also others not uttered before.” 
22 Economics - Wall 
Street/Populism 
street, peopl, wall, 
countri, sander, 
campaign, bank  
“Phoenix, are you ready for a political revolution? Are you tired of a handful of billionaires r




peopl, trump, will, know, 
great, want, said  
“Mr. Trump: I want to thank you. Look over there, look at this. There that have to get in -- th
ere are 3000 people that have to get in. Yes. This is the biggest crowd of the political season s
o far. We have 30,000 people. Amazing. 30,000 people. I want to thank everybody.” 
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24 Culture Issues: 
Jewish and 
Catholic Voters 
jewish, jew, letter, israel, 
adelson, support, group  
“Regardless of political leanings or depth of spirituality, American Jews expressed great prid
e yesterday that one of their own, Senator Joseph I. Lieberman of Connecticut, had been pick
ed by Vice President Al Gore to be his running mate.” 
25 Horserace: White 
Working Class 
voter, democrat, vote, 
white, elect, among, 
support 
“"What I've said over and over again," he said on "Meet the Press," "we will do well when yo
ung people, when working-class people come out. We do not do well when the voter turnout i
s not large.” 
26 Horserace: 
Chicago Politics 
polit, democrat, chicago, 
run, jackson, say, senat  
“Even friends told Mr. Obama it was a bad idea when he decided in 1999 to challenge an inc
umbent congressman and former Black Panther, Bobby L. Rush, whose stronghold on the So
uth Side of Chicago was overwhelmingly black, Democratic and working class.” 
27 Economics: Labor union, labor, worker, 
endors, member, organ, 
support  
“The iron workers' union, representing more than 100,000 workers, became the first 
international union to endorse a presidential candidate, announcing its support for 
Representative Dick Gephardt, Democrat of Missouri." 
28 Campaign 
Activities: VPs 
vice, run, mate, presid, 
ticket, pick, penc 
“Mitt Romney is starting to bear down on his search for a running mate, but he cautioned in a
n interview on Monday that a final selection may not come until the Republican convention i
n August.” 
29 Foreign Policy: 
National Security 
polici, foreign, presid, 
nation, administr, secur, 
issu  
“Gov. George W. Bush of Texas is counting on a small group of conservative experts steeped 
in the intricacies of arms control, military budgets and geopolitical security to counsel him on 
a subject that has caused him the most trouble in his presidential campaign: foreign affairs.” 
30 Culture Issues: 
White Supremacy 
tweet, star, david, white, 
duke, support, endors  
“Dishonest media is trying their absolute best to depict a star in a tweet as the Star of David 
rather than a Sheriff's Star, or plain star!…It can be easy to confuse these stars! A handy 
mnemonic device is to ask yourself, ‘Does this star have little nubs at the ends of its points, or 
was it used by the Nazis?’” 
31 Campaign 
Activities: Q&As 
think, peopl, know, dont, 
get, that, want 
“I love it here. How are you getting to that. Wonderful to see you man. You're only around w
hen I'm talking about these heavy issues. I know some great things. Well thank you. Thank y
ou. I really thought you were great at our…OK. She asked you a question. I don't know. You'
re right.” 
32 Culture Issues: 
Gender 
women, woman, men, 
femal, gender, shes, male 
“Gloria Steinem and Madeleine Albright called on young women who favor Bernie Sanders 
over Hillary Clinton to essentially grow up.” 
33 Environment: 
Climate Change 
social, scienc, climat, 
studi, book, research, 
chang 
"Many of the alarmists on global warming, they've got a problem because the science doesn't 
back them up. In particular, satellite data demonstrate for the last 17 years, there's been zero 
warming." 
34 Candidates: Mitt 
Romney 
(Strategy) 
ohio, michigan, state, 
said, campaign, detroit, 
massachusett  
“LANSING, Mich. - Mitt Romney often finds himself on the defensive in Rust Belt states for 
having been against the auto industry bailout, which many credit with saving the industry. No
w, he is taking a new tack on the sensitive issue: he's taking credit for the industry's rebound.” 
35 Energy: Fossil 
Fuels 
energi, oil, gas, will, 
price, environment, 
industri 
“CAN THE country do without nuclear power and natural gas? Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) th
inks so. But his position would set back the fight against global warming.” 
36 Social Welfare 
Programs: 
Healthcare 
health, care, insur, plan, 
cost, system, healthcar 
“Ben Carson began rolling out his policy alternatives for the American health-care system thi
s week. Like many prescriptions, it's a bit difficult to decipher at first glance - though not bec
ause of poor handwriting. To put it bluntly, CarsonCare is a muddle.” 
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37 Parties: GOP 
History 
reagan, said, ronald, 
republican, like, hes, say  
“Mr. Santorum spoke before a crowd of 300 people at the Jelly Belly Candy Company here, a 
most unlikely setting for what was billed as ‘a major foreign policy speech.’ But there was a c





will, peopl, get, want, 
thank, thing, one 
“Hey, everybody. Hey, Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. You would think we are on vacation. 
Let's give a big cheer for Myrtle Beach. You would think this is an election night victory part
y. You are all invited. Who is ready to make Barack Obama a one-term president?” 
39 American Values: 
Democracy 
applaus, will, america, 
work, thank, want, can 
“Our campaign from the very beginning has been about one central thing and that is to give v






said, senat, campaign, 
democrat, presid 
“Mayor Edward G. Rendell of Philadelphia, the new chairman of the Democratic National Co
mmittee, has un-endorsed Vice President Al Gore in the increasingly heated campaign agains
t former Senator Bill Bradley of New Jersey for the Democratic Presidential nomination.” 
41 Foreign Policy: 
Middle East 
muslim, islam, state, 
terrorist, attack, unit, 
terror  
“The Council on American-Islamic Relations had planned to hold a news conference Tuesday 
unveiling a report on Islamophobia, including the rise of "Muslim-free" businesses, anti-Musl
im rallies by armed protesters, direct attacks on Muslims and the vandalism of mosques.” 
42 Candidate Traits: 
Relatability 
crowd, one, like, man, 
say, hand, ask  
“The man who would be president takes peanut butter and jelly sandwiches -- on whole whea
t, strawberry jelly preferred to grape -- twice a day on the campaign trail. He wears $15 readi




cancer, medic, drug, 
doctor, diseas, said, 
hospit  
“Senator Barack Obama, 46, was in ''excellent health'' at the time of his last examination mor
e than a year ago and has no known medical problems that would affect his ability to serve as 
president, according to a letter by his physician released on Thursday.” 
44 Foreign Policy: 
Nuclear Threats 
iran, nuclear, state, 
world, will, unit, militari  
“We have made dramatic progress in reducing the number of nuclear weapons. In the last dec
ade, the United States and the countries of the former Soviet Union together have taken about 
eight to nine thousand strategic nuclear weapons out of commission.” 
45 Horserace: 
Advisers 
sen, democrat, said, 
presidenti, candid, 
former, campaign 
“There's only one thing better for a presidential campaign than securing the support of a key a




south, carolina, state, 
nevada, primari, north, 
campaign  
“Newt Gingrich's momentum from the South Carolina wanes days ahead of the Florida prima





facebook, polit, first, 
race, news  
“Mr. Jindal's latest effort comes in the form of a web video, which the governor's campaign p
ut on Facebook, that mocks Mr. Trump's descriptions of his knowledge of foreign policy.” 
48 Horserace: Iowa 
Caucus 
iowa, caucus, campaign, 
poll, said, support, state 
“’The Iowa caucuses are five hours away,’ Cruz said in a community center gym here. The T
exas Republican's campaign is banking on a painstaking turnout strategy here in Iowa, confid




Herman Cain & 
Donald Trump 
(Scandals) 
said, campaign, report, 
interview, told, 
comment, call  
“A state attorney in Florida does not intend to prosecute Donald Trump's campaign manager, 
Corey Lewandowski, who was charged with battery after allegedly grabbing a reporter last m
onth, according to media reports Wednesday evening.” 
50 Candidates: Mitt 
Romney 
(Background) 
said, school, year, one, 
game, time, name  
“Mitt Romney returned from a three-week spring break in 1965 to resume his studies as a hig




state, deleg, win, vote, 
primari, tuesday, contest  
“It was closer, too, than Sanders seemed to get on election night, when a rout bigger than any 
poll had suggested effectively ended the Democratic primary. Since then, Sanders added 879,
671 votes to his California total; Clinton added 804,713 votes.” 
52 Other: Media 
Critiques 
report, media, post, stori, 
time, news, press 
“Donald Trump said Monday that he is pulling The Washington Post's credentials to cover hi




govern, liberti, peopl, 
money, war, get, will 
“[We] have drifted far from our constitution and individual and liberties, a sense of foreign- p
olicy, and the American people are sick of paying for it because we are out of money and hav




israel, state, unit, trip, 
visit, minist, palestinian 
"The truth is they [other countries] don't respect us. When President Obama landed in Cuba o




virginia, counti, said, 
state, maryland, west, 
district  
“Gore's fund-raising efforts have included a Georgetown event last month with co-hosts Mary




campaign, advis, aid, 
strategist, team, staff, 
work 
“Donald J. Trump's campaign is adding staff members to key areas it has been criticized for n
eglecting, bringing on Jim Murphy as its new national political director and preparing to beef 
up its communications team.” 
57 Economics: Taxes tax, cut, plan, incom, 
percent, propos, budget 
“A middle income household making between about $64,000 and $110,000 would get hit wit
h an average tax increase of about $4,300, lowering its after-tax income by more than 6 perce
nt...” 
58 Crime: Gun 
Control 
gun, crime, control, law, 
shoot, violenc, issu  
"None of the major shootings that have occurred in this country over the last few months or y
ears that have outraged us, would gun laws have prevented them." - Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla
.). interview on CBS's "This Morning," Dec. 4, 2015” 
59 Candidate Traits: 
Scandals/Immoral
ity 
claim, alleg, fact, accus, 
lie, sexual, fals  
“If Hillary thinks she can unleash her husband, with his terrible record of women abuse, whil
e playing the women's card on me, she's wrong! Trump is obviously referring to the sexual all
egations that have long swirled around Clinton, even before he became president.” 
60 Candidate Traits: 
Financial 
Transparency 
million, foundat, return, 
releas, financi, paid, year  
“Gov. Rick Perry of Texas on Friday disclosed new travel-related campaign debts of almost $
230,000 that appear to largely stem from improper underpayments to owners of private jets u
sed by his presidential campaign.” 
61 Economics: Trade trade, china, deal, 
agreement, state, countri, 
unit  
"They [Japan] have cars coming in by the millions, and we sell practically nothing. When Jap






thank, one, want, know, 
good, right, year  
“Thanks for everything that you were just the greatest. And you know miss you knew every d




will, gop, republican, 
even, like, one, voter  
“Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Tex.) is having a bad week. First, he is body-blocked from getting on cam
era in Mike Huckabee's media circus with Kim Davis. Then he gets upstaged by Donald Tru




immigr, illeg, legal, 
border, citizenship, state, 
countri 
“Sen. Ted Cruz said Tuesday he opposes granting legal status to the 11 million undocumente





famili, father, son, 
brother, mother, said, 
year  
“On Dec. 16, 1987, a teenager named Marco Rubio arrived home from school in West Miami 
to find his mother in anguish. Earlier that day, federal drug agents raided a house a few miles 
away that his brother-in-law, Orlando Cicilia, shared with Rubio's older sister, Barbara. Cicili
a, a large, sturdily built Cuban immigrant, had played an intimate role in Rubio's early life.” 
66 Candidates: Al 
Gore 
campaign, vice, peopl, 
say, internet, one, polit  
“Michael Feldman knew he'd be making some sacrifices when he decided to spend a year on t
he road with Al Gore's presidential campaign. But Feldman, a senior adviser to the vice presi





nomine, ryan, gop, hous, 
will  
“House Speaker Paul D. Ryan (R-Wis.) returns to the Capitol this week to face not just a divi
ded caucus trying to determine how to handle Donald Trump's presidential campaign, but als
o a leadership team that is split down the middle on whether to support the presumptive Repu
blican nominee.” 
68 American Values: 
Exceptionalism 
will, america, american, 
nation, countri, world, 
peopl  
“Ours is a great nation and I make one pledge to you, to use our greatness for goodness. We a
re a great nation because our greatness is built on the foundation of fundamental goodness. If 




estat, busi, said, hotel, 
golf, real, build  
“Donald Trump's latest Washington project got further underway this week. The real estate m
agnate and aspiring presidential candidate's company has selected a provider to furnish the Ol
d Post Office Pavilion on Pennsylvania Avenue as it undergoes a $200 million renovation to 
become a luxury hotel.” 
70 Horserace: NY 
Primary 
new, york, citi, mayor, 
time, manhattan, local  
“Hillary Rodham Clinton's decision to use Roosevelt Island, the two-mile sliver of land mash
ed between Queens and Manhattan, as the backdrop Saturday for her first major stump speec
h sent a small but noticeable ripple through the island's previously scheduled weekend plans.” 
71 Horserace: NH 
Primary 
new, hampshir, state, 
jersey, primari, town, 
governor 
“New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie has cancelled a series of campaign appearances scheduled in 
New Hampshire for Friday and Saturday "due to inclement weather in New Jersey," his camp
aign has announced. I'm sorry, NH but I gotta go home - we got snow coming.” 
72 Horserace: Polls percent, poll, republican, 
point, among, voter, 
support  
“This is the story of Hillary Clinton's favorability that's usually told: a steep and accelerating 
drop over time. New polling data from The Washington Post and ABC News, though, paints 




mormon, church, cathol, 
religi, faith, religion, 
presid  
“Even before Mitt Romney's presidential announcement last Tuesday, his Mormon faith was 
becoming the hottest "religious issue" since 1960, when John F. Kennedy, a Catholic, became 





convent, parti, deleg, 
will, support, committe, 
nation  
“The options are limited, and attempts to cause trouble at political conventions are usually qu
ickly thwarted. But anti-Trump activists who spent weeks trying to play within the party struc




mrs, said, rodham, senat, 
campaign, time, 
photograph  
“CHICAGO -- With just days before several primaries where she will depend on the loyalty o
f female and black voters in Florida, North Carolina and the Midwest, Hillary Clinton got so




news, fox, debat, 
interview, host, cnn, 
show  
“ABC didn't share. Fox News didn't share. Neither did CNBC, CBS, MSNBC or Fox Busines
s Network. But when PBS televises Thursday's Democratic debate in Milwaukee, it will share 
the event with another network, CNN.” 
77 Horserace: 
Frontrunners 
candid, will, win, race, 
one, like, nomin  
“The conventional wisdom on the Republican nomination race has once again shifted. In the 
span of just two weeks, Mitt Romney has gone from seeming quite vulnerable to the near-ine
vitable Republican nominee.” 
78 Candidates: Mitt 
Romney 
(Business) 
compani, busi, firm, 
bain, execut, capit, 
corpor  
“Gov. Mitt Romney said that during his tenure at Bain Capital, a private equity firm, he helpe




polit, power, reform, 
govern, chang, system, 
politician  
“Good countries can sometimes go bad. Donald Trump's supporters implicitly make this argu
ment when they proclaim, "Make America Great Again." And so do those who loathe Trump 




husband, first, wife, 
book, life, year, friend  
“Family friends offer harmless details about Dorothy Emma Howell Rodham. She likes to rea
d. She travels on her own. She loves the National Zoo. Down-to-earth and sturdy, with gray h
air, she does not bear an obvious physical resemblance to her daughter, Sen. Hillary Rodham 
Clinton, but even if she did, few people would recognize her because she is rarely seen at pub
lic events.” 
81 Horserace: TX 
Politics 
governor, state, texa, 
former, republican, gov, 
presidenti  
“Gov. Rick Perry of Texas is intensifying his advertising push in Iowa, with the second televi
sion commercial of his campaign set to broadcast Monday in hopes of elevating him back int




say, presid, one, time, 
peopl, run, make  
“He spoke approvingly of a notion from a store owner who wanted to make anyone who does 









Appendix A.4: Validation of Topics in PPCC (for Chapter 6) 
 
Appendix Table A.4.1: Topics from STM of PPCC Used in Chapter 6 




trump, donald, cruz, can- 
did, presidenti,  
“And tonight, Trump and Cruz locked in a nuclear war of words over their wives. It started with th




clinton, hillari, sander,  
democrat, candid,  





romney, gingrich, mitt,    
presid, huckabe, 
“And finally this morning, not everything goes as planned on the campaign trail. Just ask Mitt Ro
mney, whose unpredictable grandson managed to steal the spotlight during an event in Michigan a




job, work, economi, ame- 
rican,  
“In a sense, he's inverting tradition -- saying that the nation should worry first about changing the 




money, million, dollar,     
buy, pay 
“Eric Trump, the son of presumptive Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump, said in an i
nterview Wednesday that his father gives "millions and millions and millions" of his own money t
o charity - including hundreds of thousands to Eric Trump's own charitable foundation.” 
6 Horserace: 
Favorability 
percent, voter, among,     
poll, support, favor 
“Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump are separated by a narrow three points in a potential 2016 mat
ch-up, according to a new Washington Post-ABC News poll, with 46 percent of registered voters c
hoosing Clinton to 43 percent picking Trump.” 
7 Social Welfare 
Programs: 
Healthcare 
health, care, plan, insur,   
cost, medicar 
“Senator John McCain detailed his plan to solve the nation's health care crisis in a speech here Tue
sday, calling for the federal government to give some money to states to help them cover people w
ith illnesses who have been denied health insurance.” 
8 Candidate Traits: 
Intellectual 
Curiosity 
polit, book, one, write “Al Gore is an intellectual. In case we doubted his credentials, a recent New Yorker profile of the 
vice president made this clear...Wonky to the point of weirdness, Mr. Gore loves nothing more tha




south, carolina, florida,     
state, nevada, primari 
“MOLLY HENNEBERG, FOX NEWS CORRESPONDENT (voice-over): A homecoming for Jo
hn Edwards; back in South Carolina, the state where he was born, for the first time since his secon
d place finish in Iowa.” 
10 Horserace: New 
Hampshire Primary 
new, hampshir, win, cam-
paign, 
“(VO) On the Republican side, John McCain is running even with George W. Bush in the first-of-t
he-nation New Hampshire primary on February 1st, even though nationally it's Bush who leads by 
a huge 60 points.” 
11 Other: Media 
Critiques 
media, news, report, post, 
press, interview 
“’Based on the incredibly inaccurate coverage and reporting of the record setting Trump campaign
, we are hereby revoking the press credentials of the phony and dishonest Washington Post,’ read a 
post on Trump's Facebook page” 
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12 Economics: Trade trade, china, oil, price,      
agreement 
“Seeking to undercut strident trade critic Vermont Sen. Bernie Sanders, Hillary Clinton said she su






avi, shes, brown, senat 
“All right. Let me start with you, Congressman Wexler. Do you think as an Obama supporter that 
Hillary Clinton`s actions and inactions of the last 48 hours have hurt her chances of getting the V.
P. nod?” 
 
14 Candidates: John 
McCain 
senat, vote, sen, mccain,  
democrat, issu, time 
“So difficult, in fact, that Senator John McCain of Arizona has missed more than half of the roll-ca
ll votes since January 2007, more than any other senator except Senator Tim Johnson of South Da





orm, governor, call 
“We begin with the bruising Republican nomination battle as GOP voters cast ballots today in thre
e states.  John McCain and George W. Bush are showing no signs of reining in their attacks.” 
16 Media: 
Roundtables (Fox) 
think, hes, hume, well,      
barn, know, right 
“KONDRACKE: But he's going to have a lot of explaining to do. 
LIASSON: Hard to imagine. Hard to imagine. 
BARNES: Going to be a hard one to put together.” 
17 Media: Punditry/ 
Metacommentary 
think, know, peopl, well, 
dont, that, get 
“I think he is a superb candidate. There's a little bit of concern with him, though, in the sense that 
he seems like a malcontent.” 
18 Media: Theater 
Criticism 
presid, speech, polici,       
speak, kennedi, deliv 
“IN the end, said Theodore C. Sorensen, the celebrated speechwriter for President John F. Kenned
y, what made a great speech in 1940 or 1961 is not much different from what makes a great speech 
in 2008.” 
19 Candidates: Hillary 
Clinton (Emails) 
email, inform, depart, stat
e, classifi, server, fbi 
“In his press briefing, FBI Director James B. Comey said he was going to provide more detail abo
ut Hillary Clinton's ‘extremely careless . . . handling of very sensitive, highly classified informatio
n’ than he normally would "because I think the American people deserve those details in a case of 




win, state, deleg, vote,      
primari, will, nomin 
“That's because Donald Trump is right on the cusp of accumulating the majority of delegates he ne
eds to win the Republican nomination outright - avoiding a potentially messy convention fight in 
which the party tries to wrest the nomination from his definitely not-small-at-all hands.” 
21 Media: Blogs 
(NYT) 
mrs, said, polit, twitter,     
senat, presidenti, facebook 
“Find out what you need to know about the 2016 presidential race today, and get politics news upd
ates via      a Facebook, Twitter and the First Draft newsletter.” 
22 Horserace: Polls poll, number, point, lead, 
one 
“We noted early this month that Donald Trump's lead in the polling emerged quickly and ferociou
sly - but that it was hardly unprecedented.” 
23 Campaign 
Activities: Comedy 
show, host, joke, night,     
star, like, live 
“Larry David's Bernie Sanders and Kate McKinnon's Hillary Clinton met for perhaps one last danc
e (quite literally), on ‘Saturday Night Live’ last night.” 
24 Horserace: NY 
Primary 
new, york, citi, mayor,      
time, jersey 
“For the first time in decades, New York will have two meaningful presidential primaries. With vo
ters heading to the polls on Tuesday in both the Republican and Democratic races, here's a look at 




debat, question, night, ask, 
answer, attack 
“Donald Trump does not want to suffer through another longer-than-usual Republican debate. Neg
otiations are currently underway for the third Republican debate, which will be hosted by CNBC o
n Oct. 28 at the University of Colorado at Boulder.” 
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26 Candidate Traits: 
Investigations and 
Corruption 
case, lawyer, said, attor-  
ney, investig, judg 
“Senior Justice Department officials twice urged Attorney General Janet Reno to appoint an indep
endent counsel to investigate Vice President Al Gore for his role in political fund-raising and at on
e point came closer to persuading her than was previously known...” 
27 Culture Issues: 
Race  
black, white, american,     
race, african, racial 
“Democratic presidential candidate and civil rights activist Al Sharpton is condemning Illinois 
Democratic Congressman Jesse Jackson, Jr. for endorsing Howard Dean, whom Sharpton says 
opposes affirmative action and supports the death penalty.” 
28 Foreign Policy: 
ISIS 
isi, islam, state, paul “As hundreds of thousands of refugees from Syria, Iraq and other war-torn countries descend upon 
Europe in search of a safe place to live, Republican presidential hopeful Scott Walker said Sunday 




immigr, illeg, border, his-
pan, mexico, mexican 
“Sen. Ted Cruz said Tuesday he opposes granting legal status to the 11 million undocumented im
migrants in the United States, significantly hardening his stance on immigration.” 
30 Horserace: 
Advisers 
said, campaign, former,    
advis, week, aid, critic 
“Kevin Madden, a Republican communications expert with long ties to Mitt Romney, will become 
a more frequent and visible spokesman for the presidential campaign, a source close to the 




drug, doctor, medic, can- 
cer, diseas 
“Regardless of whether Herman Cain wins the GOP nomination to run for president, he has alread
y beaten the odds: He has survived a bout of advanced colon cancer.” 
32 Horserace: Iowa 
Caucus 
iowa, caucus, campaign,   
support, state, moin, des 
“With just 48 hours left before Iowans head to their caucuses, Bernie Sanders held a massive rally 
in Iowa City on Saturday night.” 
33 Culture Issues: 
Gender 
omen, shes, woman, hus- 
band, men, femal, first 
“And with her opponent, Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont, outdrawing her in support among yo
ung women, Mrs. Clinton's candidacy has turned into a generational clash, one that erupted this pa
st weekend when two feminist icons, Madeleine Albright and Gloria Steinem, called on young wo
men who supported Mr. Sanders to essentially grow up and get with the program.” 
34 Media: Soft News 
(ABC) 
view, carson, michell,      
goldberg, know, joy 
JOY BEHAR ("THE VIEW") 




ryan, hous, republican,     
said, speaker, congress, le
ader 
“House Speaker Paul D. Ryan (R-Wis.) returns to the Capitol this week to face not just a divided c
aucus trying to determine how to handle Donald Trump's presidential campaign, but also a leaders
hip team that is split down the middle on whether to support the presumptive Republican nominee.
” 
36 Media: Blogs 
(WaPo) 
ill, polit, like, can, one,     
even, make 
“Romney's attack on Trump only goes so far I never thought I would write this: I am glad Mitt Ro




trip, pope, world, europ,   
unit, visit, european 
“Sen Bernie Sanders snags brief meeting with Pope Francis while in Rome for conference hosted 
by Vatican's Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences.” 
38 Crime: Policing polic, crime, crimin,         
death, justic, offic, law 
“Tough-on-crime policies that emphasized arrests and convictions for relatively minor offenses ha
ve failed the country, Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Rodham Clinton said Wednesday, 
leading to overcrowded prisons and too many black men ‘missing’ from their families and commu
nities.” 
39 Media: Megyn 
Kelly (Fox) 
kelli, megyn, one, know “MEGYN KELLY, HOST, THE KELLY FILE: Breaking tonight, Donald Trump under fire at thi
s moment for an unbelievable shot at a Hispanic judge hearing the fraud case against him. We'll ha
ve that for you in a moment.” 
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40 Candidates: Barack 
Obama (Rev. 
Wright) 
wright, reverend, church, 
pastor, said, say, jeremiah 
“The Rev. Jeremiah A. Wright Jr. has been in the news for several weeks, his inflammatory sermo
ns broadcast again and again and his words now used in a Republican television advertisement in 
North Carolina.” 
41 Culture Issues: 
Religious Right 
christian, faith, religi,       
church, evangel, mormon 
“The Rev. R. Philip Roberts, the president of a Southern Baptist seminary in Kansas City, Mo., is 
an evangelist with a particular goal: countering Mormon beliefs.” 
42 Horserace: Rust 
Belt Primaries 
santorum, michigan, state, 
conserv, pennsylvania 
“And one more note from the campaign. Republican Rick Santorum is back on the trail tonight aft




hay, maddow, right “RACHEL MADDOW, MSNBC HOST: Good evening, Chris. Thanks, my friend. 
HAYES: You bet. 
MADDOW: And thanks to you at home for joining us this hour.” 
44 Candidates: Hillary 
Clinton (Benghazi) 
committe, foundat, state,  
secretari, benghazi 
“Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was planning to visit Libya in 2012, but those plans were upen
ded when terrorists attacked the U.S. diplomatic mission in Benghazi on Sept. 11 and 12 of that ye
ar, according to newly revealed testimony given to the House Select Committee on Benghazi...” 
45 Economics: Labor 
 
endors, union, support,   
member, labor, leader 
“The iron workers' union, representing more than 100,000 workers, became the first international 
union to endorse a presidential candidate, announcing its support for Representative Dick Gephard
t, Democrat of Missouri.” 
46 Economics - Wall 
Street/Populism 
street, wall, bank, financi, 
big, crisi, system 
“Secretary Clinton says that Glass-Steagall would not have prevented the financial crisis because s
hadow banks like AIG and Lehman Brothers, not big commercial banks, were the real culprits. Se
cretary Clinton is wrong.” 




unidentifi, odonnel, male, 
know, think, hes, yes 
“LUNTZ: What do you know about Bob Graham? 
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Nothing. 
LUNTZ: Lisa, what do you know about Bob Graham? 
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Nothing. 
48 Media: Hardball 
(MSNBC) 
matthew, think, hes, well, 
know, guy, like 
“MATTHEWS: We got a main chancer out there, John Edwards, who is trying to win the presiden
cy, despite perhaps all -- perhaps what is the trend right now. 
FINEMAN: Right. 
MATTHEWS: He's going to try to buck that trend.” 
49 Horserace: 
Fundraising 
campaign, million, fund-  
rais, rais, money, donor,   
pac 
“It's not just Bernie Sanders's fundraising that is staggering. The senator from Vermont managed t
o spend roughly $46 million in March alone, the same amount he raised, based on figures released 
by his campaign Wednesday night.” 
50 Media: Greta Van 
Susteren (Fox) 
van, susteren, know, think
, greta 
“VAN SUSTEREN: All right. Romney endorsing cruz on Facebook. That has, no doubt, we know 
that Governor Kasich will be here shortly. He doesn't like it. Donald Trump doesn't like it. We kno
w that.” 
51 Media: Opinion 
Shows (MSNBC) 
carlson, campaign, abram, 
olbermann 
“PAT BUCHANAN, MSNBC POLITICAL ANALYST: You`re asking about his competence and 
sagacity and wisdom. And it all adds up, I guess, to his experience and knowledge and the rest of i
t.” 
52 Horserace: DMV 
Primaries 
vote, voter, state, demo-   
crat, virginia, elect 
“Sen. Barack Obama's campaign announced Wednesday that it is adding 20 offices across Virgini
a, an unprecedented effort by a presidential candidate and another sign that he plans to compete vi
gorously in a state that has been on the sidelines during past presidential contests.” 
53 Energy: Energy 
Policy 
energi, will, govern, new, 
technolog, need, develop 




54 Media: “Campaign 
Carl” Cameron 
(Fox) 
cameron, fox, campaign,  
news, correspond, carl 
“Chief political correspondent, Carl Cameron, is covering a busy day on the campaign trail… 
CARL CAMERON, FOX NEWS CHIEF POLITICAL CORRESPONDENT (voice-over): Runnin
g last in South Carolina polls, Texas governor, Rick Perry, ended his presidential bid.” 
55 Media: Graphics 
(ABC) 
abc, news, offcamera, voi-
ceov, stephanopoulo,       
georg, graphic 
“GRAPHICS: ABC THIS WEEK 
GRAPHICS: TRUMP TOUGHER ON CARSON 
GRAPHICS: FORMER SURGEON NOW LEADS SOME IOWA POLLS 
56 Media: 
Factchecking 
fact, claim, use, site, data, 
report 
“PolitiFact, the nonpartisan fact-checking outlet based in Florida, is out today with its mid-year re




trump, peopl, know, dont, 
said, great, want 
“They called me. I didn't call them. They said, Mr. Trump, please come. Please come. We want to 
do our job. These are incredible people. They're told to stand back. Let people walk right in front o
f him. Stand back. Beautiful people.” 
58 Media: Political 
Insiders 
(Fox/MSNBC) 
morri, let, well, north, pre-
sid, hes, zahn 
“ZAHN: How did this happen, Dick Morris? 
MORRIS: I think that -- I think this could be an interesting issue. In the letter… 
ZAHN: Let me hand it to you. 
59 Scandals: Cain 
Sexual Harassment 
stori, alleg, accus, said,    
campaign, cain, report 
“Karen Kraushaar, one of the two women who settled sexual harassment claims against Herman C
ain with the National Restaurant Association, spoke publicly for the first time on Tuesday about h
er allegations against the Republican presidential candidate.” 
60 American Values: 
Exceptionalism 
will, america, american,   
countri, nation, world 
“The work that awaits us in this hour, on our watch: to defend our country from its enemies; to ad
vance the ideals that are our greatest strength; to increase the prosperity and opportunities of all A
mericans and to make in our time, as each preceding American generation has, another, better worl





famili, father, said, year,   
son, one, friend 
“The last thing Al Gore's father told him, a few days before he died, and just before he lost the abil




court, law, constitut, sup- 
rem, presid, judg, amend 
“In any campaign season, voters are bound to hear Republican candidates talk about ‘activist judg
es’ -- jurists who rule in ways that the right wing does not like. But Newt Gingrich, who is leading 
in polls in Iowa, is taking the normal attack on the justice system to a deep new low.” 
63 Candidates: Mitt 
Romney (Business) 
compani, busi, return, re-  
leas, tax, year, capit 
“Hundreds of pages of confidential internal documents from the private equity firm Bain Capital p
ublished online Thursday provided new details on investments held by the Romney family's trusts, 
as well as aggressive strategies that Bain appears to have used to minimize its investors' and partne




parti, conserv, republican, 
support, establish, nomin 
“McCain would be the first Republican nominee since Gerald Ford in 1976 to win despite oppositi
on from organized conservatism, and also the first whose base in Republican primaries rested on t
he party's center and its dwindling left.” 
65 Media: News 
Blurbs (ABC) 
news, john, obama, abc,   
democrat, jake, tapper 
“JAKE TAPPER (ABC NEWS) 
(Voiceover) John Edwards discusses poverty. 
CLIP FROM JOHN EDWARDS'S POLITICAL AD 
66 Careers: Military 
Service 
veteran, war, militari,       
vietnam, servic, serv 
“When John Kerry released his military records to the public last week, Americans learned a lot ab
out Mr. Kerry's exceptional service in Vietnam.” 
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67 Economics: Taxes tax, cut, plan, budget,       
spend 
“A tax system overhaul along the lines that Mitt Romney has proposed would give big tax cuts to 
high-income households and increase the tax burden on middle- and lower-income households, ac
cording to an analysis from economists at the Tax Policy Center.” 
68 Careers: Governors governor, state, texa, gov, 
former, record 
“Former Arkansas Gov. Mike Huckabee is slated to announce Tuesday that he will make a second 




convent, wisconsin, cam- 
paign, indiana, penc 
“CLEVELAND - The Never Trump agitators have been defeated, but they say they're not going a
way. Republicans who failed to change party rules here this week and stop Donald Trump from wi
nning the party's presidential nomination are threatening to cause chaos on the floor of the national 
convention next week.” 
70 Foreign Policy: 
Middle East 
foreign, polici, iran, state, 
israel, nuclear 
“We are indignant that certain Middle Eastern leaders have discarded the principle of direct negoti
ations between the sovereign nation of Israel and the Palestinian leadership, and we are equally ind
ignant that the Obama Administration's Middle East policy of appeasement has encouraged such a
n ominous act of bad faith.” 
71 Media: O’Reilly/ 
The Five (Fox) 
oreilli, right, think, know, 
william, boll 
“PERINO: Yeah. 




think, cavuto, baier, right, 
say 
“NEIL CAVUTO, HOST: All right, Howard Dean is giving Bernie Sanders advice about toning it 




applaus, will, peopl, want, 
can, get, thank 
“Thank you. (Cheers, applause.) Thank you. Thank you. 
(Chants of "Obama! Obama!") 
Thank you. Thank you so much. Thank you. Thank you.” 
74 Media: Sharpton/ 
Schultz (MSNBC) 
sharpton, hes, think, presi-
d, schultz 
“REVEREND AL SHARPTON, MSNBC HOST, POLITICS NATION: Welcome to "Politics Nat
ion." I`m Al Sharpton live tonight from Miami.” 
75 Campaign 
Activities: VPs 
vice, pick, run, ticket, pre-
sid, mate, choic 
“Unprompted, White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest mentioned Virginia Sen. Tim Kaine as s




republican, candid, presi- 
denti, gop, hes, run, race 
“HATCH TO QUIT PRESIDENTIAL RACE Sen. Orrin Hatch tells ABCNEWS he plans to drop 
out of the presidential race.” 
77 Foreign Policy: 
War on Terror 
iraq, war, troop, presid,    
american, afghanistan 
“The President's strategy in Iraq is not succeeding. It is not making America safer. Doing more of t
he same would be a disaster.” 
78 Candidate Traits: 
Candidate 
Appearance 
like, say, one, wear, look, 
just, hand 
“The first known published description of Donald Trump's hair, as an entity that deserved its own 
description, was mild.” 
79 Horserace: Rally 
Crowd 
Descriptions 
ralli, said, crowd, protest, 
event 
“Donald J. Trump said on Sunday he was in favor of the actions of his supporters who reportedly 
punched and kicked a protester from the Black Lives Matter movement who interrupted Mr. Trum
p's campaign rally the previous day in Birmingham, Ala.” 
80 Immigration: 
Muslim Ban 
un, muslim, said, ban,       
state, islam 
“After doubling down on his proposal to ban some immigrants by including those from countries 
with a history of terrorism, Donald Trump is now doubling down on another controversial idea in t




thank, get, want, know,    
one, peopl 
“I'm with you all the way. Yeah. I was with you from the former days. That helps a lot. Tell every
body to come out. We will. Good. We will. Marty, are you eating that? No.” 
202 
 
82 Media: Video Clip 
(ABC/ 
Fox/MSNBC) 
video, clip, end, begin “(END VIDEO CLIP) 
O'REILLY: And Congresswoman Michele Bachmann will be here to tell us how she would get A
merica out of the economic chaos. 




vice, presid, bush, cam-   
paign, gore 
“Al Gore challenged Bill Bradley on one of his pet issues during their second debate this weekend, 
campaign finance reform.  Gore proposed to Bradley yesterday that both stop spending money on 
TV and radio campaign ads and debate twice a week instead.” 
84 Candidates: Bernie 
Sanders 
democrat, parti, campaign, 
support, vermont 
“Sen Bernie Sanders, facing lengthening odds of winning Democratic presidential nomination, is a
ttempting to use his widespread popularity to increase his political influence…” 
85 Culture Issues: 
Abortion/Gay 
Marriage 
abort, issu, marriag, right, 
gay, life 
“Mitt Romney, when asked about what he had done to advance gay rights, replied: ‘I don't discrim
inate,’ and he recalled an appointment of a gay person to his cabinet as governor of Massachusetts.
” 
86 Media: Hannity 
(Fox) 
hanniti, colm, right, know, 
sean 
“HANNITY: You're not calling me stupid, right?.. 
CONWAY: You're not the candidate. 
COLMES: Why are you looking my way?” 
87 Education: Primary 
Education 
school, educ, colleg, stu-  
dent, children, teacher 
“Think about it: we're asking America's teachers to meet our greatest obligation for the future. We'
re asking them to educate and help mold our children. Yet we pay them far less than other professi
onals with essentially the same qualifications are now earning.” 
88 Candidates: Chris 
Christie 
jersey, christi, new, gov-  
ernor,  
“Good evening. Please take your seats. Welcome, Governor Christie. we have here a New Jersey b














Appendix A.5: Pre- and Post-test Experiment Questionnaire (for Chapter 7) 
 
Do you agree to participate in this experiment? 
Yes  (1)  
No  (2)  
 
Please select your gender. 
Male  (1)  
Female  (2)  
Other  (3)  
 
Are you Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino? 
Yes  (1)  
No  (2)  
 
Do you consider yourself primarily white or Caucasian, black or African American, 
American Indian, Asian, or something else? 
White or Caucasian  (1)  
Black or African American  (2)  
American Indian  (3)  
Asian  (4)  
Other  (5)  
 
We would like to get a sense of your general preferences. Most modern theories of 
decision making recognize that decisions do not take place in a vacuum. Individual 
preferences and knowledge, along with situational variables can greatly impact the 
decision process. To demonstrate that you’ve read this much, just go ahead and select 
both red and green among the alternatives below, no matter what your favorite color is. 
Yes, ignore the question below and select both of those options.  
What is your favorite color? 
White  (1)  
Black  (2)  
Red  (3)  
Pink  (4)  
Green  (5)  
Blue  (6)  
 
Some people seem to follow what’s going on in government and public affairs most of 
the time, whether there’s an election going on or not. Others aren’t that interested. Would 
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you say you follow what’s going on in government and public affairs most of the time, 
some of the time, only now and then, or hardly at all?   
Most of the time  (1)  
Some of the time  (2)  
Only now and then  (3)  
Hardly at all  (4)  
 
How much do you trust the accuracy of the news and information that you get from the 
news media?  
A great deal  (1)  
A lot  (2)  
A moderate amount  (3)  
A little  (4)  
None at all  (5)  
 
When a big news story breaks people often go online to get up-to-to-minute details on 
what is going on. We want to know which websites people trust to get this information. 
We also want to know if people are paying attention to the question. Please ignore the 
question and select FoxNews.com and NBC.com as your two answers.  
When there is a big news story, which is the one news website you would visit first? 
(Please only choose one) 
New York Times website  (1)  
Washington Post  (2)  
CNN.com  (3)  
FoxNews.com  (4)  
Google News  (5)  
Yahoo! News  (6)  
NBC.com  (7) 
USA Today website (8) 
Other (9) 
 
Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an 
Independent, or what? 
Democrat  (1)  
Republican  (2)  
Independent  (3)  
 
Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat? [Asked of 
those identifying as “Democrat”] 
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Strong Democrat  (1)  
Not very strong Democrat  (2)  
 
Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican? [Asked of 
those identifying as “Republican”] 
Strong Republican  (1)  
Not very strong Republican  (2)  
 
Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic party, or do you 
consider yourself to be closer to neither? [Asked of those identifying as “Independent”] 
Closer to Republican Party  (1)  
Closer to Democratic Party  (2)  
Closer to neither  (3)  
 
You are going to participate in a hypothetical presidential primary. Would you prefer to 
participate in a Republican Party primary or a Democratic Party primary? [Asked of 
those identifying as “Closer to neither”] 
Republican Party primary  (1)  
Democratic Party primary  (2)  
 
In the grid below, you will see a series of statements. Please tell us whether you agree or 
disagree with each statement. [For each question, options are: Strongly agree (1), 
Somewhat agree (2), Neither agree nor disagree (3), Somewhat disagree, and Strongly 
disagree (5)]. 
 
Sen. Alex Simmons cares about people like me 
Sen. Alex Simmons is focused on the important issues 
Sen. Alex Simmons is a political insider 
Please click the “neither agree nor disagree” response 
Sen. Alex Simmons is a strong leader 
Sen. Alex Simmons is electable 
World War I came after World War II 
 
I'd like you to rate Sen. Alex Simmons using something we call the FEELING 
THERMOMETER. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel 
favorable and warm toward the person. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean 
that you don't feel favorable toward the person and that you don't care too much for that 
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person. You would rate the person at the 50-degree mark if you don't feel particularly 
warm or cold toward the person. [Answer via feeling thermometer]. 
 
How likely would you be to vote for Sen. Alex Simmons in a hypothetical Democratic 
presidential primary? 
Not at all likely  (1)  
Not too likely  (2)  
Somewhat likely  (3)  
Very likely  (4)  
 
If you were asked to choose between Gov. Nick Turner and Sen. Alex Simmons to win 
the Democratic party nomination, for whom would you vote? 
Gov. Nick Turner  (1)  
Sen. Alex Simmons  (2)  
 
How confident do you feel in your vote choice? 
Extremely confident  (1)  
Mostly confident  (2)  
Somewhat confident  (3)  
Not at all confident  (4) 
 
Below is a list of a number of important issues facing the country today. What issues do 
you think are most important right now? Please rank your top 3. 
______ Government ethics (1) 
______ Climate change/environment (2) 
______ National defense (3) 
______ Economic inequality (4) 
______ Healthcare (5) 
______ 2nd Amendment/gun control (6) 
______ Higher Education (7) 
______ Taxes (8) 
______ Immigration (9) 
______ Social Security/retirement (10) 
______ Government deregulation (11) 
______ Foreign policy (12) 
______ Abortion (13) 
______ National deficit (14) 
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______ Race relations (15) 
______ Job creation (16) 
______ Terrorism (17) 
______ Primary eduction (18) 
______ Crime/safety (19) 
______ Energy/gas prices (20) 
______ Prescription drugs (21) 
______ Trade (22) 
______ Infrastructure (23) 
______ LGBTQ rights (24)  
 
 
Sen. Alex Simmons mentioned a number of important issues in her press release. Below 
is a list of a number of important issues facing the country today. Please select the issues 
you recall Sen. Alex Simmons mentioning in her campaign press release. Select as many 
as you can recall. 
Government ethics  (1)  
Climate change/environment  (2)  
National defense  (3)  
Economic inequality  (4)  
Healthcare  (5)  
2nd Amendment/gun control  (6)  
Higher education  (7)  
Taxes  (8)  
Immigration  (9)  
Social Security/retirement  (10)  
Government deregulation  (11)  
Foreign Policy  (12)  
Abortion  (13)  
National deficit  (14)  
Race relations  (15)  
Terrorism  (16)  
Job creation  (17)  
Prescription drug costs  (18)  
Trade  (19)  
Primary education  (20)  
Crime/safety  (21)  
Energy/gas prices  (22)  
Infrastructure  (23)  
LGBTQ rights  (24) 
 
Timing [Records time spent on Full Information Page] 
First Click  (1) 
Last Click  (2) 
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Page Submit  (3) 
Click Count  (4) 
 
Earlier you were given a press release from hypothetical Democratic presidential primary 
candidate Sen. Alex Simmons that summarized her remarks during a campaign stop. If 
you are interested in learning more about the candidate, you may do so by opening the 
following PDF. It contains biographical information about the candidate and a collection 
of policy white papers. The PDF has a table of contents and you can click on the page 
numbers to jump to sections that are of particular interest to you. The PDF is also 
searchable. If you are interested, please take some time to peruse this information. 
Otherwise, click below to continue.   
 
Now that you've had a chance to view more information about the candidates, would you 
like to re-consider your vote? 
Yes  (1)  
No  (2)  
 
How likely would you be to vote for Sen. Alex Simmons in a hypothetical Democratic 
presidential primary?  
Not at all likely  (1)  
Not too likely  (2)  
Somewhat likely  (3)  
Very likely  (4)  
 
If you were asked to choose between Gov. Nick Turner and Sen. Alex Simmons to win 
the Democratic party nomination, for whom would you vote? 
Gov. Nick Turner  (1)  










Appendix A.6: Experimental Instruments (for Chapter 7) 
Democratic Candidate Press Release 
Press Release – U.S. Senator and Democratic presidential candidate Alex Simmons: “The 
structural change we need is a wealth tax.” 
September 19, 2019 
U.S. Senator and Democratic presidential candidate Alex Simmons will deliver a speech 
at a campaign rally at the University of Iowa in Iowa City, Iowa. Senator Simmons looks 
forward to discussing the most important issues facing the country. 
Key Excerpts of Prepared Remarks: 
“How about we pass some basic rules of ethics for the Department of Defense? How 
about a little transparency in this area? The big five defense contractors want to lobby? 
Let's hear what you are saying. I have brothers who served in the military. I just want to 
be able to say as an American, I guarantee when a decision is made at the Department of 
Defense, it's not a decision to enhance the profitability of the major contractors. It is a 
decision to protect the safety and security of the United States of America.” 
“Fossil fuel companies worry that if Congress gets serious about this climate thing, that 
could affect their bottom line. So they invested, they really invested, in politicians. They 
invested in Washington.” 
“The structural change we need is a wealth tax. Here is my proposal. For the top one-
tenth of 1%, those with more than $50 million, let's include wealth in your property tax. 
This is not to say, ‘You built one of the great fortunes in this country and now we’re 
taking it.’ For the top one-tenth of 1%, good for you. But here is the deal. That fortune 
was built, in part, using workers all of us helped pay to educate. At least in part using 
public roads to get goods to market. That fortune was protected by police and firefighters. 
So we just say you built one of the big fortunes. That's great. Good for you. But pitch in 
so everybody else gets a chance to build something real.” 
“Let's start with health care is a basic human right and we fight for basic human rights. 
As Democrats, what are we looking for? For a way to get everybody covered at the 
lowest possible cost. The data say the best way to do that is through Medicare for all. 
Now, there are multiple pathways. Some, like my opponent Gov. Nick Turner, say we 
start by lowering the age. Some say we raise the age. It's going to take bringing folks to 
the table. We need unions to be represented. That is very important.” 
“I believe in gun safety. Seven children and teenagers will die today from gun violence. 
And most of the time it won't make a headline. Some will be in mass shootings, and that 
210 
 
will get people's attention. Most will be on sidewalks and playgrounds. Right now the 
NRA holds Congress hostage, and we need to fight back.” 
 
Republican Candidate Press Release 
Press Release – U.S. Senator and Republican presidential candidate Alex Simmons: 
“This will be the best place in the world to create jobs for the 21st century economy.” 
September 19, 2019 
U.S. Senator and Republican presidential candidate Alex Simmons will deliver a speech 
at a campaign rally at the University of Iowa in Iowa City, Iowa. Senator Simmons looks 
forward to discussing the most important issues facing the country. 
Key Excerpts of Prepared Remarks: 
“For 200 years, America has been a special country unlike any in the history of the world. 
I believe that began when we were founded on a powerful truth: That our rights don't 
come from government, our rights do not come from our laws, our rights do not come 
from our leaders. Our rights come from God. Our rights come from our Creator. This is 
why we embrace free enterprise. This is why we embrace individual liberty. That is why 
the American example, the American dream, has inspired millions all over the world.” 
“We need to grow the conservative movement. I look forward to reaching out to 
Americans who live paycheck to paycheck. I grew up paycheck to paycheck. My mother 
was a maid, a cashier. I will talk to young Americans, staggering under the weight of 
student loans. A 500% increase in student loans in the last 10 years. People graduating 
with thousands of dollars that they paid for a degree that did not lead to a job. They 
cannot lecture me about student loans. I had a student loan. I never thought I'd pay it off.” 
“We will protect the Second Amendment. We will protect religious liberty. Every 
American has the constitutional right to live out the teachings of their religion.” 
“First day in office, we will energize the economy. We will embrace free enterprise. We 
will fix the tax code, rollback regulations, save Social Security and Medicare. We will 
bring the budget under control. When we do all that, there will be no better place in the 
world to start a business or expand an existing one. This will be the best place in the 
world to create jobs for the 21st century economy.” 
“Stopping illegal immigration is about public safety. Unless we know who you are and 
why are coming, you're not getting into the United States of America. I am tired of 




Democratic and Republican Control Group Article 
Layers of Deceit  
Browning onions is a matter of patience. My own patience ran out earlier this year 
while leafing through the New York Times food section. This passage caught my eye:  
Add the onions to the skillet and increase the heat to medium-high. Cook until 
they begin to turn dark brown and somewhat soft, about 5 minutes. Add the oil and a 
pinch of the fine sea salt; continue cooking until the onions are soft and caramelized, 
about 5 minutes longer.  
Fully caramelized onions in 10 minutes. That is a lie. As long as I’ve been 
cooking, I’ve been reading various versions of this lie, over and over.  
Telling the truth about how to prepare onions for French onion soup, is Julia 
Child: “[C]ook slowly until tender and translucent, about 10 minutes. Blend in the salt 
and sugar, raise heat to moderately high, and let the onions brown, stirring frequently 
until they are a dark walnut color, 25 to 30 minutes.” That is how long it takes to 
caramelize onions.  
The deeper problem with all the deceit around the question of caramelized onions 
is that the premise is wrong. The faster you try to do it, the more you waste your time. 
The 10-minute-cum-28-minute caramelized onion is all labor and anxiety. Give yourself 
45 or 50 minutes to brown onions, working slowly on a moderate flame, and it’s an 
untaxing background activity.  
In truth, the best time to caramelize onions is yesterday. Often enough, you need 
to have them ready before you can start on the rest of the dish. Thus the recipe-writers’ 
impulse to deceive. Browning onions is slow work, and it comes first. So throw the 
onions in a crock pot and go to bed. In recipe time, that’s hours and hours. In your time, 
the time that matters, it’s less than five minutes. 
 
Democratic and Republican Low Convergence Treatment Group Article 
[Democratic/Republican] Presidential Candidate Alex Simmons Planning Foreign 
Trip after Stop at the University of Iowa 
[Democratic/Republican] presidential candidate and United States Senator Alex 
Simmons spoke before a crowd of University of Iowa students on Tuesday, highlighting a 
number of issues central to her platform. But after the event all attention turned to the 




Up to this point, foreign policy has not been a critical issue for Sen. Simmons. But 
advisers fear that it could become a lingering question later on, especially in contrast with 
rival Gov. Nick Turner, and are trying to get ahead of the issue.  
While no announcement of the trip is imminent, advisers say they are targeting 
stops in a number of major cities of ally countries including London, Paris, and Berlin. 
Presumably they will attempt to arrange joint appearance with prominent world leaders 
like Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany and President Emmanuel Macron of France. 
Arranging such events can prove a difficult logistical task, but the Simmons campaign 
believes they are up to it. 
“During my time in the Senate I have taken numerous votes on issues of foreign 
policy. The American people know all about what a decision-maker I am on those 
issues,” Sen. Simmons said to reporters after the event. 
When asked by reporters during the press availability if this represented an 
attempt to show voters a capacity of leadership on the world stage, Sen. Simmons pushed 
back.  
“The goal of this campaign is and always will be to focus on the important issues. 
This campaign is about focusing on what the American people care about. And the 
American people really want to hear about what I’m going to do to combat the influence 
of special interests and reduce income inequality.”  
 
Democratic High Convergence Treatment Group Article 
Democratic Presidential Candidate Alex Simmons Discusses Government Ethics 
and a Wealth Tax at the University of Iowa 
Democratic presidential candidate and U.S. Senator Alex Simmons spoke before a 
crowd of University of Iowa students on Tuesday, highlighting a number of issues central 
to her platform. 
“I just want to be able to say as an American, I guarantee when a decision is made 
at the Department of Defense, it's not a decision to enhance the profitability of the major 
contractors,” Sen. Simmons said to an engaged crowd. 
Sen. Simmons emphasized the need to fight lobbyist influence on Congress as 
well, especially with regards to oil companies. “Fossil fuel companies worry that if 
Congress gets serious about this climate thing, that could affect their bottom line. 
So…[they] invested, they really invested, in politicians. They invested in Washington,” 
she said to applause. 
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Sen. Simmons also discussed a central part of her campaign promises: a wealth 
tax. “Here is my proposal. For the top one-tenth of 1%, those with more than $50 million, 
let's include wealth in your property tax… So we just say you built one of the big 
fortunes. That's great. Good for you. But pitch in so everybody else gets a chance to build 
something real.” 
As for those who say that Sen. Simmons is ignoring other important issues, like 
rival Gov. Nick Turner, she told reporters following the rally that, “The goal of this 
campaign is and always will be to focus on the important issues. This campaign is about 
focusing on what the American people care about. And the American people really want 
to hear about what I’m going to do to combat the influence of special interests and reduce 
income inequality.” 
After the event, attention turned to talk that the Sen. Simmons campaign is 
planning a trip abroad to bolster her foreign policy credentials. But the campaign has not 
made an announcement confirming the rumors. 
 
Republican High Convergence Treatment Group Article 
Republican Presidential Candidate Alex Simmons Discusses the Economy, Student 
Loans, and Immigration at the University of Iowa 
Republican presidential candidate and United States Senator Alex Simmons held 
a rally at the University of Iowa on Tuesday, speaking on a number of issues central to 
his platform. 
“First day in office, we will energize the economy. We will embrace free 
enterprise,” Sen. Simmons said to an engaged crowd. “When we do all that, there will be 
no better place in the world to start a business or expand an existing one. This will be the 
best place in the world to create jobs for the 21st-century economy.” 
Sen. Simmons also emphasized an issue closely connected to the lives of the 
students in the audience: student loan debt. “I will talk to young Americans, staggering 
under the weight of student loans…People graduating with thousands of dollars that they 
paid for a degree that did not lead to a job. They cannot lecture me about student loans. I 
had a student loan. I never thought I'd pay it off.” he said to applause. 
Sen. Simmons once again laid out the basis of his immigration policy: “Unless we 
know who you are and why are coming, you're not getting into the United States of 
America.” And he took shots at his critics on that issue, saying, “I am tired of hearing that 
securing the border is anti-immigrant.” 
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As for those who say that Sen. Simmons is ignoring other important issues, like 
rival Gov. Nick Turner, he told reporters following the rally that, “The goal of this 
campaign is and always will be to focus on the important issues. This campaign is about 
focusing on what the American people care about. And the American people really want 
to hear about what I’m going to do to create an American economy for the 21st century.” 
After the event, attention turned to talk that the Simmons campaign is planning a 
trip abroad to bolster his foreign policy credentials. But the campaign has not made an 
























Appendix B (Chapter 4) 
 
Appendix B.1: Validity Checks for Measure of Candidate Anger 
 
Automated processes of text analysis, including dictionary methods, have the 
advantage of perfect reliability. That said, the anger dictionary still needs to be 
independently validated. While the original creators of the EmoLex dictionaries 
performed validation checks (Mohammad and Turney 2013), these efforts did not 
validate the dictionary in the specific context of political campaign speeches. It is 
possible that candidates convey anger in different ways than the average person, 
necessitating a specific validation effort. To do so, I assess the construct convergence and 
divergence validity by estimating how the anger measure correlates with other 
dictionaries provided by EmoLex. 
Construct convergence validity represents how closely the measure approximates 
similar measures while construct divergence validity assesses how unrelated the measure 
is to measurements that are conceptually opposed. To test the anger dictionary against 
this standard, I utilize the other dictionaries provided by EmoLex. Besides for anger, 
EmoLex has dictionaries for seven other emotions – anticipation, disgust, fear, joy, 
surprise, trust, and sadness – as well as positive and negative affect. Anger is a negatively 
charged emotion, so it would be a sign of validity if candidate speeches with high 
percentages of anger words also used high percentages of negative affect words. 
Similarly, emotions like disgust, fear, and sadness rise out of negative emotional 
foundations, and so the use of anger should also be positively related to the use of other 
negative emotional words. While positive correlations between the use of anger words 
and the use of both negative affect and negative emotion words would suggest construct 
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convergence validity, weak or negative correlations with the use of positive affect and 
positive emotion words would suggest construct divergence validity. 
The percentage of anger words is positively and strongly correlated with negative 
words, as expected. The correlations with the other negative words – disgust, fear, and 
sadness – are slightly weaker but still positive and quite high. Percent anger words is 
positively correlated with the use of both positive affect and all positive emotions, but the 
correlations are much weaker than for negative emotions and negative affect. This 
suggests that the anger dictionary in this context serves as a valid measure. 
 
Appendix Table B.1: Correlations between Percentage Anger Words and 
Percentages Other Emotions and Affects 






















Appendix C (Chapter 5) 
 
Appendix C.1: Unit Root Tests by Length of Series 
 










8 Z = -8.196 
p = 0.0000 
Z = -11.264 
p = 0.000 
Chi Sq = 
277.833 
p = 0.000 
Z = 0.831 
p = 0.203 
7 series 
9 Z = -6.528 
p = 0.000 
Z = -5.911 
p = 0.000 
Chi Sq = 
144.201 
p = 0.000 
Z = 2.758 
p = 0.003 
7 series 
10 Z = -6.731 
p = 0.000 
Z = -4.400 
p = 0.000 
Chi Sq = 68.179 
p = 0.000 
Z = .311 
p = .378 
6 series 
11 Z = -
10.836 
p = 0.000 
Z = -7.541 
p = 0.000 
Chi Sq = 
165.437 
p = 0.000 
Z = 0.677 
p = 0.249 
7 series 
12 Z = -4.850 
p = 0.000 
Z = -3.482 
p = 0.000 
Chi Sq = 45.303 
p = 0.000 
Z = -0.232 
p = 0.592 
4 series 
13 Z = -5.372 
p = 0.000 
Z = -4.447 
p = 0.000 
Chi Sq = 73.341 
p = 0.000 
Z = 2.074 
p = 0.019 
6 series 
14 Z = -7.891 
p = 0.000 
Z = -6.454 
p = 0.000 
Chi Sq = 90.496 
p = 0.000 
Z = 1.148 
p = 0.125 
5 series 
15 Z = -5.358 
p = 0.000 
Z = -4.702 
p = 0.000 
Chi Sq = 61.862 
p = 0.000 
Z = 0.025 
p = 0.490 
5 series 
16 Z = -7.456 
p = 0.000 
Z = -6.745 
p = 0.000 
Chi Sq = 86.567 
p = 0.000 
Z = 0.006 
p = 0.498 
4 series 
17 Z = -1.298 
p = 0.097 
Z = -0.812 
p = 0.208 
Chi Sq. = 3.699 
p = .157 
Z = 1.540 
p = .062 
1 series 
18 Z = -2.954 
p = 0.002 
Z = -2.579 
p = 0.005 
Chi Sq = 13.084 
p = 0.001 
Z = -0.384 
p = 0.650 
1 series 
19 Z = -2.400 
p = 0.008 
Z = -2.662 
p = 0.004 
Chi Sq = 14.753 
p = 0.001 
Z = 0.311 
p = 0.378 
1 series 
Notes: Lags for all series calculated via AIC. All tests account for exogenous intercepts. Italicized cells are tests that indicate the series 












Appendix C.3: Effect of Change in Number of Candidates on Agenda Convergence 
 Convergence 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Convergence, Lagged 0.112* 0.118* 0.120* 0.111* 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
Change in # of Candidates -0.008* -0.004* -0.005* -0.014* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) 
% Anger Words (EmoLex) 0.029*    
 (0.011)    
% Anger Words (LIWC)  0.027* 0.027* 0.028* 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Authentic Language (LIWC) 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Readability Score 0.0005 0.001 0.001 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Inverse Shannon H Entropy -0.306* -0.306* -0.303* -0.296* 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) 
# of Effective Candidates 0.010*   0.006 
 (0.003)   (0.004) 
Frontrunner – Second Place Polls  0.0003   
  (0.0004)   
Frontrunner’s Poll Standing   -0.0003  
   (0.0005)  
# of Candidates    0.002 
    (0.002) 
Change in # of Candidates * # of Candidates    0.001 
    (0.001) 
Constant 0.268* 0.290* 0.322* 0.288* 
 (0.039) (0.040) (0.047) (0.037) 
Observations 648 648 648 648 
R2 0.286 0.274 0.274 0.286 
Breusch-Godfrey Test Statistic 0.064 0.049 0.008 0.007 
Notes: All models OLS regression. * denotes p < .05, one-tailed. All models also include controls for race, party, 
gender, prior work experience, poll standing, number of candidate speeches, interpolation of candidate agenda and 
election year fixed effects not included to preserve space. All Breusch-Godfrey Test Statistics are statistically 






Appendix D (Chapter 6) 
 
Appendix D.1: Included and Excluded Candidate-Media Series by Media Type and Year 
 
  2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 
Newspaper Included All 
 






















Excluded None None Mike Gravel None None 
ABC Included Bill Bradley, 





















































































Gary Johnson George Pataki, 
Jim Gilmore 
Fox Included Bill Bradley, 




































































Excluded Gary Bauer None Mike Gravel, 
Jim Gilmore 





























































































Notes: Nexis Uni transcripts for MSNBC begin in November, 1999. All of the excluded ended their campaigns before or during that 










Appendix D.2: Panel Unit Root Tests by Media Type 
 




Maddala and Wu Hadri 
Newspapers Z = -63.84 
p = 0.0000 
Z = -37.82 
p = 0.000 
Chi Sq = 1310.1 
p = 0.000 
Z = 3.3255 
p = 0.000 
ABC News Z = -19.783 
p = 0.000 
Z = -17.605 
p = 0.000 
Chi Sq = 975.34 
p = 0.000 
Z = 2.8464 
p = 0.002 
Fox News Z = -23.856 
p = 0.000 
Z = -22.858 
p = 0.000 
Chi Sq = 1088.9 
p = 0.000 
Z = 2.2883 
p = .01106 
MSNBC Z = -23.557 
p = 0.000 
Z = -23.314 
p = 0.000 
Chi Sq = 735.83 
p = 0.000 
Z = 2.8087 
p = 0.002487 
All series trimmed to 8 months. All series shorter than 8 months dropped. LLC, IPS, and MW test against null that there is a unit root. 


















































% Anger Language, (EmoLex) 0.025* 0.020 0.003 0.007 -0.002 0.018* 0.013 0.013 -0.006 -0.015 
 (0.011) (0.027) (0.015) (0.022) (0.020) (0.011) (0.027) (0.027) (0.021) (0.022) 
% Authentic, (LIWC) 0.032* 0.046* 0.043* 0.027 0.060*      
 (0.009) (0.020) (0.015) (0.022) (0.020)      
% I Language, (LIWC)      0.016 0.030 0.030 0.067* 0.025 
      (0.010) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) 
Readability,  0.005 0.023 0.026* 0.039* 0.013 -0.0004 0.008 0.008 0.015 0.009 
 (0.010) (0.025) (0.015) (0.021) (0.020) (0.011) (0.028) (0.028) (0.022) (0.024) 
Shannon Inverse H, -0.034* -0.019 -0.057* -0.038* -0.078* -0.032* -0.011 -0.011 -0.038* -0.070* 
 (0.010) (0.024) (0.013) (0.019) (0.018) (0.010) (0.024) (0.024) (0.018) (0.019) 
Poll,  -0.001 -0.0001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Constant 0.496* 0.402* 0.484* 0.505* 0.454* 0.498* 0.411* 0.411* 0.507* 0.454* 
 (0.011) (0.027) (0.017) (0.024) (0.026) (0.011) (0.027) (0.027) (0.023) (0.028) 
Observations 208 74 121 68 53 208 74 74 68 53 
R2 0.113 0.087 0.216 0.147 0.379 0.070 0.040 0.040 0.227 0.274 
Models 1 and 6 only Candidate-Newspaper Dyads. Models 2 and 7 only Candidate-ABC News Dyads. Models 3 and 8 only Candidate-Cable News 
Dyads. Models 4 and 9 only Candidate-Fox News Dyads. Models 5 and 10 only Candidate-MSNBC Dyads. All models OLS regression. * denotes p < 
























Appendix E (Chapter 7) 
 
Appendix E.1: Models of Effect of Experimental Treatment on Alternative Attitudes 
toward Candidates 
 
Appendix Table 7E.1.1: Effect of Treatment Group on Unrelated Attitudes toward 
Candidate 




Strong Leader Electable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
High Convergence Treatment 0.003 -0.005 0.039 0.074* 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) 
Low Convergence Treatment 0.017 -0.023 0.027 0.039 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) 
Constant 0.733* 0.422* 0.623* 0.676* 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) 
Observations 396 394 394 394 
R2 0.001 0.002 0.006 0.021 
















Appendix E.2: Replication Models by Party Primary 
 
Appendix Table E.2.1: Effect of Treatment Group and Party Primary on Support for 
Candidate 




 (1) (2) (3) 
High Convergence Treatment -0.028 -0.105 -0.012 
 (0.029) (2.551) (0.053) 
Low Convergence Treatment -0.045 -1.182 -0.018 
 (0.027) (2.402) (0.050) 
GOP Primary -0.039 -3.947 -0.057 
 (0.038) (3.287) (0.068) 
High Convergence * GOP Primary  0.052 3.762 0.067 
 (0.056) (4.861) (0.101) 
Low Convergence * GOP Primary  0.004 3.710 0.008 
 (0.055) (4.784) (0.099) 
Constant 0.822* 66.000* 0.872* 
 (0.020) (1.763) (0.037) 
Observations 390 390 390 
R2 0.013 0.005 0.003 














Appendix Table E.2.2: Effect of Treatment Group and Party Primary                                 
on Correct Voting Behavior 
 Time on Full Info Page Opted to Revote 
 (1) (2) 
High Convergence Treatment 6.225 -0.010 
 (5.282) (0.054) 
Low Convergence Treatment 9.256* 0.044 
 (4.972) (0.051) 
GOP Primary 2.358 -0.033 
 (6.805) (0.069) 
High Convergence * GOP Primary  -13.740 0.002 
 (10.065) (0.102) 
Low Convergence * GOP Primary  -10.679 0.142 
 (9.905) (0.101) 
Constant 23.763* 0.138* 
 (3.651) (0.037) 
Observations 390 390 
R2 0.016 0.018 















Appendix E.3: Replication Models by Level of Attention 
 
Appendix Table E.3.1: Effect of Treatment Group and Attention Check Scores on 
Support for Candidate 
 Important Issues Feeling Thermometer Vote Choice 
 (1) (2) (3) 
High Convergence Treatment 0.046 -0.390 -0.093 
 (0.077) (6.820) (0.141) 
Low Convergence Treatment -0.121 -5.063 -0.246* 
 (0.080) (7.082) (0.146) 
Attention Check Scores 0.022 -1.119 -0.008 
 (0.022) (1.907) (0.039) 
High Convergence * Attention 
Check  
-0.024 0.544 0.042 
 (0.031) (2.694) (0.056) 
Low Convergence * Attention 
Check  
0.031 2.004 0.093* 
 (0.031) (2.727) (0.056) 
Constant 0.758* 67.593* 0.876* 
 (0.055) (4.886) (0.101) 
Observations 390 390 390 
R2 0.025 0.002 0.014 
Notes: * denotes p < .05, one-tailed. All models OLS regression. Attention check scores originally 

















Appendix Table E.3.2: Effect of Treatment Group and Attention Check Scores on 
Correct Voting Behavior 
 Time on Full Info Page Opted to Revote 
 (1) (2) 
High Convergence Treatment -4.058 -0.144 
 (13.736) (0.143) 
Low Convergence Treatment -22.530 0.080 
 (14.262) (0.149) 
Attention Check Scores 5.371 -0.056 
 (3.841) (0.040) 
High Convergence * Attention Check  2.976 0.055 
 (5.426) (0.057) 
Low Convergence * Attention Check  11.414* 0.001 
 (5.491) (0.057) 
Constant 11.340 0.264* 
 (9.839) (0.103) 
Observations 390 390 
R2 0.067 0.021 
Notes: * denotes p < .05, one-tailed. All models OLS regression. Attention check scores originally 





















Appendix E.4: Models Interacting Treatment and Media Trust 
 
Appendix Table E.4.1: Effect of Treatment Group and Media Trust on Support for 
Candidate 




 (1) (2) (3) 
High Convergence Treatment 0.068 8.532 0.077 
 (0.077) (6.665) (0.139) 
Low Convergence Treatment -0.027 -0.421 0.016 
 (0.077) (6.710) (0.140) 
Media Trust 0.033 2.203 0.038 
 (0.024) (2.053) (0.043) 
High Convergence * Media 
Trust 
-0.040 -3.666 -0.031 
 (0.034) (2.952) (0.062) 
Low Convergence * Media 
Trust 
-0.006 0.084 -0.012 
 (0.033) (2.897) (0.061) 
Constant 0.739* 60.040* 0.773* 
 (0.055) (4.732) (0.099) 
Observations 395 397 394 
R2 0.015 0.008 0.004 











Appendix Table E.4.2: Effect of Treatment Group and Media Trust on Correct 
Voting 
 Time on Full Info 
Page 
Opted to Revote 
 (1) (2) 
High Convergence Treatment -12.365 -0.011 
 (13.758) (0.141) 
Low Convergence Treatment -10.990 0.351* 
 (13.849) (0.142) 
Media Trust 0.384 0.055 
 (4.238) (0.043) 
High Convergence * Media Trust 7.044 0.002 
 (6.092) (0.062) 
Low Convergence * Media Trust 7.824 -0.125* 
 (5.980) (0.061) 
Constant 23.600* 0.008 
 (9.766) (0.100) 
Observations 397 395 
R2 0.023 0.026 
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